Michael Tye (tye)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bradley, Peter and Tye, Michael. 2001. “Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves.” The Journal of Philosophy 98(9): 469–487.
Byrne, Alex and Tye, Michael. 2006. “Qualia Ain’t in the Head.” Noûs 40(2): 241–255.
Cutter, Brian and Tye, Michael. 2011. “Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain.” in Philosophical Issues 21: The Epistemology of Perception, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 90–109. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tye, Michael. 1985. “Against the Token Identity Theory.” in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Brian P. McLaughlin, pp. 427–443. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tye, Michael. 1988. “Braving the Perils of an Uneventful World.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 31: 179–186.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Tye, Michael. 1998a. “Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge.” in Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald, pp. 285–320. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241406.001.0001.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Tye, Michael. 1998b. “Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?” The Philosophical Review 107(3): 349–380.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Tye, Michael. 1998c. “The Brown-McKinsey Charge of Inconsistency.” in Externalism and Self-Knowledge, edited by Peter J. Ludlow and Norah M. Martin. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Sainsbury, Richard Mark and Tye, Michael. 2011. “An Originalist Theory of Concepts.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 101–124.
Sainsbury, Richard Mark and Tye, Michael. 2012. Seven Puzzles of Thought. And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695317.001.0001.
Sainsbury, Richard Mark and Tye, Michael. 2015. “Counting Concepts: Reply to Paul Boghossian (2015).” in Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107478152.
Tye, Michael. 1975. “The Adverbial Theory: A Defence of Sellars Against Jackson.” Metaphilosophy 6(2): 136–143.
Tye, Michael. 1978. “The Puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56(3): 219–224.
Tye, Michael. 1981. “On an Objection to the Synonymy Principle of Property Identity.” Analysis 41: 22–26.
Tye, Michael. 1982a. “A Note on the Synonymy Principle of Property Identity.” Analysis 42: 52–55.
Tye, Michael. 1982b. “A Causal Analysis of Seeing.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42: 311–325.
Tye, Michael. 1983a. “Functionalism and Type Physicalism.” Philosophical Studies 44: 161–174.
Tye, Michael. 1983b. “On the Possibility of Disembodied Existence.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61(3): 275–282.
Tye, Michael. 1984a. “The Debate about Mental Imagery.” The Journal of Philosophy 81: 678–691.
Tye, Michael. 1984b. “The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience.” The Philosophical Review 93(2): 195–225.
Tye, Michael. 1986. “The Subjective Qualities of Experience.” Mind 95: 1–17.
Tye, Michael. 1988a. “Representation in Pictorialism and Connectionism.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26(suppl.): 163–183. Reprinted in Horgan and Tienson (1991, 309–330).
Tye, Michael. 1988b. “The Picture Theory of Images.” The Philosophical Review 97.
Tye, Michael. 1989a. The Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tye, Michael. 1989b. “Supervaluationism and the Law of Excluded Middle.” Analysis 49: 141–143.
Tye, Michael. 1990. “Vague Objects.” Mind 99: 535–557.
Tye, Michael. 1991. The Imagery Debate. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Tye, Michael. 1992. “Visual Qualia and Visual Content.” in The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, edited by Tim Crane, pp. 158–176. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in revised form as “Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited” in Chalmers (2002, 447–456).
Tye, Michael. 1993a. “Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum.” Noûs 27.
Tye, Michael. 1993b. “Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 891–896.
Tye, Michael. 1993c. “Blindsight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of Consciousness.” in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, edited by Christopher Hookway and Donald M. Peterson, pp. 19–40. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures n. 34. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tye, Michael. 1994a. “Why the Vague Need Not be Higher-Order Vague.” Mind 103(409): 43–45.
Tye, Michael. 1994b. “Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness.” in Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 189–206. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Keefe and Smith (1996, 281–293).
Tye, Michael. 1994c. “Do Pains Have Representational Content?” in Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, edited by Roberto Casati, Barry Smith, and Graham White, pp. 169–178. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 21. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Tye, Michael. 1994d. “Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19: Philosophical Naturalism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 122–142. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Tye, Michael. 1995a. Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/6712.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 1995b. “A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character.” in Philosophical Perspectives 9: AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 223–239. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co. Reprinted in Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere (1997, 329–340).
Tye, Michael. 1995c. “Vagueness, Welcome to the Quicksand.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 33(suppl.): 1–22.
Tye, Michael. 1995d. “What ‘What It is Like’ Is Like.” Analysis 56.
Tye, Michael. 1995e. “The Burning House.” in Conscious Experience, edited by Thomas Metzinger, pp. 81–91. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
Tye, Michael. 1996a. “Orgasms again.” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 51–54. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Tye, Michael. 1996b. “Fuzzy Realism and the Problem of the Many.” Philosophical Studies 81: 215–225.
Tye, Michael. 1996c. “The Function of Consciousness.” Noûs 30: 287–305.
Tye, Michael. 1996d. “Perceptual Experience is a Many-Layered Thing [on Lycan (1996)].” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 117–126. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Tye, Michael. 1997a. “The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It’s like to Be a Honeybee?” Philosophical Studies 88: 289–317. Partially reprinted as ch. 8 of Tye (2000a).
Tye, Michael. 1997b. “Qualia.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall1997/entries/qualia/.
Tye, Michael. 1997c. “On the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness.” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 247–253. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Tye, Michael. 1998a. “Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationalism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 459–477. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reworked into ch. 6 of Tye (2000a).
Tye, Michael. 1998b. “Externalism and Memory.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 72: 77–94.
Tye, Michael. 1999. “Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion.” Mind 108. Reprinted in Tye (2000a).
Tye, Michael. 2000a. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/2110.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2000b. “Vagueness and Reality.” Philosophical Topics 28(1): 195–210.
Tye, Michael. 2000c. “Review of Shoemaker (1996).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(2): 461–464.
Tye, Michael. 2003a. Consciousness and Persons. Unity and Identity. Representation and Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Tye, Michael. 2003b. “Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism?” in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Aleksandar Jokić and Quentin Smith, pp. 7–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2003c. “A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts.” in Minds and Persons, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 91–105. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tye, Michael. 2003d. “Consciousness, Color and Content.” Philosophical Studies 113(3): 233–235.
Tye, Michael. 2003e. “On the Virtue of Being Poised: Reply to Seager (2003).” Philosophical Studies 113(3): 275–280.
Tye, Michael. 2003f. “Phenomenal Character and Color: Reply to Maund (2003).” Philosophical Studies 113(3): 281–285.
Tye, Michael. 2003g. “The Panic Theory: Reply to Byrne (2003).” Philosophical Studies 113(3): 287–290.
Tye, Michael. 2003h. “Qualia.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/qualia/.
Tye, Michael. 2003i. “Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience.” in Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, edited by Brie Gertler, pp. 31–44. Ashgate Epistemology and Mind Series. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315245997.
Tye, Michael. 2005a. “Another Look at Representationalism about Pain.” in Pain. New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede, pp. 99–119. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Tye, Michael. 2005b. “In Defense of Representationalism: Reply to Commentaries [Aydede (2005), Block (2005), Maund (2005), and Noordhof (2005)].” in Pain. New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede, pp. 163–176. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Tye, Michael. 2006a. “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem.” The Philosophical Review 115(2): 139–168.
Tye, Michael. 2006b. “Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain.” in Perceptual Experience, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 504–530. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2006c. “The Thesis of Nonconceptual Content.” in The Structure of Nonconceptual Content, edited by Christine van Geen and Frédérique de Vignemont, pp. 7–30. European Review of Philosophy n. 6. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Tye, Michael. 2007a. “Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content.” in Philosophical Perspectives 21: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 598–613. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Tye, Michael. 2007b. “New Troubles for the Qualia Freak.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, pp. 303–318. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. second edition: McLaughlin and Cohen (2023).
Tye, Michael. 2007c. “True Blue Redux.” Analysis 67(1): 92–93.
Tye, Michael. 2007d. “Philosophical Problems of Consciousness.” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, edited by Max Velmans and Susan Schneider, pp. 23–36. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Tye, Michael. 2007e. “The Problem of Common Sensibles .” Erkenntnis 66(1–2): 287–303, doi:10.1007/s10670-006-9035-9.
Tye, Michael. 2007f. “Qualia.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/qualia/.
Tye, Michael. 2008. “The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 63(243): 25–50.
Tye, Michael. 2009a. Consciousness Revisited. Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2009b. “A New Look at the Speckled Hen.” Analysis 69(2): 258–263, doi:10.1093/analys/anp011.
Tye, Michael. 2009c. “Representationalist Theories of Consciousness.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 253–267. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2009d. “The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience.” The Philosophical Quarterly 59(236): 541–562. Reprinted in Hawley and Macpherson (2011, 172–193).
Tye, Michael. 2010a. “Up Close with the Speckled Hen.” Analysis 70(2): 283–286.
Tye, Michael. 2010b. “Attention, Seeing, and Change Blindness.” in Philosophical Issues 20: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 410–437. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Tye, Michael. 2011. “Knowing What It Is Like.” in Knowing How. Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, edited by John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, pp. 300–313. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2012a. “Cohen on Color Relationism [on Cohen (2009)].” Analytic Philosophy 53(3): 297–305, doi:10.1111/j.2153-960x.2012.00569.x.
Tye, Michael. 2012b. “Précis of Tye (2009a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84(1): 187–189.
Tye, Michael. 2012c. “Reply to Crane (2012), Jackson (2012) and McLaughlin (2012).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84(1): 215–232.
Tye, Michael. 2013. “Qualia.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/qualia/.
Tye, Michael. 2014a. “What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience?” in Does Perception Have Content?, edited by Berit Brogaard, pp. 291–309. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2014b. “Does Conscious Seeing Have A Finer Grain Than Attention? [on Block (2012)].” Thought 3(2): 154–158.
Tye, Michael. 2014c. “Speaks on Strong Property Representationalism.” Philosophical Studies 170(1): 85–86.
Tye, Michael. 2014d. “Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism.” Philosophical Studies 170(1): 39–57.
Tye, Michael. 2015a. “The Puzzle of Transparency.” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, pp. 439–446. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Reprinted in Rosen et al. (2018, 392–399).
Tye, Michael. 2015b. “The Nature of Pain and the Appearance/Reality Distinction.” in Phenomenal Qualities. Sense, Perception, and Consciousness, edited by Paul Coates and Sam Coleman, pp. 298–321. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2015c. “Phenomenal Externalism, Lolita, and the Planet Xenon.” in Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World. Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim, edited by Terence E. Horgan, Marcelo Sabatés, and David Sosa, pp. 190–208. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139939539.
Tye, Michael. 2015d. “Qualia.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/qualia/.
Tye, Michael. 2016. “Do Fish Have Feelings?” in, pp. 169–175.
Tye, Michael. 2017a. Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs. Are Animals Conscious? Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190278014.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2017b. “Qualia.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/qualia/.
Tye, Michael. 2019a. “Homunculi Heads and Silicon Chips: The Importance of History to Phenomenology.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 545–570. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2019b. “How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience.” in The Philosophy of Perception.  Proceedings of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau and Friedrich Stadler, pp. 77–94. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 26. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110657920.
Tye, Michael. 2021a. Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness. Through the Looking Glass. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198867234.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2021b. “Qualia.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/qualia/.

Further References

Aydede, Murat. 2005. “The Main Difficulty with Pain [on Tye (2005a)].” in Pain. New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede, pp. 123–136. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Block, Ned. 2005. “Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism [on Tye (2005a)].” in Pain. New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede, pp. 137–142. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Reprinted in Block (2007, 611–616).
Block, Ned. 2007. Consciousness, Function, and Representation. Collected Papers, Volume 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/2111.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2012. “The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention.” Thought 1(3): 170–184.
Block, Ned, Flanagan, Owen, Jr. and Güzeldere, Güven, eds. 1997. The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 2015. “Further Thoughts on the Transparency of Mental Content.” in Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107478152.
Byrne, Alex. 2003. “Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content [on Tye (2000a)].” Philosophical Studies 113(3): 261–274.
Chalmers, David J., ed. 2002. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, Jonathan. 2009. The Red and the Real. An Essay on Color Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.001.0001.
Crane, Tim. 2012. “What is the Problem of Non-Existence?” Philosophia 40(3): 417–434.
Hawley, Katherine and Macpherson, Fiona. 2011. The Admissible Contents of Experience. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444343915.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L., eds. 1991. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Studies in Cognitive Systems n. 9. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Jackson, Frank. 2012. “Michael Tye on Perceptual Content [on Tye (2009a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84(1): 199–205.
Keefe, Rosanna and Smith, Peter, eds. 1996. Vagueness: A Reader. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7064.001.0001.
Lycan, William G. 1996. “Layered Perceptual Representation.” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 81–100. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Maund, J. Barry. 2003. “Tye: Consciousness, COlor and Content [on Tye (2000a)].” Philosophical Studies 113(3): 249–260.
Maund, J. Barry. 2005. “Michael Tye on Pain and Representational Content [on Tye (2005a)].” in Pain. New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede, pp. 143–150. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2012. “Phenomenal Concepts and the Defense of Materialism [on Tye (2009a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84(1): 206–214.
Noordhof, Paul. 2005. “In a State of Pain [on Tye (2005a)].” in Pain. New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede, pp. 151–162. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Rosen, Gideon, Byrne, Alex, Cohen, Joshua and Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, eds. 2018. The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Seager, William E. 2003. “Tye on Consciousness: Time to Panic? [on Tye (2000a)].” Philosophical Studies 113(3): 237–247.
Shoemaker, Sydney S. 1996. The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624674.