Nathan Salmón (salmon-n)

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Salmón, Nathan. 1979. “How Not to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference.” The Journal of Philosophy 76(8): 703–725.
Salmón, Nathan. 1982a. Reference and Essence. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers.
Salmón, Nathan. 1982b. “Assertion and Incomplete Definite Descriptions.” Philosophical Studies 42(1): 37–45.
Salmón, Nathan. 1984a. “Impossible Worlds.” Analysis 44(3): 114–117. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 119–121).
Salmón, Nathan. 1984b. “Fregean Theory and the Four Worlds Paradox: A Reply to David Over (1984).” Philosophical Books 25(1): 7–11. Reprinted in Salmón (2005b, 265–271).
Salmón, Nathan. 1986a. Frege’s Puzzle. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Salmón, Nathan. 1986b. “Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: Studies in Essentialism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 75–120. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Salmón (2005b, 273–344).
Salmón, Nathan. 1986c. “Reflexivity.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27: 401–429. Reprinted in Salmón and Soames (1988, 240–274).
Salmón, Nathan. 1987a. “Existence.” in Philosophical Perspectives 1: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 49–108. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 9–49).
Salmón, Nathan. 1987b. “The Fact That \(X = Y\).” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 17(4): 517–518. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 153–154).
Salmón, Nathan. 1988a. “Review of Lewis (1986).” The Philosophical Review 97(2): 237–244. Reprinted as “An Empire of Thin Air” in Salmón (2005a, 122–128).
Salmón, Nathan. 1988b. “How to Measure the Standard Metre.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88: 193–217.
Salmón, Nathan. 1989a. “The Logic of What Might Have Been.” The Philosophical Review 98(1): 3–34. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 129–151).
Salmón, Nathan. 1989b. “Illogical Belief.” in Philosophical Perspectives 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 243–285. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Salmón, Nathan. 1989c. “Tense and Singular Propositions.” in Themes from Kaplan, edited by Joseph Almog, John R. Perry, and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 331–392. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Salmón, Nathan. 1989d. “Reference and Information Content: Names and Descriptions.” in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV: Topics in the Philosophy of Language, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, pp. 409–461. Synthese Library n. 167. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted in revised form as Salmón (2003b), doi:10.1007/978-94-009-1171-0.
Salmón, Nathan. 1989e. “How to Become a Millian Heir.” Noûs 23(2): 211–220.
Salmón, Nathan. 1990. “A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn.” in Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind, edited by Curtis Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens, pp. 215–247. CSLI Lecture Notes n. 20. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Salmón, Nathan. 1991a. Frege’s Puzzle. 2nd ed. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Salmón, Nathan. 1991b. “The Pragmatic Fallacy.” Philosophical Studies 63(1): 83–97.
Salmón, Nathan. 1991c. “How Not to Become a Millian Heir.” Philosophical Studies 62(2): 165–177.
Salmón, Nathan. 1991d. “Singular Terms.” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith, pp. 835–837. Analytica: Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language n. 2. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Salmón, Nathan. 1992a. “Reflections on Reflexivity.” Linguistics and Philosophy 15(1): 53–63.
Salmón, Nathan. 1992b. “On Content.” Mind 101(404): 733–751. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 269–285).
Salmón, Nathan. 1993a. “A Problem in the Frege-Church Theory of Sense and Denotation.” Noûs 27(2): 158–166. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 335–343).
Salmón, Nathan. 1993b. “This Side of Paradox.” Philosophical Topics 21(2): 187–197. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 155–164).
Salmón, Nathan. 1993c. “Analyticity and Apriority.” in Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 125–133. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Salmón, Nathan. 1993d. “Relative and Absolute Apriority.” Philosophical Studies 69(1): 83–100.
Salmón, Nathan, ed. 1994a. Logic, Language and the Structure of Scientific Theories. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Salmón, Nathan. 1994b. “Sense and Reference.” in Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language, edited by Robert M. Harnish, pp. 99–129. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Salmón, Nathan. 1995a. “Relational Belief.” in On Quine – New Essays, edited by Paolo Leonardi and Marco Santambrogio, pp. 206–228. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Salmón, Nathan. 1995b. “Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt.” Noûs 29(1): 1–20.
Salmón, Nathan. 1996a. “Trans-World Identification and Stipulation.” Philosophical Studies 84(2–3): 203–223. Reprinted in Salmón (2005b, 345–356).
Salmón, Nathan. 1996b. “Reference: Names, Descriptions, and Variables.” in Sprachphilosophie: ein internationales Handbuch zeitgenössischer Forschung, II. Teilband, edited by Marcelo Dascal, Dietfried Gerhardus, Kuno Lorenz, and Georg Meggle, pp. 1123–1152. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Salmón, Nathan. 1997a. “Is de re Belief Reducible to de dicto?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27(suppl. 23): 85–110.
Salmón, Nathan. 1997b. “Wholes, Parts, and Numbers.” in Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 1–25. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 229–242).
Salmón, Nathan. 1998. “Nonexistence.” Noûs 32(3): 277–319. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 50–90).
Salmón, Nathan. 2001a. “The Limits of Human Mathematics.” in Philosophical Perspectives 15: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 93–117. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 243–267).
Salmón, Nathan. 2001b. “The Very Possibility of Language: A Sermon on the Consequences of Missing Church.” in Logic, Meaning and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church, edited by Curtis Anthony Anderson and Michael Zelëny, pp. 573–595. Synthese Library n. 304. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 344–365).
Salmón, Nathan. 2002a. “Demonstrating and Necessity.” The Philosophical Review 111(4): 497–537.
Salmón, Nathan. 2002b. “Mythical Objects.” in Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 105–123. New York: Seven Bridges Press. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 91–109).
Salmón, Nathan. 2002c. “Identity Facts.” Philosophical Topics 30(1): 237–267. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 165–191).
Salmón, Nathan. 2002d. “Puzzles about Intentionality.” in A Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Dale Jacquette, pp. 73–85. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470996751.
Salmón, Nathan. 2003a. “Naming, Necessity, and Beyond. Critical Notice of Soames (2002).” Mind 112(447): 475–492. Reprinted in Salmón (2005b, 377–397).
Salmón, Nathan. 2003b. “Reference and Information Content: Names and Descriptions.” in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume X, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, 2nd ed., pp. 39–86. Dordrecht: Springer. First publication as Salmón (1989d).
Salmón, Nathan. 2003c. “Tense and Intension.” in Time, Tense and Reference, edited by Aleksandar Jokić and Quentin Smith, pp. 107–154. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 365–398).
Salmón, Nathan. 2004. “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” in Descriptions and Beyond, edited by Marga Reimer and Anne L. Bezuidenhout, pp. 230–260. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Salmón, Nathan. 2005a. Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning. Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199284717.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2005b. Reference and Essence. 2nd ed. Studies in Analytic Philosophy. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
Salmón, Nathan. 2005c. “Personal Identity: What’s the Problem.” in Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning. Philosophical Papers Volume 1, pp. 192–227. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Written 1995, doi:10.1093/0199284717.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2005d. “On Designating.” Mind 114(456): 1069–1133. Reprinted in Salmón (2005a, 286–334).
Salmón, Nathan. 2005e. “Two Conceptions of Semantics.” in Semantics versus Pragmatics, edited by Zoltán Gendler Szabó, pp. 317–328. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251520.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2005f. “Modal Logic Kalish-and-Montague Style.” in Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning. Philosophical Papers Volume 1, pp. 111–118. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Written 1994, doi:10.1093/0199284717.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2005g. “Are General Terms Rigid?” Linguistics and Philosophy 28(5): 117–134.
Salmón, Nathan. 2005h. “Proper Names and Descriptions.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Salmón, Nathan. 2006a. “A Theory of Bondage.” The Philosophical Review 115(4): 415–448.
Salmón, Nathan. 2006b. “Terms in Bondage.” in Philosophical Issues 16: Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest Sosa, pp. 263–274. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Salmón, Nathan. 2006c. “The Resilience of Illogical Belief.” Noûs 40(2): 369–375.
Salmón, Nathan. 2006d. “Pronouns as Variables [on Berger (2002)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3): 656–664. “Reprinted” in Salmón (2005a, 399–406).
Salmón, Nathan. 2007a. Content, Cognition and Communication. Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2007b. “About Aboutness.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3(2): 59–76.
Salmón, Nathan. 2008a. “Numbers versus Nominalists.” Analysis 68(3): 177–182.
Salmón, Nathan. 2008b. “That \(F\).” Philosophical Studies 141(2): 263–280.
Salmón, Nathan. 2009a. “Quantifying into the Unquantifiable: The Life and Work of David Kaplan.” in The Philosophy of David Kaplan, edited by Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi, pp. 25–43. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367881.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2009b. “Points, Complexes, Complex Points, and a Yacht.” in Russell vs. Meinong. The Legacy of “On Denoting” , edited by Nicholas Griffin and Dale Jacquette, pp. 343–364. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 30. London: Routledge.
Salmón, Nathan. 2010a. “Vagaries about Vagueness.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 131–148. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2010b. “The Possibility of Partial Definition.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 46–62. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2010c. “Three Perspectives on Quantifying In.” in New Essays on Singular Thought, edited by Robin Jeshion, pp. 64–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567881.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2010d. “Lambda in Sentences with Designators: An Ode to Complex Predication.” The Journal of Philosophy 107(9): 445–468.
Salmón, Nathan. 2011a. “Fiction, Myth, and Reality.” in Saul Kripke, edited by Alan Berger, pp. 49–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Salmón, Nathan. 2011b. “A Note on Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief.” in Saul Kripke, edited by Alan Berger, pp. 235–252. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Salmón, Nathan. 2012a. “Recurrence.” Philosophical Studies 159(3): 407–441.
Salmón, Nathan. 2012b. “Generality.” Philosophical Studies 161(3): 471–481.
Salmón, Nathan. 2013. “A Note on Kripke’s Paradox about Time and Thought.” The Journal of Philosophy 110(4): 213–220.
Salmón, Nathan. 2014a. “What is Existence?” in Empty Representations. Reference & Non-Existence, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Genoveva Martı́, pp. 245–261. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647057.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2014b. “Personal Identity: What’s the Problem?” in Naming, Necessity and More. Explorations in the Philosophical World of Saul Kripke, edited by Jonathan Berg, pp. 81–125. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Salmón, Nathan. 2015a. “The Philosopher’s Stone and Other Mythical Objects.” in Fictional Objects, edited by Stuart Brock and Anthony Everett, pp. 114–128. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735595.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2015b. “Recurrence Again.” Philosophical Studies 172(2): 445–457.
Salmón, Nathan. 2016. “Constraint with Restraint.” in Meanings and Other Things. Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer, edited by Gary Ostertag, pp. 149–155. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.001.0001.
Salmón, Nathan. 2020. “Naming and Non-Necessity.” in Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Themes from Michael Devitt, edited by Andrea Bianchi, pp. 237–248. Cham: Springer.
Salmón, Nathan and Soames, Scott, eds. 1988. Propositions and Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further References

Berger, Alan. 2002. Terms and Truth. Reference Direct and Anaphoric. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Over, David E. 1984. “The Consequences of Direct Reference [review of Salmón (1982a)].” Philosophical Books 25(1): 1–7.
Soames, Scott. 2002. Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195145283.001.0001.