Jerry A. Fodor (fodor-ja)
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Bibliography
Block, Ned and Fodor, Jerry A. 1972. “What Psychological States are Not.” The Philosophical Review 81: 159–181. Reprinted in Block (1980, 237–250), in Fodor, J. A. (1981a, 79–99) and in Block (2007, 45–61).
Chihara, Charles S. and Fodor, Jerry A. 1965. “Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein.” American Philosophical Quarterly 2(4): 281–295. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1981a, 35–62) and in Rosenthal (1991).
Chomsky, Noam and Fodor, Jerry A. 1980. “The Inductivist Fallacy.” in Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky, edited by Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Translation of Piattelli-Palmarini (1979).
Fodor, Janet Dean, Fodor, Jerry A. and Garrett, Merrill F. 1975. “The Psychological Unreality of Semantic Representations.” Linguistic Inquiry 6: 515–531.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1965a. “Could Meaning Be an R\(_m\)?” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 4(2): 73–81. Reprinted in Steinberg and Jacobovits (1971), doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(65)80087-1.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1965b. “Explanations in Psychology.” in Philosophy in America, edited by Max Black, pp. 161–179. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1968a. Psychological Explanation. New York: Random House.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1968b. “The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation.” The Journal of Philosophy 65: 627–640. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1981a, 63–78).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1970. “Troubles about Actions.” Synthese 21(3–4): 298–319. Reprinted in Davidson and Harman (1972, 48–69).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1972. L’explication en psychologie. Paris: Seghers.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1974. “Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Synthese 28: 97–115. Reprinted in Block (1980, 120–133) and in Fodor, J. A. (1981a, 127–145).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1975. The Language of Thought. New York: Thomas A. Crowell Co.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1978a. “Propositional Attitudes.” The Monist 61(4): 501–523. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1981a, 177–203).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1978b. “Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother.” Cognition 6: 229–247. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1981a, 204–224).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1978c. “Computation and Reduction.” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume IX: Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, edited by C. Wade Savage, pp. 229–260. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1981a, 146–175).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1980a. “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 63–73. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1981a, 225–255), in Haugeland (1981, 307–338) and Boyd, Gasper and Trout (1991).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1980b. “Searle on What Only Brains Can Do.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1980c. “Replies to Commentators on Fodor, J. A. (1980a).” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 99–109.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1980d. “Reply to Putnam (1980).” in Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky, edited by Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Translation of Piattelli-Palmarini (1979).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1980e. “On the Impossibility of Acquiring ‘More Powerful’ Structures.” in Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky, edited by Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Translation of Piattelli-Palmarini (1979).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1980f. “Les sciences particulières (l’absence d’unité de la science: une hypothèse de travail).” in De Vienne à Cambridge. L’héritage du positivisme logique, pp. 417–440. Paris: Gallimard. Special Sciences or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis, 1974, trad. P. Jacob.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1981a. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science n. 13. Brighton: Harvester Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1981b. “Introduction: Something on the State of the Art.” in Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, pp. 1–33. Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science n. 13. Brighton: Harvester Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1981c. “Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes.” in Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, pp. 100–125. Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science n. 13. Brighton: Harvester Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1981d. “Introduction: Some Notes on What Linguistics is About.” in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume II, edited by Ned Block, pp. 97–107. Language and Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1981e. “The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy.” in Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, pp. 257–315. Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science n. 13. Brighton: Harvester Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1981f. “The Mind-Body Problem.” Scientific American 244: 114–125. Reprinted in Warner and Szubka (1994, 24–40).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1982. “Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23(1): 98–119.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1983a. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1983b. “A Reply to Loar (1983).” in PSA 1982: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposia and Invited Papers, edited by Peter D. Asquith and Thomas Nickles, pp. 644–653. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1984a. “Observation Reconsidered.” Philosophy of Science 51(1): 23–43. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1990a, 251–252), doi:10.1086/289162.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1984b. “Semantics, Wisconsin Style.” Synthese 59(3): 231–250. Reprinted in Silvers (1989, 1–18) and in Fodor, J. A. (1990a, 31–50).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1985a. “Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum.” Mind 94: 76–100. Reprinted in Greenwood (1991, 22–50) and in Fodor, J. A. (1990a, 3–30).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1985b. “Précis of Fodor, J. A. (1983a).” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8: 1–42. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1990a, 195–206).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1986a. “Individualism and Supervenience.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 60: 235–262.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1986b. “Information and Association.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27(3): 307–323. Reprinted in Brand and Harnish (1986, 80–100).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1986c. “Banish disContent.” in Language, Mind and Logic, edited by Jeremy Butterfield, pp. 1–24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Lycan (1990).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1986d. “The Modularity of Mind.” in Meaning and Cognitive Structure: Issues in the Computational Theory of Mind, edited by Zenon W. Pylyshyn and William Demopoulos. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Co.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1986e. La modularité de l’esprit. Essai sur la psychologie des facultés. Propositions. Paris: Éditions de Minuit. Traduction de Fodor, J. A. (1983a) par Abel Gerschenfeld.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1987a. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1987b. “A Situated Grandmother.” Mind and Language 2.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1987c. “Why Paramecia Don’t Have Mental Representations.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 1–23. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1987d. “Modules, Frames, Fridgeons, Sleeping Dogs, and the Music of the Spheres.” in The Robot’s Dilemma: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence, edited by Zenon W. Pylyshyn, pp. 139–149. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Co. Simultaneously published in Garfield (1987, 25–36).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1988. “A Reply to Churchland, P. M. (1988).” Philosophy of Science 55(2): 188–198. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1990a, 253–264).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1989a. “Making Mind Matter More.” Philosophical Topics 17(1): 59–80. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1990a, 137–160).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1989b. “Why should the Mind Be Modular?” in Reflections on Chomsky, edited by Alexander George, pp. 1–22. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1990a, 207–230).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1989c. “Review of Schiffer (1987).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49: 409–423. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1990a, 177–193).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1989d. “Why There Still Has to Be a Language of Thought.” in Computers, Brains and Minds. Essays in Cognitive Science, edited by Peter Slezák and W. R. Albury, pp. 23–46. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 7. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1990a. A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/6765.001.0001.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1990b. “A Theory of Content, I: The Problem.” in A Theory of Content and Other Essays, pp. 51–87. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/6765.001.0001.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1990c. “A Theory of Content, II: The Theory.” in A Theory of Content and Other Essays, pp. 89–136. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/6765.001.0001.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1990d. “Psychosemantics, or Where Truth Conditions Come From.” in Mind and Cognition, edited by William G. Lycan, pp. 312–338. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1990e. “Information and Representation.” in Information, Language and Cognition, edited by Philip P. Hanson. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science n. 1. Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1990f. “Reply to Dretske (1990).” in Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 28–35. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1990g. “Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs.” in Meaning and Method – Essays in Honour of Hilary Putnam, edited by George Boolos, pp. 63–78. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1990a, 161–176).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1991a. “The Dogma that Didn’t Bark.” Mind 100: 201–220.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1991b. “You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation.” Mind 100: 19–34.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1991c. “A Modal Argument for Narrow Content [on Burge (1986)].” The Journal of Philosophy 88: 5–26. Reprinted in Macdonald and Macdonald (1995b, 206–225).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1991d. “Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room.” in The Nature of Mind, edited by David M. Rosenthal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1991e. “Replies.” in Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Georges Rey, pp. 255–320. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1991f. “Too Hard for Our Kind of Mind? [review of McGinn (1991)].” The London Review of Books, June, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v13/n12/jerry-fodor/too-hard-for-our-kind-of-mind.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1992. “Introduction au problème de la représentation mentale.” Les Études Philosophiques 46(3): 301–322.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1993a. “The Persistence of the Attitudes.” in Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Scott M. Christensen and Dale R. Turner, pp. 221–246. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1993b. “Unpacking a Dog [review of Peacocke (1992)].” The London Review of Books, October. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 27–34), https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v15/n19/jerry-fodor/unpacking-a-dog.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1994. The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1995a. “A Theory of the Child’s Theory of Mind.” in Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, edited by Martin Kinsey Davies and Tony Stone, pp. 109–122. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1995b. “Concepts: A Potboiler.” Cognition 50: 133–151. Reprinted in Villanueva (1995, 1–24).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1995c. “Encounters with Trees [review of McDowell (1994)].” The London Review of Books, April. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 3–8), https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v17/n08/jerry-fodor/encounters-with-trees.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1995d. “Review of Churchland, P. M. (1995).” The Times Literary Supplement, August. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 83–89).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1996a. “Deconstructing Dennett’s Darwin.” Mind and Language 11(3): 246–262. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 170–187).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1996b. “Peacocking [review of Dawkins (1996)].” The London Review of Books, April. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 163–169), https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v18/n08/jerry-fodor/peacocking.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1996c. “It’s the Thought that Counts [review of Mithen (1996)].” The London Review of Books, November. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 151–160), https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v18/n23/jerry-fodor/it-s-the-thought-that-counts.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1997a. “Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky’s Solution Still Doesn’t Work.” Cognition 62: 109–119. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 113–125).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1997b. “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years.” in Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 149–163. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 10–24).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1997c. “Review of Elman et al. (1998).” The Times Literary Supplement 20(12). Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 142–151).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1997d. “Cat’s Whiskers [review of Moore (1997)].” The London Review of Books, October. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 75–80), https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v19/n21/jerry-fodor/cat-s-whiskers.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998a. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198236360.001.0001.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998b. In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998c. “There are no Recognitional Concepts; not even RED.” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 1–14. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 34–47).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998d. “There are no Recognitional Concepts – not even RED, Part 2: The Plot Thickens.” in In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind, pp. 48–62. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998e. “Do we Think in Mentalese? Remarks on Some Arguments of Peter Carruthers.” in In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind, pp. 63–74. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998f. “There and Back Again: A Review of Annette Karmiloff-Smith’s Beyond Modularity.” in In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind, pp. 125–142. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998g. “Is Science Biologically Possible? Some Comments on Some Arguments of Patricia Churchland and of Alvin Plantinga.” in In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind, pp. 189–202. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998h. “The Trouble with Psychological Darwinism [review of Pinker (1997) and Plotkin (1997)].” The London Review of Books, January. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 203–214), https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v20/n02/jerry-fodor/the-trouble-with-psychological-darwinism.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2000b. “A Science of Tuesdays [review of Putnam (1999)].” The London Review of Books, July, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v22/n14/jerry-fodor/a-science-of-tuesdays.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2001. “Language, Thought and Compositionality.” Mind and Language 16: 1–15. Reprinted in O’Hear (2001, 227–242).
Fodor, Jerry A. 2002a. “Is Science Biologically Possible?” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, edited by James K. Beilby, pp. 30–42. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2002b. “Mouse Thoughts [review of Davidson (2001)].” The London Review of Books, March, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v24/n05/jerry-fodor/mouse-thoughts.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2003. Hume Variations. Lines of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287338.001.0001.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2004a. “Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the 20th Century.” Mind and Language 19(1): 29–47.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2004b. “You Can’t Argue with a Novel [review of Lloyd (2003)].” The London Review of Books, March, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v26/n05/jerry-fodor/you-can-t-argue-with-a-novel.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2007a. “The Revenge of the Given.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, pp. 105–116. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. second edition: McLaughlin and Cohen (2023).
Fodor, Jerry A. 2007b. “Headaches Have Themselves [review of ].” The London Review of Books, May. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 203–214), https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v29/n10/jerry-fodor/headaches-have-themselves.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2008a. LOT 2. The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.001.0001.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2008b. “Comment on Cosmides and Tooby (2008a, 2008b).” in Moral Psychology, Volume 1. The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 137–142. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2009a. “Enough with the Norms Already!” in Reduction. Between the Mind and the Brain, edited by Alexander Hieke and Hannes Leitgeb, pp. 1–8. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 12. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2009b. “Introduction: So What’s So Good about Pylyshyn?” in Computation, Cognition, and Pylyshyn, edited by Don Dedrick and Lana Trick, pp. ix–. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2012. “Déjà vu All Over Again: How Danto’s Aesthetics Recapitulates the Philosophy of Mind.” in Danto and His Critics, edited by Mark Rollins, 2nd ed., pp. 55–68. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118253045.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2013. “C’est mon métier [review of Putnam (2012)].” The London Review of Books, January, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v35/n02/jerry-fodor/c-est-mon-metier.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2015. “Burge on Perception.” in The Conceptual Mind. New Direction in the Study of Concepts, edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, pp. 203–222. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A., Garrett, Merrill F., Walker, Elbert A. and Parkes, C. H. 1980. “Against Definitions.” Cognition 8(3): 263–367.
Fodor, Jerry A. and Katz, Jerrold J., eds. 1964. The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Fodor, Jerry A. and Katz, Jerrold J. 1974. “Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft.” in Linguistik und Philosophie, edited by Günther Grewendorf and Georg Meggle. Wiesbaden: Beltz Athenäum.
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1991. “Why Meaning (Probably) Isn’t Conceptual Role.” Mind and Language 6: 328–343. Reprinted in Villanueva (1993, 15–32) and in Fodor, J. A. and LePore (2002a, 9–26).
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1993a. “Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative?” in Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind, edited by Bo Dahlbom, pp. 70–82. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1993b. “Replies [to Discussants of Fodor, J. A. and LePore (1992)].” Grazer Philosophische Studien 46: 303–322. “Holism: A Consumer Update,” ed. by Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore.
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1993c. “Is Radical Interpretation Possible?” in Reflecting Davidson, edited by Ralf Stoecker, pp. 57–76. Berlin: de Gruyter. Reprinted in Tomberlin (1994, 101–119).
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1994a. “Meaning Holism and the Problem of Extensionality.” in Language, Mind and Epistemology. On Donald Davidson’s Philosophy, edited by Gerhard Preyer, Frank Siebelt, and Alexander Ulfig, pp. 3–20. Synthese Library n. 241. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1994b. “What is the Connection Principle?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 837–845.
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1996a. “What Cannot Be Evaluated Cannot Be Evaluated, and It Cannot Be Superevaluated Either.” The Journal of Philosophy 93(10): 516–535. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. and LePore (2002a, 63–87).
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1996b. “Paul Churchland and State Space Semantics.” in The Churchlands and their Critics, edited by Robert N. McCauley, pp. 145–158. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. and LePore (2002a, 155–173).
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1996c. “Reply to Churchland, P. S. and Churchland (1996).” in The Churchlands and their Critics, edited by Robert N. McCauley, pp. 159–162. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. and LePore (2002a, 155–173).
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1996d. “The Red Herring and the Pet Fish: Why Concepts Still Can’t Be Prototypes.” Cognition 58: 253–270. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. and LePore (2002a, 27–42).
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1996e. “All at Sea in Semantic Space: Churchland on Meaning Similarity.” The Journal of Philosophy 93(8): 381–403. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. and LePore (2002a, 174–199), doi:10.2307/2564628.
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1998. “The Emptiness of the Lexicon: Reflections on James Pustejovsky’s The Generative Lexicon.” Linguistic Inquiry 29(2): 269–288. Reprinted in Bouillon and Busa (2001) and in Fodor, J. A. and LePore (2002a, 89–119).
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1999. “Impossible Words?” Linguistic Inquiry 30(3): 445–453. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. and LePore (2002a, 120–133).
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 2001a. “Brandom’s Burdens: Compositionality and Inferentialism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(2): 465–481. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. and LePore (2002a, 135–154).
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 2001b. “Why Compositionality Won’t Go Away: Reflections on Horwich’s ‘Deflationary’ Theory.” Ratio 14(4): 350–368. Reprinted in Fodor, J. A. and LePore (2002a, 43–62).
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 2002a. The Compositionality Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199252152.001.0001.
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 2002b. “Geographical Introduction.” in The Compositionality Papers, pp. 1–8. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199252152.001.0001.
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 2006. “Analyticity Again.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley, pp. 114–130. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470757031.
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 2007. “Brandom Beleaguered [on Brandom (2007)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(3): 677–691.
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 2010b. “Brandom Beleaguered.” in Reading Brandom. On Making It Explicit, edited by Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy Wanderer, pp. 181–193. London: Routledge.
Fodor, Jerry A. and McLaughlin, Brian P. 1990. “Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky’s Solution Doesn’t Work [on Smolensky (1988)].” Cognition 35: 183–204. Reprinted in Horgan and Tienson (1991, 331–355), in Macdonald and Macdonald (1995a, 199–222) and in Fodor, J. A. (1998b, 90–111).
Fodor, Jerry A. and Pylyshyn, Zenon W. 1981. “How Direct is Visual Perception? Some Reflections on Gibson’s ‘Ecological Approach’ .” Cognition 9: 139–196.
Fodor, Jerry A. and Pylyshyn, Zenon W. 1988. “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis.” Cognition 28. Reprinted in Macdonald and Macdonald (1995a, 90–163).
Fodor, Jerry A. and Pylyshyn, Zenon W. 2003. “Connexionisme et architecture cognitive.” in Philosophie de l’esprit, vol. 2: Problèmes et perspectives, edited by Denis Fisette and Pierre Poirier, pp. 269–328. Textes clés. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin. Traduction de Fodor, J. A. and Pylyshyn (1988) par Geneviève Choquette.
Fodor, Jerry A. and Pylyshyn, Zenon W. 2015. Minds without Meanings. An Essay on the Content of Concepts. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027908.001.0001.
Further References
Block, Ned, ed. 1980. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I. Language and Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Block, Ned. 2007. Consciousness, Function, and Representation. Collected Papers, Volume 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/2111.001.0001.
Bouillon, Pierrette and Busa, Federica, eds. 2001. The Language of Word Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boyd, Richard N., Gasper, Philip and Trout, J. D., eds. 1991. The Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
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