Derk Pereboom (pereboom-de)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Alter, Torin and Pereboom, Derk. 2019. “Russellian Monism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/russellian-monism/.
Alter, Torin and Pereboom, Derk. 2023. “Russellian Monism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/russellian-monism/.
Caruso, Gregg D. and Pereboom, Derk. 2021. “A Non-Punitive Alternative to Retributive Punishment.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment, edited by Farah Focquaert, Elizabeth Shaw, and Bruce N. Waller, pp. 355–365. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Chignell, Andrew and Pereboom, Derk. 2015. “Natural Theology and Natural Religion.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/natural-theology/.
Chignell, Andrew and Pereboom, Derk. 2020. “Natural Theology and Natural Religion.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/natural-theology/.
McLear, Colin and Pereboom, Derk. 2023. “Kant on Transcendental Freedom, Priority Monism, and the Structure of Intuition.” in The Idea of Freedom: New Essays on the Kantian Theory of Freedom, edited by Dai Heide and Evan C. Tiffany, pp. 39–63. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198860563.001.0001.
Nelkin, Dana Kay and Pereboom, Derk, eds. 2022. The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190679309.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 1988. Logique et logistique. Méthodes. Genève: Institut Interuniversitaire (INU press).
Pereboom, Derk. 1991a. “Why a Scientific Realist Cannot Be a Functionalist.” Synthese 88: 341–358.
Pereboom, Derk. 1991b. “Is Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy Inconsistent?” History of Philosophy Quarterly 8(4): 357–372.
Pereboom, Derk. 1993. “Stoı̈c Psychotherapy in Descartes and Spinoza.” Faith and Philosophy 11(4): 592–625.
Pereboom, Derk. 1994. “Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limits of Introspection.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 315–329.
Pereboom, Derk. 1995a. “Conceptual Structure and the Individuation of Content.” in Philosophical Perspectives 9: AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 401–428. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Pereboom, Derk. 1995b. “Self-Understanding in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.” Synthese 103: 1–42.
Pereboom, Derk, ed. 1999. The Rationalists: Critical Essays on Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Critical Essays on the Classics. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Pereboom, Derk. 2000. “Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories.” in Philosophical Perspectives 14: Action and Freedom, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 119–137. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Pereboom, Derk. 2001a. Living without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498824.
Pereboom, Derk. 2001b. “Assessing Kant’s Master Argument.” Kantian Review 5: 90–102.
Pereboom, Derk. 2002a. “Robust Nonreductive Materialism.” The Journal of Philosophy 99(10): 499–531, doi:10.2307/3655563.
Pereboom, Derk. 2002b. “On Baker’s Persons and Bodies [on Baker (2000)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(3): 615–622.
Pereboom, Derk. 2002c. “Living without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, pp. 477–488. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Kane (2011), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2003. “Meaning in Life without Free Will.” Philosophic Exchange 33: 19–34.
Pereboom, Derk. 2004. “Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent?” Philosophical Topics 32(1–2): 275–286.
Pereboom, Derk. 2005a. “The Problem of Evil.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, edited by William E. Mann, pp. 148–171. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470756638.
Pereboom, Derk. 2005b. “Defending Hard Incompatibilism.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 228–247. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Pereboom, Derk. 2005c. “Kant’s Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions.” in A Companion to Kant, edited by Graham H. Bird, pp. 154–168. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470996287.
Pereboom, Derk. 2005d. “Free Will, Evil, and Divine Providence.” in God and the Ethics of Belief. New Essays in Philosophy of Religion, edited by Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell, pp. 77–98. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pereboom, Derk. 2006. “Kant on Transcendental Freedom.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(3): 537–567.
Pereboom, Derk. 2007. “On Alfred Mele’s Free Will and Luck.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10(2): 163–172.
Pereboom, Derk. 2008. “A Hard-line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument [reply to McKenna (2008)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(1): 160–170.
Pereboom, Derk. 2009a. “Consciousness and Introspective Inaccuracy.” in Metaphysics and the Good. Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams, edited by Samuel Newlands and Larry M. Jorgensen, pp. 156–187. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542680.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2009b. “Hard Incompatibilism and Its Rivals.” Philosophical Studies 144(1): 21–33.
Pereboom, Derk. 2009c. “Further Thoughts about a Frankfurt-Style Argument.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 12(2): 109–118.
Pereboom, Derk. 2009d. “Kant’s Transcendental Arguments.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/kant-transcendental/.
Pereboom, Derk. 2010a. “Structuralism, Anti-Structuralism and Objectivity.” Philosophic Exchange 40: 39–55.
Pereboom, Derk. 2010b. “Early Modern Philosophical Theology on the Continent.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, edited by R. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn, 2nd ed., pp. 114–123. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Pereboom, Derk. 2011a. Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2011b. “Theological Determinism and Divine Providence.” in Molinism. The Contemporary Debate, edited by Kenneth J. Perszyk, pp. 262–280. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2011c. “Free-Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, 2nd ed., pp. 407–424. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Kane (2002), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2012a. “On Fischer (2009).” Philosophical Studies 158(3): 523–528.
Pereboom, Derk. 2012b. “Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection.” in Philosophical Issues 22: Action Theory, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Berit Brogaard, pp. 298–315. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Pereboom, Derk. 2013. “Kant’s Transcendental Arguments.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/kant-transcendental/.
Pereboom, Derk. 2014a. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685516.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2014b. “Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties.” in Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 40–69. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Pereboom, Derk. 2014c. “The Disappearing Agent Objection to Event-Causal Libertarianism.” Philosophical Studies 169(1): 59–69.
Pereboom, Derk. 2015a. “Consciousness, Physicalism, and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties.” in Consciousness in the Physical World. Perspectives on Russellian Monism, edited by Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa, pp. 300–323. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pereboom, Derk. 2015b. “A Notion of Moral Responsibility Immune to the Threat from Causal Determination.” in The Nature of Moral Responsibility. New Essays, edited by Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith, pp. 281–296. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199998074.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2015c. “Omissions and Different Senses of Responsability.” in Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, edited by Andrei A. Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell, pp. 179–191. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pereboom, Derk. 2016a. “Anti-Reductionism, Anti-Rationalism, and the Material Constitution of the Mental.” in Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, edited by Kenneth Aizawa and Carl Gillett, pp. 123–140. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6.
Pereboom, Derk. 2016b. “Libertarianism and Theological Determinism.” in Free Will and Theism. Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns, edited by Kevin Timpe and Daniel Speak, pp. 112–131. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743958.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2016c. “Illusionism and Anti-Functionalism about Phenomenal Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 23(11–12): 172–185.
Pereboom, Derk. 2016d. “Transcendental Arguments.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 444–464. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2017a. “Responsibility, Regret, and Protest.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume IV, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 121–140. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805601.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2017b. “Theological Determinism and the Relationship with God.” in Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology, pp. 201–220. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190611200.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2018a. “Honderich on Freedom, Determinism, and Meaning in Life.” in Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity, edited by Gregg D. Caruso, pp. 143–158. Philosophers in Depth. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pereboom, Derk. 2018b. “Criminal Punishment and Free Will.” in The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy, edited by David Boonin, pp. 63–76. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pereboom, Derk. 2018c. “Kant’s Transcendental Arguments.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/kant-transcendental/.
Pereboom, Derk. 2019. “Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta-Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 26(9–10): 182–193.
Pereboom, Derk. 2021. Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846006.001.0001.
Pereboom, Derk. 2022. “Kant’s Transcendental Arguments.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/kant-transcendental/.
Pereboom, Derk and Kornblith, Hilary. 1991. “The Metaphysics of Irreducibility.” Philosophical Studies 63: 125–145.
Shaw, Elizabeth, Pereboom, Derk and Caruso, Gregg D., eds. 2019. Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781108655583.
Sie, Maureen and Pereboom, Derk, eds. 2015. Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will. London: Routledge.

Further References

Baker, Lynne Rudder. 2000. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173124.
Fischer, John Martin. 2009. Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
McKenna, Michael. 2008. “A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(1): 142–159.