Joseph [Joe] Salerno (salerno-j)

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Contributions à Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2002. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/fitch-paradox/.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2004. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/fitch-paradox/.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2005. “Anti-realism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy.” Noûs 39(1): 123–139.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2006. “Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle.” American Philosophical Quarterly 43(3): 261–270.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2007a. “Why Counterpossibles are Non-Trivial.” The Reasoner 1(1): 5–6.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2007b. “A Counterfactual Account of Essence.” The Reasoner 1(4): 4–5.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2008a. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/fitch-paradox/.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2008b. “Counteractuals and Contexts.” Analysis 68(1): 39–46.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2013a. “Remarks on Counterpossibles.” Synthese 190(4): 639–660.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2013b. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/fitch-paradox/.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2019. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/fitch-paradox/.
Salerno, Joseph [Joe], ed. 2009a. New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.001.0001.
Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2009b. “Introduction.” in, pp. 1–11.
Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2009c. “Knowability Noir: 1945–1963.” in, pp. 29–49.
Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2010. “Truth Tracking and the Problem of Reflective Knowledge.” in Knowledge and Skepticism, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, pp. 73–84. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 5. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014083.003.0004.
Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2011. “The Knowability Paradox.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 639–652. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2016. “Epistemic Modals and Modus Tollens.” Philosophical Studies 173(10): 2663–2680.