Heather Logue (logue-h)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather. 2008. “Either/Or.” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 57–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather, eds. 2009a. Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather. 2009b. “Introduction.” in Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, edited by Alex Byrne and Heather Logue, pp. vii–xxix. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.001.0001.
Logue, Heather. 2010. “Getting Acquainted with Naı̈ve Realism: Critical Notice of Fish (2009).” Philosophical Books 51(1): 22–38.
Logue, Heather. 2011. “The Skeptic and the Naı̈ve Realist.” in Philosophical Issues 21: The Epistemology of Perception, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 268–288. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Logue, Heather. 2012a. “What should the Naı̈ve Realist say about Total Hallucinations?” in Philosophical Perspectives 26: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 173–199. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Logue, Heather. 2012b. “Why Naive Realism?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112(2): 211–237.
Logue, Heather. 2013. “Visual Experience of Natural Kind Properties: Is There Any Fact of the Matter?” Philosophical Studies 162(1): 1–12.
Logue, Heather. 2014a. “Experiential Content and Naı̈ve Realism: A Reconciliation.” in Does Perception Have Content?, edited by Berit Brogaard, pp. 220–241. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001.
Logue, Heather. 2014b. “But Where Is a Hallucinator’s Perceptual Justification? [on Hellie (2014)].” in Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, edited by Richard O. Brown, pp. 155–162. Studies in Brain and Mind n. 6. Berlin: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1.
Logue, Heather. 2015. “Disjunctivism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen, pp. 198–216. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001.
Logue, Heather. 2016a. “Metaphysics of Color 2: Non-Physicalist Theories of Color.” Philosophy Compass 11(4): 220–231.
Logue, Heather. 2016b. “Metaphysics of Color 1: Physicalist Theories of Color.” Philosophy Compass 11(4): 211–219.
Logue, Heather. 2017a. “Perception First?” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 182–199. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
Logue, Heather. 2017b. “Are Perceptual Experiences Just Representations?” in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, edited by Bence Nanay, pp. 43–56. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Logue, Heather. 2022. “Gender Fictionalism.” Ergo 8(28): 125–162, doi:10.3998/ergo.2229.
Logue, Heather and Richardson, Louise, eds. 2021. Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198853534.001.0001.

Further References

Fish, William. 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.001.0001.
Hellie, Benj. 2014. “It’s Still There!” in Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, edited by Richard O. Brown, pp. 127–136. Studies in Brain and Mind n. 6. Berlin: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1.