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Bibliography
Arnold, Jack and Shapiro, Stewart. 2007. “Where in the (World Wide) Web of Belief is the Law of
Non-Contradiction?” Noûs 41(2):
276–297.
Dunn, Michael J., Epstein, George, Cocchiarella, Nino Barnabas and Shapiro, Stewart, eds. 1975. Proceedings of the 1975 International Symposium on
Multiple-Valued Logic. Indiana University, Bloomingto, May 13-16,
1975. Long Beach, California: IEEE Computer
Society.
Florio, Salvatore and Shapiro, Stewart. 2014. “Set Theory, Type Theory, and Absolute
Generality.” Mind 123(489): 157–174.
Hellman, Geoffrey and Shapiro, Stewart. 2015a.
“Regions-Based Two-Dimensional Continua: The Euclidean
Case.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 24(4):
499–534.
Hellman, Geoffrey and Shapiro, Stewart. 2015b. “Points, Gunk, Boundaries, and Contact.” in
The Logica Yearbook 2014, edited by Pavel Arazim and Michal Dančák, pp. 165–184. London: College
Publications.
Hellman, Geoffrey and Shapiro, Stewart. 2018. Varieties of Continua. From Regions to Points and
Back. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198712749.001.0001.
Linnebo, Øystein and Shapiro, Stewart. 2019. “Realizability as a Kind of Truth-Making.”
in Quo Vadis, Metaphysics? Essays in Honor of
Peter van Inwagen, edited by Mirosław Szatkowski, pp. 351–366. Philosophical
Analysis n. 81. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110664812.
Linnebo, Øystein and Shapiro, Stewart. 2021. “Modality in Mathematics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by
Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 281–291. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London:
Routledge.
Linnebo, Øystein, Shapiro, Stewart and Hellman, Geoffrey. 2016.
“Aristotelian Continua.” Philosophia
Mathematica 24(2): 214–246.
Lycan, William G. and Shapiro, Stewart. 1986. “Actuality and Essence.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: Studies in
Essentialism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 343–377. Minneapolis, Minnesota:
University of Minnesota Press.
McCarthy, Timothy G. and Shapiro, Stewart. 1987. “Turing
Projectability.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic 28: 520–535.
Raffman, Diana and Shapiro, Stewart. 2003. “Review of Keefe (2000).” The
Philosophical Review 112(2): 260.
Scharp, Kevin and Shapiro, Stewart. 2012. “On Richard
(2008).” Philosophical Studies 160(3):
455–463.
Scharp, Kevin and Shapiro, Stewart. 2017. “Revising
Inconsistent Concepts.” in Reflections on the Liar, edited by Bradley
Armour-Garb, pp. 257–280. New York:
Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199896042.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1977. “Incomplete Translations of Complete
Logics.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 18:
248–250.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1980. “On the Notion of Effectiveness.”
History and Philosophy of Logic 1: 209–230.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1981. “Understanding Church’s Thesis.” The
Journal of Philosophical Logic 10(2): 353–365.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1983a. “Conservativeness and Incompleteness.”
The Journal of Philosophy 80(9): 521–531, doi:10.2307/2026112.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1983b. “Mathematics and Reality.” Philosophy of
Science 50: 523–548.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1983c. “Remarks on the Development of
Computability.” History and Philosophy of Logic
4: 203–220.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1984a. “Arithmetic Sinn and
Effectiveness.” Dialectica 38(1): 3–16.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1984b. “Principles of Logic and Principles of
Reflection.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 49:
1446–1147.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1984c. “Review of Field (1980).”
Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 14: 437–444.
Shapiro, Stewart, ed. 1985a.
Intensional Mathematics. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of
Mathematics n. 113. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1985b. “Introduction – Intensional Mathematics and Constructive
Mathematics.” in Intensional
Mathematics, edited by Stewart Shapiro, pp. 1–10. Studies
in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics n. 113. Amsterdam:
North-Holland Publishing Co.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1985c. “Epistemic and Intuitionistic Arithmetic.”
in Intensional Mathematics, edited by Stewart
Shapiro, pp. 11–45. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of
Mathematics n. 113. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1985d. “Second-Order Languages and Mathematical
Practice.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 50:
714–742. Reprinted in Shapiro (1996a).
Shapiro, Stewart. 1987. “Principles of Reflection and Second-Order
Logic.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 16(3):
309–333.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1989a. “Structure and Ontology.” Philosophical
Topics 17(2): 145–172.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1989b. “Logic, Ontology and Mathematical Practice.”
Synthese 79: 13–50.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1990. “Second-Order Logic, Foundations, and
Rules.” The Journal of Philosophy 87: 234–261.
Reprinted in Shapiro (1996a).
Shapiro, Stewart. 1991. Foundations without Foundationalism: A Case for
Second-Order Logic. Oxford Logic Guides n. 17.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198250290.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1992. “Foundationalism and Foundations of
Mathematics.” in Proof and
Knowledge in Mathematics, edited by Michael Detlefsen, pp. 171–207. London: Routledge.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1993a. “Understanding Church’s Thesis, Again.”
Acta Analytica 8(11): 59–77.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1993b. “Review of Hellman (1989).”
Noûs 27: 522–525.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1993c. “Modality and Ontology.” Mind
102(407): 455–481.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1993d. “Anti-Realism and Modality.” in Proceedings of the 15th International Wittgenstein
Symposium: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics (part
1), edited by Johannes Czermak, pp. 269–287. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 20/1. Wien:
Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1994. “Mathematics and Philosophy of Mathematics.”
Philosophia Mathematica 2(2): 148–160.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1995a. “Reasoning, Logic, and Computation.”
Philosophia Mathematica 3(1): 31–51.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1995b.
“Skolem Paradox.” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, edited by
Ted Honderich, pp. 827. Oxford
Companions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1996a. The Limits of Logic: Second-Order Logic and the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Brookfield,
Vermont: Aldershot.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1996b.
“Introduction.” Philosophia
Mathematica 4(2): 81–82.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1996c. “Space, Number, and Structure: A Tale of Two
Debates.” Philosophia Mathematica 4(2): 148–173.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1997. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and
Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195139305.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1998a. “Proof and Truth: Through Thick and Thin.”
The Journal of Philosophy 95(10): 493–521.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1998b. “Logical Consequence: Models and Modality.”
in The Philosophy of Mathematics
Today, edited by Matthias Schirn, pp. 131–156. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236542.003.0005.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1998c. “Incompleteness, Mechanism, and Optimism.”
The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4(3): 273–302.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1998d. “Induction and Indefinite Extendibility: The Gödel Sentence is True but Did Someone Change the
Subject.” Mind 107: 597–624.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1999. “Do Not Claim Too Much: Second-Order and First-Order
Logic.” Philosophia Mathematica 7(1): 42–64.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2000a. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of
Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2000b. “The Status of Logic.” in New Essays on the A Priori, edited by Paul
Artin Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, pp. 333–366. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241279.003.0014.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2000c. “Frege Meets Dedekind: A Neo-Logicist Treatment of Real
Analysis.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41:
335–364. Reprinted in Cook (2007, 219–252).
Shapiro, Stewart. 2000d. “Quine on Logic.” in The Logica
Yearbook 1999, edited by Timothy Childers, pp. 11–21. Praha:
Filosofia. Nakladetelstvı́ Filosofického
ústavu AV ČR.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2000e.
“Classical Logic.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2000/entries/logic-classical/.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2001a. “Why Anti Realists and Classical Mathematicians Cannot Get
Along.” Topoi 20: 53–63.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2001b. “The ‘Triumph’ of First-Order
Languages.” in Logic, Meaning and
Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church, edited by
Curtis Anthony Anderson and Michael Zelëny, pp. 219–259. Synthese
Library n. 304. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2001c. “Systems between First- and Second-order
Logic.” in Handbook of
Philosophical Logic, Volume I, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, 2nd ed., pp. 131–187. Dordrecht:
Springer.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2001d.
“Classical Logic II – Higher-Order Logic.” in
The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical
Logic, edited by Lou F. Goble, pp. 33–54. Blackwell Philosophy
Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9781405164801.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2002a. “Incompleteness and Inconsistency.”
Mind 111: 817–831.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2002b. “Deflation and Conservation.” in Principles of Truth, edited by Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten, pp. 103–128. Egelsbach:
Hänsel-Hohenhausen. Second edition, with small
corrections: Halbach and Horsten
(2004).
Shapiro, Stewart. 2002c. “Necessity, Meaning, and Rationality: The Notion of
Logical Consequence.” in A
Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Dale Jacquette, pp. 227–240. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470996751.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2003a. “Prolegomenon to Any Future Neo-Logicist Set Theory:
Abstraction and Indefinite Extensibility.” The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54(1): 59–91. Reprinted
in Cook (2007,
353–382).
Shapiro, Stewart. 2003b. “Vagueness and Conversation.” in Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox,
edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 39–72. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2003c. “Mechanism, Truth, and Penrose’s New
Argument.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic
32(1): 19–42.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2003d. “All Sets Great and Small: And I Do Mean
All.” in Philosophical
Perspectives 17: Language and Philosophical Linguistics,
edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John
Hawthorne, pp. 467–490. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2003e. “The Guru, the Logician, and the Deflationist: Truth and
Logical Consequence.” Noûs 37(1):
113–132.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2003f. “Philosophy of Mathematics.” in Philosophy of Science Today, edited by Peter
Clark and Katherine Hawley, pp. 181–200. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2003g. “Bertrand Russell, ‘On Denoting’ (1905) and
‘Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types’
(1908): Metaphysics to Logic and Back.” in Classics in Western Philosophy. A Reader’s
Guide, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia, Gregory M. Reichberg, and Bernard N. Schumacher, pp. 460–466. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2004a. “The Nature and Limits of Abstraction [review of Fine
(2002)].” The Philosophical Quarterly
54(214): 166–174.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2004b. “Foundations of Mathematics: Metaphysics, Epistemology,
Structure.” The Philosophical Quarterly 54(214):
16–37.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2004c. “Simple Truth, Contradiction, and
Consistency.” in The Law of
Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by
Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 336–354. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart, ed. 2005a. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and
Logic. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/0195148770.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2005b. “Context, Conversation, and So-Called ‘Higher-Order
Vagueness’ .” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supplementary Volume 79: 147–165.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2005c. “Categories, Structures, and the Frege-Hilbert
Controversy: The Status of Meta-Mathematics.”
Philosophia Mathematica 13(1): 61–77. Reprinted in Lindström et al.
(2009, 435–448).
Shapiro, Stewart. 2005d. “Gurus, Logical Consequence, and Truth Bearers: What Is It
that Is True?” in Deflationary
Truth, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, pp. 153–169. LaSalle, Illinois: Open
Court Publishing Co.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2005e. “Sets and Abstracts – Discussion of Fine (2002).”
Philosophical Studies 122(3): 315–332.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2005f. “Philosophy of Mathematics and Its Logic:
Introduction.” in The Oxford
Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, edited by
Stewart Shapiro, pp. 3–27. Oxford
Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195148770.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2005g. “Logical Consequence, Proof Theory, and Model
Theory.” in The Oxford Handbook
of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, edited by Stewart
Shapiro, pp. 651–670. Oxford
Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195148770.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2005h.
“Higher-Order Logic.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and
Logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, pp. 751–780. Oxford
Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195148770.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2006a. Vagueness in Context. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280391.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2006b. “The Governance of Identity [reply to Keränen
(2006)].” in Identity and
Modality, edited by Fraser MacBride, pp. 164–173. Mind Association
Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2006c. “Structure and Identity.” in Identity and Modality, edited by Fraser MacBride, pp. 109–145. Mind Association
Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2006d. “Externalism, Anti-Realism, and the
KK-Thesis.” in A Logical Approach
to Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Graham Solomon, edited by
David DeVidi and Timothy Kenyon, pp. 22–35. The
University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science
n. 69. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/1-4020-4054-7.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2006e.
“Effectiveness.” in The Age of Alternative Logics. Assessing Philosophy of
Logic and Mathematics Today, edited by Johan van Benthem, Gerhard Heinzmann, Manuel Rebuschi, and Henk Visser, pp. 37–50. Logic,
Epistemology, and the Unity of Science n. 3. Dordrecht: Springer.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2006f. “Computability, Proof, and Open-Texture.” in
Church’s Thesis After 70 Years,
edited by Adam Olszewski, Jan Woleński, and Robert Janusz, pp. 420–455. Ontos Mathematical
Logic n. 1. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2007a. “The Objectivity of Mathematics.”
Synthese 156(2): 337–381.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2007b. “Burali-Forti’s Revenge.” in Revenge of the Liar. New Essays on the
Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 320–344. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199233915.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2008a. “Identity, Indiscernibility, and ante rem
Structuralism: The tale of \(i\) and
\(-i\).” Philosophia
Mathematica 16(3): 285–309.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2008b.
“Mathematical Objects.” in Proof and Other Dilemmas: Mathematics and
Philosophy, edited by Bonnie Gold and Roger A. Simons, pp. 157–178. Washington, D.C.:
Mathematical Association of America.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2008c. “Frege Meets Zermelo: A Perspective on Ineffability and
Reflection.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 1(2):
241–266.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2009a. “The Measure of Scottish Neo-Logicism.” in
Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. What Has
Become of Them?, edited by Sten Lindström, Erik Palmgren, Krister Segerberg, and Viggo Stoltenberg-Hansen, pp. 69–90. Synthese
Library n. 341. Dordrecht: Springer.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2009b. “Life on the Ship of Neurath: Mathematics in the
Philosophy of Mathematics.” Croatian Journal of
Philosophy 9(2): 149–166. Reprinted in Trobok, Miščević and Žarnić (2012,
11–28).
Shapiro, Stewart. 2009c. “We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident: But What Do We
Mean by That?” The Review of Symbolic Logic 2(1):
175–207.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2009d. “Reference to Indiscernible Objects.” in
The Logica Yearbook 2008, edited by Michal Peliš, pp. 223–236. London: College
Publications.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2009e.
“Classical Logic.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/logic-classical/.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2010a. “Vagueness, Metaphysics, and Objectivity.”
in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and
Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 149–161. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2010b. “So Truth is Safe from Paradox: Now What?”
Philosophical Studies 147(3): 445–455.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2011a. “Truth, Function and Paradox.”
Analysis 71(1): 38–44.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2011b. “Varieties of Pluralism and Relativism for
Logic.” in A Companion to
Relativism, edited by Steven D. Hales, pp. 526–552. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444392494.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2011c. “Epistemology of Mathematics: What are the Questions? What
Count as Answers?” The Philosophical Quarterly
61(242): 130–150.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2011d. “The Company Kept by Cut Abstraction (and its
Relatives).” Philosophia Mathematica 19(2):
107–138.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2011e. “Addendum [to Lipton (2011)].” in
Meaning in Mathematics, edited by
John C. Polkinghorne, pp. 55–60. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2011f. “Mathematics and Objectivity.” in Meaning in Mathematics, edited by John C.
Polkinghorne, pp. 97–108. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2011g. “Reply [to Rosen (2011)].” in
Meaning in Mathematics, edited by
John C. Polkinghorne, pp. 112. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2012a. “Objectivity, Explanation, and Cognitive
Shortfall.” in Mind, Meaning, and
Knowledge.Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright,
volume 1, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp.
211–237. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2012b. “An ‘I’ for an I: Singular Terms, Uniqueness,
and Reference.” The Review of Symbolic Logic
5(3): 380–415.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2012c. “Revising Logic in Light of Paradox.” in
Insolubles and Consequences. Essays in Honour
of Stephen Read, edited by Catarina Dutilh-Novaes and Ole Thomassen Hjortland. Tributes n. 18. London:
King’s College Publications.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2013a.
“Classical Logic.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/logic-classical/.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2013b. “Tarski’s Theorem and the Extensionality of
Truth.” Erkenntnis 78(5): 1197–1204.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2013c. “The Open Texture of Computability.” in
Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond, edited by B.
Jack Copeland, Carl J. Posy, and Oron Shagrir, pp. 153–182. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The MIT Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2014a. Varieties of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696529.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2014b. “Structures and Logics: A Case for (a)
Relativism.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 2): 309–329.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2014c. “Vagueness and Abstraction.” in Vague Objects and Vague Identity. New Essays on Ontic
Vagueness, edited by Ken Akiba and Ali Abasnezhad, pp. 217–237. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
n. 33. Cham: Springer.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2014d. “Pluralism, Relativism, and Objectivity.” in
The Metaphysics of Logic, edited by
Penelope Rush, pp. 49–71. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139626279.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2015. “The Meaning of Logical Terms.” in Foundations of Logical Consequence, edited by
Colin R. Caret and Ole Thomassen Hjortland, pp. 186–220. Mind Association
Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2016a. “Mathematics in Philosophy, Philosophy in Mathematics:
Three Case Studies.” in Objectivity, Realism, and Proof. FilMat Studies in the
Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Francesca Boccuni and Andrea Sereni, pp. 1–12. Boston
Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science n. 318.
Dordrecht: Springer.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2016b.
“What Numbers Could Be; What Objects Could
Be.” in Truth, Objects,
Infinity. New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul
Benacerraf, edited by Fabrice Pataut, pp. 177–193. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
n. 28. Cham: Springer.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2016c. “Philosophy of Mathematics: Issues and
Methods.” in The Oxford Handbook
of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 622–640. Oxford
Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2017. “Computing with Numbers and Other Non-syntactic Things:
De re Knowledge of Abstract Objects.”
Philosophia Mathematica 25(2): 268–281.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2018a. “Changing the Subject: Quine, Putnam and Waismann on
Meaning-Change, Logic, and Analyticity.” in Hilary Putnam on Logic and Mathematics,
edited by Geoffrey Hellman and Roy T.
Cook, pp. 115–127. Outstanding Contributions to Logic n. 9. Cham:
Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-96274-0.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2018b. “Properties and Predicates, Objects and Names:
Impredicativity and the Axiom of Choice.” in Being Necessary. Themes of Ontology and Modality from the
Work of Bob Hale, edited by Ivette Fred-Rivera and Jessica F. Leech, pp. 92–110. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198792161.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2019. “Inconsistency and Incompleteness,
Revisited.” in Graham Priest on
Dialetheism and Paraconsistency, edited by Can Başkent and Thomas Macaulay Ferguson, pp. 469–480. Cham: Springer Nature,
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3.
Shapiro, Stewart and Hellman, Geoffrey. 2017. “Frege Meets Aristotle: Points as
Abstracts.” Philosophia Mathematica 25(1): 73–90.
Shapiro, Stewart and Hellman, Geoffrey, eds. 2021. The History of Continua. Philosophical and Mathematical
Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198809647.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart and Kouri Kissel, Teresa. 2018.
“Classical Logic.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/logic-classical/.
Shapiro, Stewart and Kouri Kissel, Teresa. 2022.
“Classical Logic.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/logic-classical/.
Shapiro, Stewart and Schumm, George F. 1990. “Expressive Completeness and Decidability.”
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 31: 576–579.
Shapiro, Stewart and Taschek, William W. 1996. “Intuitionism, Pluralism and Cognitive
Command.” The Journal of Philosophy 93: 74–88.
Shapiro, Stewart and Uzquiano, Gabriel. 2016. “Ineffability within the Limits of Abstraction
Alone.” in Abstractionism. Essays
in Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, pp. 283–309. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645268.001.0001.
Shapiro, Stewart and Weir, Alan. 1999. “New V, ZF and Abstraction.” Philosophia
Mathematica 7(3): 293–321.
Shapiro, Stewart and Weir, Alan. 2000. “ ‘Neo-Logicist’ Logic is not Epistemically
Innocent.” Philosophia Mathematica 8(2): 293–321,
doi:10.1093/philmat/8.2.160.
Shapiro, Stewart and Wright, Crispin. 2006. “All Things
Indefinitely Extensible.” in Absolute
Generality, edited by Agustı́n Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano, pp. 255–304. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Snyder, Eric and Shapiro, Stewart. 2019. “Frege on the Real Numbers.” in Essays on Frege’s Basic Laws of
Arithmetic, edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, pp. 343–383. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198712084.001.0001.
Snyder, Eric, Shapiro, Stewart and Samuels, Richard. 2018. “Cardinals, Ordinals, and the Prospects for a Fregean
Foundation.” in Metaphysics, edited
by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 77–107. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 82.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Further References
Cook, Roy T., ed. 2007. The Arché Papers on the
Mathematics of Abstraction. The
University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science
n. 71. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-4265-2.
Field, Hartry. 1980. Science without Numbers: A Defense of
Nominalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Second
edition: Field
(2016), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777915.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2016. Science without Numbers: A Defense of
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