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Karen Neander (neander)

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Bibliography

    Neander, Karen. 1991. “Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defense.” Philosophy of Science 58: 168–184.
    Neander, Karen. 1995. “Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning.” Philosophical Studies 79: 109–141.
    Neander, Karen. 1996a. “Swampman Meets Swampcow.” Mind and Language 11: 118–129.
    Neander, Karen. 1996b. “Dretske’s Innate Modesty.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(2): 258–274.
    Neander, Karen. 1997. “The Function of Cognition: Godfrey-Smith’s Environmental Complexity Thesis [on Godfrey-Smith (1996)].” Biology and Philosophy 12(4): 567–580.
    Neander, Karen. 1998. “The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness.” in Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 411–434. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Neander, Karen. 2002. “Types of Traits: The Importance of Functional Homologues.” in Functions. New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, edited by André Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman, pp. 390–415. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Neander, Karen. 2004. “Teleological Theories of Mental Content.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/content-teleological/.
    Neander, Karen. 2006a. “Naturalistic Theories of Reference.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley, pp. 374–391. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470757031.
    Neander, Karen. 2006b. “Content for Cognitive Science.” in Teleosemantics. New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham F. Macdonald and David Papineau, pp. 167–194. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Neander, Karen. 2007. “Biological Approaches to Mental Representation.” in Philosophy of Biology, edited by Mohan Matthen and Christopher Stephens, pp. 549–566. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science n. 3. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
    Neander, Karen. 2012. “Teleological Theories of Mental Content.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/content-teleological/.
    Neander, Karen. 2013. “Toward an Informational Teleosemantics.” in Millikan and Her Critics, edited by Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury, and Kenneth Williford, pp. 21–36. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118328118.
    Neander, Karen. 2016a. “Peacocke on Primitive Self-Representation.” Analysis 76(3): 324–334.
    Neander, Karen. 2016b. “The Methodological Argument for Informational Teleosemantics.” in How Biology Shapes Philosophy. New Foundations for Naturalism, edited by David Livingstone Smith, pp. 121–140. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781107295490.
    Neander, Karen. 2016c. “Kitcher’s Two Design Stances.” in The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher, edited by Mark B. Couch and Jessica Pfeifer, pp. 45–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199381357.001.0001.
    Neander, Karen. 2017a. A Mark of the Mental. In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262036146.001.0001.
    Neander, Karen. 2017b. “Review of Fodor and Pylyshyn (2015).” The Philosophical Review 126(3): 410–417.
    Neander, Karen. 2017c. “Functional Analysis and the Species Design.” Synthese 194(4): 1147–1168.
    Neander, Karen. 2017d. “Does Biology Need Teleology?” in The Routledge Handbook of Evolution and Philosophy, edited by Richard Joyce, pp. 64–78. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Neander, Karen and Ravenscroft, Ian, eds. 1993. Prospects for Intentionality. Working Papers in Philosophy n. 3. Canberra: RSSS Australasian National University.
    Neander, Karen and Rosenberg, Alexander. 2012. “Solving the Circularity Problem for Functions: A Response to Nanay.” The Journal of Philosophy 109(10): 613–622.
    Neander, Karen and Schulte, Peter. 2020. “Teleological Theories of Mental Content.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/content-teleological/.
    Schulte, Peter and Neander, Karen. 2022. “Teleological Theories of Mental Content.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/content-teleological/.

Further References

    Fodor, Jerry A. and Pylyshyn, Zenon W. 2015. Minds without Meanings. An Essay on the Content of Concepts. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027908.001.0001.
    Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 1996. Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.