L. Nathan Oaklander (oaklander)

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Hoy, Ronald C. and Oaklander, L. Nathan, eds. 1991. Metaphysics: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co.
Magalhães, Ernâni and Oaklander, L. Nathan, eds. 2010. Presentism: Essential Readings. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1978. “The Bundle Theory of Substance.” The New Scholasticism 52(1): 91–96.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1982. “A Note on Chisholm on Tense.” Philosophical Studies 42: 283–285. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 67–70).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1983a. “McTaggart, Schlesinger, and the Two-Dimensional Time Hypothesis.” The Philosophical Quarterly 33(133): 391–397. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 221–228) and in Oaklander (2004a, 145–152).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1983b. “The Russellian Theory of Time.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 12: 263–292. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 183–206).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1983c. “Time and Becoming.” in Proceedings of the 7th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, edited by Paul Weingartner and Johannes Czermak, pp. 101–103. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 9. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. Reprinted in Oaklander (1984, 73–90) and Oaklander (2004a, 207–210).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1984. Temporal Relations and Temporal Becoming: A Defense of a Russellian Theory of Time. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1985a. “Review of Mellor (1981).” Noûs 19: 105–111. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 175–182).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1985b. “A Reply to Schlesinger (1985).” The Philosophical Quarterly 35: 93–94. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 232–233).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1987a. “Delmas Lewis on Persons and Responsibility: A Critique.” Philosophy Research Archives 13: 181–187. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 295–302), doi:10.5840/pra1987/1988131.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1987b. “Parfit, Circularity, and the Unity of Consciousness.” Mind 96: 525–529.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1987c. “McTaggart’s Paradox and the Infinite Regress of Temporal Attributions: A Reply to Smith (1986).” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 25: 425–431. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 195–201).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1990. “The New Tenseless Theory of Time.” Philosophical Studies 58: 287–292. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 77–82) and in Oaklander (2004a, 245–250).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1991. “A Defence of the New Tenseless Theory of Time.” The Philosophical Quarterly 41(162): 26–38. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 57–68) and in Oaklander (2004a, 251–264).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1992a. “Temporal Passage and Temporal Parts.” Noûs 26(1): 79–84. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 303–308).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1992b.“Zeilicovici (1989) on Temporal Becoming.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 21(3–4): 329–334. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 252–256) and in Oaklander (2004a, 123–128).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1992c. “Thank Goodness It’s Over.” Philosophy 67: 256–258. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 325–327) and in Oaklander (2004a, 211–214).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1993. “On the Experience of Tenseless Time.” Journal of Philosophical Research 18: 159–166. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 344–350) and in Oaklander (2004a, 227–234).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1994a. “Bigelow, Possible Worlds and the Passage of Time.” Analysis 54(4): 244–248. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 71–76).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1994b. “Review of Yourgrau (1991).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54(3): 737–740. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 129–134).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1994c. “Introduction: McTaggart’s Paradox and the Tensed Theory of Time.” in The New Theory of Time, pp. 157–162. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1994d. “McTaggart’s Paradox Revisited.” in The New Theory of Time, pp. 211–213. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1994e. “The Problem of Our Experience of Time.” in The New Theory of Time, pp. 289–292. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1995. “Time and Foreknowledge: A Critique of Zagzebski.” Religious Studies 31: 101–103. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 331–334).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1996. “McTaggart’s Paradox and Smith’s Tensed Theory of Time.” Synthese 107: 205–221. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 153–173).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1998a. “The Problem of Time and Change.” Stoa 1: 85–109. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 17–36).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1998b. “Freedom and the New Theory of Time.” in Questions of Time and Tense, edited by Robin Le Poidevin, pp. 185–205. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 335–355), doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236955.001.0001.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1999a. “Craig on McTaggart’s Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.” Analysis 59(4): 314–318. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 77–82).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1999b. “Review of Tooley (1997).” Mind 108: 407–413. Reprinted in Oaklander (2001a, 3–12) and in Oaklander (2004a, 135–144).
Oaklander, L. Nathan, ed. 2001a. The Importance of Time – Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society 1995–2000. Philosophical Studies Series n. 87. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2001b. “Is there a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A- and B-Time?” Journal of Philosophical Research 26: 23–36. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 37–50).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2002a. “McTaggart’s Paradox Defended.” Metaphysica 3(1): 11–25. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 51–65).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2002b. “Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience.” in Time, Reality and Experience, edited by Craig Callender, pp. 73–90. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 50. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 83–100).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2003a. “Presentism – A Critique.” in Real Metaphysics – Essays in honour of D.H. Mellor, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, pp. 196–211. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 15. London: Routledge. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 101–116).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2003b. “Review of Dainton (2001).” Mind 112: 509–513. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 117–122).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2003c. “Personal Identity, Responsibility and Time.” in Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, edited by Heather Dyke, pp. 161–178. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 309–330).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2003d. “Jokić on the Tensed Existence of Nature.” Philo 6(2): 205–210. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 221–226).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2003e. “Two Versions of the New B-Theory of Language.” in Time, Tense and Reference, edited by Aleksandar Jokić and Quentin Smith, pp. 271–304. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Reprinted in Oaklander (2004a, 265–293).
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2004a. The Ontology of Time. Studies in Analytic Philosophy. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2004b. “On our Experience of Ceasing to Exist.” in The Ontology of Time, pp. 215–220. Studies in Analytic Philosophy. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2004c. “Craig on the Experience of Tense.” in The Ontology of Time, pp. 235–244. Studies in Analytic Philosophy. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2006a. C.D. Broad’s Ontology of Mind. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 12. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2006b. “Wishing It Were Now Some Other Time.” in Proceedings of the 28th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Time and History, edited by Friedrich Stadler and Michael Stöltzner, pp. 43–50. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 1. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2007. “Reminiscences of Bergmann’s Last Student.” in Ontology and Analysis. Essays and Recollections about Gustav Bergmann, edited by Laird Addis, Greg Jesson, and Erwin Tegtmeier, pp. 287–298. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 20. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2008a. “Is there a Difference between Absolute and Relative Space?” in Fostering the Ontological Turn: Essays on Gustav Bergmann, edited by Rosaria Egidi and Guido Bonino, pp. 243–252. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 28. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, doi:10.1515/9783110325980.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2008b. “Be Careful What You Wish for: A Reply to Craig.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 156–163.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2009a. “Time and Existence: A Critique of ‘Degree Presentism’ .” in States of Affairs, edited by Maria Elisabeth Reicher, pp. 151–166. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 30. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2009b. “A Critique of Degree Presentism.” in Gustav Bergmann. Phenomenological Realism and Dialectical Ontology, edited by Bruno Langlet and Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 103–116. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 29. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2010. “McTaggart’s Paradox and Crisp’s Presentism.” Philosophia 38(2): 229–241.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2012. “A-, B-, and R-Theories of Time: A Debate.” in The Future of the Philosophy of Time, edited by Adrian Bardon, pp. 1–24. Routledge Studies in Metaphysics n. 4. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780203338315.
Oaklander, L. Nathan, ed. 2014a. Debates in the Metaphysics of Time. Studies in Analytic Philosophy. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2014b. “Temporal Realism and the R-Theory.” in Defending Realism. Ontological and Epistemological Investigations, edited by Guido Bonino, Greg Jesson, and Javier Cumpa, pp. 123–140. EIDE – Foundations of Ontology n. 7. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2014c. “Dolev’s Anti-Metaphysical Realism: A Critique.” in Debates in the Metaphysics of Time, edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, pp. 3–30. Studies in Analytic Philosophy. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2015. “Temporal Phenomena, Ontology and the R-theory.” Metaphysica 16(2): 253–269.
Oaklander, L. Nathan and Miracchi, Silvano. 1980. “Russell, Negative Facts, and Ontology.” Philosophy of Science 47: 434–455.
Oaklander, L. Nathan and Smith, Quentin. 1994. The New Theory of Time. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Oaklander, L. Nathan and White, V. Alan. 2007. “B-Time: A Reply to Tallant (2007).” Analysis 67(4): 332–340.
Orilia, Francesco and Oaklander, L. Nathan. 2015. “Do we really need a New B-Theory of Time?” Topoi 34(1): 157–170.
Smith, Quentin and Oaklander, L. Nathan. 1995. Time, Change and Freedom, introduction to metaphysics. London: Routledge.

Further References

Dainton, Barry. 2001. Time and Space. 1st ed. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Second edition: Dainton (2010).
Dainton, Barry. 2010. Time and Space. 2nd ed. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1981. Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schlesinger, George N. 1985. “How to Navigate the River of Time.” The Philosophical Quarterly 35: 91–92. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 229–231).
Smith, Quentin. 1986. “The Infinite Regress of Temporal Attributions.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 24(3): 383–396. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 180–194).
Tallant, Jonathan. 2007. “What is B-Time?” Analysis 67(2): 147–156.
Tooley, Michael. 1997. Time, Tense, and Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198250746.001.0001.
Yourgrau, Palle. 1991. The Disappearance of Time: Kurt Gödel and the Idealistic Tradition in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zeilicovici, David. 1989. “Temporal Becoming Minus the Moving Now.” Noûs 23: 505–524. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 234–251).