Dana Kay Nelkin (nelkin-dk)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Brink, David Owen and Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2013. “Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume I, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 284–314. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.001.0001.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2000. “Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom.” The Journal of Philosophy 97(10): 564–563.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2004a. “The Sense of Freedom.” in Freedom and Determinism, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 105–134. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2004b. “Irrelevant Alternatives and Frankfurt Counterfactuals.” Philosophical Studies 121(1): 1–25.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2004c. “Deliberative Alternatives.” Philosophical Topics 32(1–2): 215–240.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2004d. “Moral Luck.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/moral-luck/.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2005. “Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 181–206. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2007a. “Do we have a Coherent Set of Intuitions about Moral Responsibility?” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31: Philosophy and the Empirical, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 243–259. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2007b. “Good Luck to Libertarians.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10(2): 173–184.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2008a. “Responsibility and Rational Abilities: Defending An Asymmetrical View.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89: 497–515.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2008b. “Moral Luck.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2008/entries/moral-luck/.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2009. “Responsibility, Rational Abilities, and Two Kinds of Fairness Arguments.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 12(2): 151–165.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2011. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.001.0001.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2013a. “Replies to Critics [McKenna (2013) and Speak (2013)].” Philosophical Studies 163(1): 123–131.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2013b. “Desert, Fairness, and Resentment.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 16(2): 117–132.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2013c. “Moral Luck.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/moral-luck/.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2014. “Moral Responsibility, Conversation, and Desert: Comments on Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 171(1): 63–72.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2015. “Friendship, Freedom, and Special Obligations.” in Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, edited by Andrei A. Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell, pp. 226–250. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2017. “Fine Cuts of Moral Agency: Dissociable Deficits in Psychopathy and Autism.” in Current Controversies in Bioethics, edited by S. Matthew Liao and Collin O’Neil, pp. 47–65. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2019a. “Moral Luck.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/moral-luck/.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2019b. “Thinking outside the (Traditional) Boxes of Moral Luck.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43: Moral Luck, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Andrew C. Khoury, pp. 7–23. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1111/misp.12101.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2020. “Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120(2): 203–235.
Nelkin, Dana Kay and Pereboom, Derk, eds. 2022. The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190679309.001.0001.
Nelkin, Dana Kay and Rickless, Samuel C. 2015. “So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short.” Noûs 49(2): 376–409.
Nelkin, Dana Kay and Rickless, Samuel C. 2017. The Ethics and Law of Omissions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190683450.001.0001.
Warmke, Brandon, Nelkin, Dana Kay and McKenna, Michael, eds. 2021. Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190602147.001.0001.

Further References

McKenna, Michael. 2013. “Source Compatibilism and That Pesky Ability to Do Otherwise: Comments on Dana Nelkin’s Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 163(1): 105–116.
Speak, Daniel. 2013. “On the Possibility of Making Even More Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 163(1): 117–122.