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Mark Timmons (timmons)

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Bibliography

    Drummond, John J. and Timmons, Mark. 2021. “Moral Phenomenology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/moral-phenomenology/.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 1991. “New Wave Moral Realisms Meets Moral Twin Earth.” Journal of Philosophical Research 16: 447–465.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 1992a. “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived.” Synthese 92: 221–260.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 1992b. “Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The Open Question Argument Revived.” Philosophical Papers 21: 153–175.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 1993. “Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism.” in Philosophical Issues 4: Naturalism and Normativity, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 180–204. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 1996. “From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 28(83): 3–39.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2000a. “Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth.” Synthese 124: 139–152.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2000b. “Nondescriptivism Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethics.” Philosophical Papers 29(2): 121–153.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2002. “Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism.” in Philosophical Issues 12: Realism and Relativism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 74–96. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2005. “Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory.” in Philosophical Issues 15: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 57–77. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark, eds. 2006a. Metaethics after Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2006b. “Expressivism, yes! Relativism, no!” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume I, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 73–98. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2006c. “Introduction.” in Metaethics after Moore, edited by Terence E. Horgan and Mark Timmons, pp. 1–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2006d. “Cognitivist Expressivism.” in Metaethics after Moore, edited by Terence E. Horgan and Mark Timmons, pp. 255–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2006e. “Morality without Moral Facts.” in Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, edited by James Dreier, pp. 220–238. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 6. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2007. “Moorean Moral Phenomenology.” in Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, pp. 203–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2009a. “Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation.” in Philosophical Issues 19: Metaethics, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 92–112. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2009b. “Analytic Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth.” in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals. Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, edited by Ian Ravenscroft, pp. 221–236. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2015. “Modest Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Deep Moral Error.” in Passions and Projections. Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, edited by Robert N. Johnson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 190–209. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198723172.001.0001.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2017. “Sentimentalist Moral-Perceptual Experience and Realist Pretensions: A Phenomenological Inquiry.” in Ethical Sentimentalism. New Perspectives, edited by Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber, pp. 86–106. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316105672.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2018a. “The Phenomenology of Moral Authority.” in Moral Skepticism. New Essays, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 115–140. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory. London: Routledge.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2018b. “Gripped by Authority.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48(3–4): 313–336.
    Olson, Jonas and Timmons, Mark. 2011. “A.C. Ewing’s First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics.” in Underivative Duty. British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing, edited by Thomas Hurka, pp. 183–211. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.001.0001.
    Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and Timmons, Mark, eds. 1996. Moral Knowledge. New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Smit, Houston and Timmons, Mark. 2015. “Love of Honor, Emulation, and the Psychology of the Devilish Vices.” in Kant’s Lectures on Ethics. A Critical Guide, edited by Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen, pp. 256–276. Cambridge Critical Guides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139567527.
    Timmons, Mark. 1984. “Contradictions and the Categorical Imperative.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 66(3): 294–312.
    Timmons, Mark. 1993. “Moral Justification in Context.” The Monist 76(3): 360–378.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 1999. Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780195117318.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2002a. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays. vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Timmons, Mark. 2002b. “Motive and Rightness in Kant’s Ethical System.” in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, volume I, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 255–288. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Timmons, Mark. 2003. “The Limits of Moral Constructivism.” Ratio 16(4): 391–423.
    Timmons, Mark. 2008a. “Contrastivism, Relevance Contextualism, and Meta-Skepticism [on Sinnott-Armstrong (2006)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3): 802–810.
    Timmons, Mark. 2008b. “Toward a Sentimentalist Deontology.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality. Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 93–104. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2011. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2012. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662951.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2013a. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. III. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark. 2013b. “Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume III, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 1–12. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark. 2013c. “The Perfect Duty to Onseself as an Animal Being.” in Kant’s “Tugendlehre” , edited by Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen, and Jens Timmermann, pp. 221–244. Berlin: de Gruyter.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2014a. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. IV. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722144.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark. 2014b. “Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume IV, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 1–12. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722144.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2015a. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. V. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744665.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark. 2015b. “Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume V, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 1–14. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744665.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2016a. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. VI. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790587.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark. 2016b. “Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume VI, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 1–11. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790587.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2017a. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. VII. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198808930.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark. 2017b. Significance and System. Essays in Kant’s Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190203368.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark. 2017c. “Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume VII, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 1–11. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198808930.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2018a. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. VIII. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198828310.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark. 2018b. “Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume VIII, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 1–8. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198828310.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2019a. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. IX. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846253.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark. 2019b. “Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume IX, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 1–8. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846253.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2020. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. X. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198867944.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2021a. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. XI. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192856913.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark. 2021b. Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190939229.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, ed. 2022. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. vol. XII. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192868886.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark and Baiasu, Sorin, eds. 2013. Kant on Practical Justification. Interpretative Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395686.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark, Greco, John and Mele, Alfred R., eds. 2007. Rationality and the Good. Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark and Johnson, Robert N., eds. 2015a. Reason, Value, and Respect. Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699575.001.0001.
    Timmons, Mark and Johnson, Robert N. 2015b. “Introduction.” in Reason, Value, and Respect. Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., edited by Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson, pp. 1–17. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699575.001.0001.
    Zimmerman, Aaron Z., Jones, Karen and Timmons, Mark, eds. 2019. The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Further References