Daniel Stoljar (stoljar-d)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Armour-Garb, Bradley, Stoljar, Daniel and Woodbridge, James A. 2021. “Deflationism About Truth.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/truth-deflationary/.
Davies, Martin Kinsey and Stoljar, Daniel. 2004. “Introduction.” Philosophical Studies 118(1–2): 1–10.
Doggett, Tyler and Stoljar, Daniel. 2010. “Does Nagel’s Footnote Eleven Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” in Philosophical Issues 20: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 125–143. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Gold, Ian and Stoljar, Daniel. 1999. “A Neuron Doctrine in the Philosophy of Neuroscience.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22(5).
List, Christian and Stoljar, Daniel. 2017. “Does the Exclusion Argument Put Any Pressure on Dualism?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(1): 96–108.
Ludlow, Peter J., Nagasawa, Yujin and Stoljar, Daniel, eds. 2004. There’s Something About Mary. Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Pautz, Adam and Stoljar, Daniel, eds. 2019a. Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Pautz, Adam and Stoljar, Daniel. 2019b. “Introduction: Themes in Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 1–18. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Smithies, Declan and Stoljar, Daniel, eds. 2012a. Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.001.0001.
Smithies, Declan and Stoljar, Daniel. 2012b. “Introspection and Consciousness: An Overview.” in Introspection and Consciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 3–27. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.001.0001.
Stoljar, Daniel. 1996. “What What It’s like Isn’t Like.” Analysis 56: 281–283.
Stoljar, Daniel. 1997. “The Deflationary Theory of Truth.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall1997/entries/truth-deflationary/.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2000. “Physicalism and the Necessary A Priori.” The Journal of Philosophy 97(1): 33–54.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2001a. “Two Conceptions of the Physical.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(2): 253–281, doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00056.x.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2001b. “Physicalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2001/entries/physicalism/.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2001c. “The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical.” in Philosophical Perspectives 15: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 393–413. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2005a. “Review of Mumford (1998).” Mind 114(453): 178–180.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2005b. “Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.” Mind and Language 20: 469–494.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2005c. “Mental-Physical Distinction.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2006a. Ignorance and Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195306589.001.0001.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2006b. “Comments on Galen Strawson [Strawson (2006)].” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(10–11): 170–176.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2006c. “Should Moore Have Followed His Own Method? [on Soames (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 129(3): 609–618.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2006d. “Actors and Zombies.” in Content and Modality. Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, edited by Judith Jarvis Thomson and Alex Byrne, pp. 1–17. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2007a. “Consequences of Intentionalism.” Erkenntnis 60(1–2): 247–270.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2007b. “Two Conceivability Arguments Compared.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 27–44.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2008a. “Distinctions in Distinction.” in Being Reduced. New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, edited by Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup, pp. 263–279. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.003.0014.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2008b. “Hempel’s Dilemma.” in From Truth to Reality. New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics, edited by Heather Dyke, pp. 181–197. London: Routledge.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2009a. “The Argument from Revelation.” in Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, edited by David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola, pp. 113–138. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262012560.003.0005.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2009b. “Physicalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/physicalism/.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2009c. “Perception.” in Central Issues of Philosophy, edited by John Shand, pp. 51–67. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2009d. “Précis of Stoljar (2006a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(3): 748–755.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2009e. “Response to Alter (2009) and Bennett (2009).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(3): 775–784.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2010. Physicalism. New Problems in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2011. “On the Self-Locating Response to the Knowledge Argument [on Stalnaker (2008)].” Philosophical Studies 155(3): 437–443.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2012a. “Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts.” in Philosophical Perspectives 26: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 389–410. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2012b. “Knowledge of Perception.” in Introspection and Consciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 65–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.001.0001.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2013. “Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86(3): 745–752, doi:10.1111/phpr.12030.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2014a. “Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness, Intentionality and Ignorance.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Barry Dainton and Howard Robinson, pp. 355–377. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2014b. “Four Kinds of Russellian Monism.” in Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 17–39. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2015a. “Lewis on Materialism and Experience.” in A Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 519–531. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118398593.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2015b. “Chomsky, London and Lewis.” Analysis 75(1): 16–22.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2015c. “Russellian Monism or Nagelian Monism?” in Consciousness in the Physical World. Perspectives on Russellian Monism, edited by Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa, pp. 324–345. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2015d. “Physicalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/physicalism/.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2016a. “Review of Howell (2013).” Mind 125(498): 608–611.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2016b. “The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.” Mind 125(500): 1161–1198.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2017. Philosophical Progress. In Defence of a Reasonable Optimism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198802099.001.0001.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2018. “The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness.” Analytic Philosophy 59(3): 293–308.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2019a. “In Praise of Poise.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 511–536. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2019b. “Evans on Transparency: A Rationalist Account.” Philosophical Studies 176(8): 2067–2085, doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1111-x.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2020a. “The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness.” in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 482–497. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2020b. “Panpsychism and Non-Standard Materialism: Some Comparative Remarks.” in The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism, edited by William E. Seager, pp. 218–229. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315717708.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2021. “Physicalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/physicalism/.
Stoljar, Daniel and Damnjanovic, Nic. 2007. “The Deflationary Theory of Truth.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/truth-deflationary/.
Stoljar, Daniel and Damnjanovic, Nic. 2010. “The Deflationary Theory of Truth.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/truth-deflationary/.
Stoljar, Daniel and Gold, Ian. 1998. “On Biological and Cognitive Neuroscience.” Mind and Language 13: 110–131.
Stoljar, Daniel and Nagasawa, Yujin. 2004. “Introduction.” in There’s Something About Mary. Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, edited by Peter J. Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 1–36. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Further References

Alter, Torin. 2009. “Does the Ignorance Hypothesis Undermine the Conceivability and Knowledge Arguments? [on Stoljar (2006a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(3): 756–765.
Bennett, Karen. 2009. “What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You [on Stoljar (2006a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(3): 766–774.
Howell, Robert J. 2013. Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654666.001.0001.
Mumford, Stephen. 1998. Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199259823.001.0001.
Soames, Scott. 2003. Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2008. Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Lines of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.001.0001.
Strawson, Galen. 2006. “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(10–11): 3–31. Reprinted in Strawson (2008, 53–74).
Strawson, Galen. 2008. Real Materialism, and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.001.0001.