Kevin Scharp (scharp)
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Bibliography
Kraut, Robert E. and Scharp, Kevin. 2015. “Pragmatism without Idealism.” in The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, edited by Christopher John Daly, pp. 331–361. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/9781137344557.
Scharp, Kevin. 2003. “Communication and Content: Circumstances and Consequences of the Habermas-Brandom Debate.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11(1): 43–61.
Scharp, Kevin. 2007a. “Aletheic Vengeance.” in Revenge of the Liar. New Essays on the Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 272–319. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199233915.001.0001.
Scharp, Kevin. 2007b. “Replacing Truth.” Inquiry 50(6): 606–621.
Scharp, Kevin. 2008. “Locke’s Theory of Reflection.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16(1): 25–63.
Scharp, Kevin. 2010a. “Truth’s Saviour?” The Philosophical Quarterly 60(238): 183–188.
Scharp, Kevin. 2010b. “Falsity.” in New Waves in Truth, edited by Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Cory D. Wright, pp. 126–137. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Scharp, Kevin. 2010c. “Truth and Expressive Completeness.” in Reading Brandom. On Making It Explicit, edited by Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy Wanderer, pp. 262–275. London: Routledge.
Scharp, Kevin. 2012. “Wilfrid Sellar’s Anti-Descriptivism.” in Categories of Being. Essays on Metaphysics and Logic, edited by Leila Haaparanta and Heikki J. Koskinen, pp. 358–390. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199890576.001.0001.
Scharp, Kevin. 2013a. Replacing Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653850.001.0001.
Scharp, Kevin. 2013b. “Truth, the Liar, and Relativism.” The Philosophical Review 122(3): 427–510.
Scharp, Kevin. 2014. “Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 3): 597–645.
Scharp, Kevin. 2018. “Shrieking in the Face of Vengeance.” Analysis 78(3): 454–463.
Scharp, Kevin. 2020. “Philosophy as the Study of Defective Concepts.” in Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, pp. 396–416. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801856.001.0001.
Scharp, Kevin and Shapiro, Stewart. 2012. “On Richard (2008).” Philosophical Studies 160(3): 455–463.
Scharp, Kevin and Shapiro, Stewart. 2017. “Revising Inconsistent Concepts.” in Reflections on the Liar, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 257–280. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199896042.001.0001.
Weaver, Bryan R. and Scharp, Kevin. 2019. Semantics for Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198832621.001.0001.
Further References
Richard, Mark. 2008. When Truth Gives Out. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239955.001.0001.