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Jonas Olson (olson-j)

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Bibliography

    Bykvist, Krister and Olson, Jonas. 2009. Expressivism and Moral Certitude.” The Philosophical Quarterly 59(235): 202–215.
    Bykvist, Krister and Olson, Jonas. 2019. What Matters in Metaethics [critical notice of Parfit (2017)].” Analysis 79(2): 341–349.
    Danielsson, Sven and Olson, Jonas. 2007. Brentano and the Buck-Passers.” Mind 116(463): 511–522.
    Hirose, Iwao and Olson, Jonas, eds. 2015a. The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199959303.001.0001.
    Hirose, Iwao and Olson, Jonas. 2015b. Introduction to Value Theory.” in The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, edited by Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, pp. 1–12. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199959303.001.0001.
    Johansson, Jens and Olson, Jonas. 2015. Against Pluralism in Metaethics.” in The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, edited by Christopher John Daly, pp. 593–609. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/9781137344557.
    Olson, Jonas. 2002. Are Desires De Dicto Fetishistic? Inquiry 45(1): 89–96.
    Olson, Jonas. 2003. Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67(2): 412–422.
    Olson, Jonas. 2009. Reasons and the New Non-Naturalism.” in Spheres of Reason. New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, edited by Simon Robertson, pp. 164–182. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572939.001.0001.
    Olson, Jonas. 2010. The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of It.” Ratio 23(1): 190–205.
    Olson, Jonas. 2011a. Projectivism and Error in Hume’s Ethics.” Hume Studies 37(1): 19–42.
    Olson, Jonas. 2011b. In Defense of Moral Error Theory.” in New Waves in Metaethics, edited by Michael Sean Brady, pp. 62–84. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/9780230294899.
    Olson, Jonas. 2011c. Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VI, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 181–204. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.001.0001.
    Olson, Jonas. 2011d. Error Theory and Reasons for Belief.” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 75–93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Olson, Jonas. 2014. Moral Error Theory – History, Critique, Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001.
    Olson, Jonas. 2015. Doubts about Intrinsic Value.” in The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, edited by Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, pp. 44–59. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199959303.001.0001.
    Olson, Jonas. 2017a. Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano’s and Reid’s.” The Monist 100(1): 106–119.
    Olson, Jonas. 2017b. Brentano’s Metaethics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 187–195. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Olson, Jonas. 2018a. Error Theory in Metaethics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, pp. 58–71. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315213217.
    Olson, Jonas. 2018b. Moral and Epistemic Error Theory: The Parity Premise Reconsidered.” in Metaepistemology, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 107–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001.
    Olson, Jonas. 2018c. The Metaphysics of Reasons.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 255–274. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
    Olson, Jonas. 2019. Nihilism and the Epistemic Profile of Moral Judgment.” in The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, edited by Aaron Z. Zimmerman, Karen Jones, and Mark Timmons, pp. 304–315. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Olson, Jonas and Timmons, Mark. 2011. A.C. Ewing’s First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics.” in Underivative Duty. British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing, edited by Thomas Hurka, pp. 183–211. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.001.0001.

Further References

    Parfit, Derek. 2017. On What Matters. Volume Three. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited and introduced by Samuel Scheffler, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198778608.001.0001.
    Rabinowicz, Włodzimierz [Wlodek] and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni. 2003. Tropic of Value.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(2): 389–403. Reprinted in Rønnow-Rasmussen and Zimmerman (2005, 213–227).
    Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni and Zimmerman, Michael J., eds. 2005. Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy n. 17. Berlin: Springer.