John R. Searle (searle-jr)
Contributions to Philosophie.ch
Bibliography
Apel, Karl-Otto, Barnes, Jonathan, Bellone, Enrico, Chevalley, Catherine, Cohen, Gerald A., Cournut, Jean, Descombes, Vincent, et al., eds. 2000. Un siècle de philosophie 1900-2000. Folio essais n. 369. Paris: Gallimard.
Berlin, Isaiah, Forguson, Lynd W., Pears, David F., Pitcher, George W., Searle, John R., Strawson, Peter Frederick and Warnock, Geoffrey J., eds. 1973. Essays on J.L. Austin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John R. 1957. “Russell’s Objections to Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference.” Analysis 18: 137–143. Reprinted in Klemke (1968, 337–345).
Searle, John R. 1959. “On Determinables and Resemblance.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 33: 141–158.
Searle, John R. 1962. “Meaning and Speech Acts.” The Philosophical Review 71(4): 423–432. Reprinted in Rollins (1964, 28–37).
Searle, John R. 1964a. “How to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’ .” The Philosophical Review 73(1): 43–58.
Searle, John R. 1964b. “Rejoinders [to Vendler (1964) and Benacerraf (1964)].” in Knowledge and Experience: Proceedings of the 1962 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, edited by C. D. Rollins, pp. 50–54. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Searle, John R. 1965a. “What is a Speech Act?” in Philosophy in America, edited by Max Black, pp. 221–239. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Searle, John R. 1965b. “Review of Khatchadourian (1961).” The Philosophical Review 74(3): 392–394.
Searle, John R. 1966a. “Assertions and Aberrations.” in British Analytical Philosophy, pp. 44–54. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Reprinted in Fann (1969, 205–218).
Searle, John R. 1966b. “Review of Furberg (1963).” The Philosophical Review 75: 389–391.
Searle, John R. 1967a. “Determinables and Determinates.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan; the Free Press. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
Searle, John R. 1967b. “Strawson, Peter Frederick.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan; the Free Press. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
Searle, John R. 1968. “Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts.” The Philosophical Review 77: 405–424. Reprinted in Berlin et al. (1973, 141–159).
Searle, John R. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173438.
Searle, John R., ed. 1971a. Philosophy of Language. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John R. 1971b. “The Problem of Proper Names.” in Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology, edited by Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jacobovits, pp. 134–141. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, John R. 1975a. “Indirect Speech Acts.” in Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, edited by Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan, pp. 59–82. New York: Academic Press.
Searle, John R. 1975b. “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse.” New Literary History 6. Reprinted in French, Uehling and Wettstein (1979, 233–243).
Searle, John R. 1975c. “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts.” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume VII: Language, Mind, and Knowledge, edited by Keith Gunderson, pp. 344–369. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Searle, John R. 1976. “The Classification of Illocutionary Acts.” Language in Society 5: 1–24. Reprinted in Searle (1979a, 1–29).
Searle, John R. 1978. “Prima Facie Obligations.” in Practical Reasoning, edited by Joseph Raz, pp. 81–90. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in van Straaten (1980, 238–259).
Searle, John R. 1979a. Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, John R. 1979b. “Referential and Attributive.” The Monist 62(1): 190–208.
Searle, John R. 1979c. “Intentionality and the Use of Language.” in Meaning and Use: Papers Presented at the Second Jerusalem Philosophy Encounter, edited by Avishai Margalit, pp. 181–197. Synthese Language Library n. 3. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Searle, John R. 1979d. “Metaphor.” in Metaphor and Thought, edited by Andrew Ortony, pp. 83–111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page references are to the second edition.
Searle, John R. 1980a. “The Intentionality of Intention and Action.” in Proceedings of the 4th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Language, Logic, and Philosophy, edited by Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang Grassl. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 4. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Searle, John R. 1980b. “The Background of Meaning.” in Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics, edited by John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer, and Manfred Bierwisch, pp. 221–232. Synthese Language Library n. 10. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Searle, John R. 1980c. “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417–424. Reprinted in Haugeland (1981, 282–306) and Rosenthal (1991).
Searle, John R. 1980d. “Prima Facie Obligations.” in Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson, edited by Zak van Straaten, pp. 238–259. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John R. 1981a. “Analytic Philosophy and Mental Phenomena.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6: Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 405–424. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Smith, J.-C. (1990, 243–266).
Searle, John R. 1981b. “L’intentionnalité de l’intention et de l’action.” Critique 39(401): 990–1010. Traduction de Searle (1980a) par Joëlle Proust.
Searle, John R. 1983a. Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, John R. 1983b. Sens et expression. Paris: Éditions de Minuit. Traduction de Searle (1979a) par Joëlle Proust.
Searle, John R. 1984a. Minds, Brains and Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. The 1984 Reith lectures.
Searle, John R. 1984b. “Intentionality and its Place in Nature.” Dialectica 38(2–3): 87–100. Republished as Searle (1984c).
Searle, John R. 1984c. “Intentionality and Its Place in Nature.” Synthese 61: 3–16.
Searle, John R. 1985a. Les actes de langage: Essai de philosophie du langage. collection savoir. Paris: Hermann & cie. Traduit par de Searle (1969) par H. Pauchard.
Searle, John R. 1986. “Meaning, Communication, and Representation.” in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, edited by Richard E. Grandy and Richard Warner, pp. 209–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John R. 1987a. “L’indétermination, l’empirisme et la première personne.” Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 37(1): 67–92. Simultaneously published as Searle (1987b).
Searle, John R. 1987b. “Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person.” The Journal of Philosophy 89(3): 123–146. Simultaneously published as Searle (1987a).
Searle, John R. 1989a. “How Performatives Work.” Linguistics and Philosophy 12(5): 535–558.
Searle, John R. 1989b. “Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and Intentionality.” Philosophical Topics 17(1): 193–209. Reprinted in Anderson and Owens (1990, 269–284) and in Villanueva (1991, 45–66).
Searle, John R. 1989c. “Reply to Jacquette [to Jacquette (1989)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49: 701–708.
Searle, John R. 1990a. “Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion, and Cognitive Science.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13: 585–642.
Searle, John R. 1990b. “Collective Intentions and Actions.” in Intentions in Communication, edited by Philip R. Cohen, Jerry L. Morgan, and Martha E. Pollack, pp. 401–415. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Searle, John R. 1990c. “Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Program?” Scientific American 262(1): 26–31.
Searle, John R. 1991b. “L’intentionnalité collective.” in La communauté en paroles. Communication, consensus, ruptures. Liège: Mardaga.
Searle, John R. 1991c. “Response: Meaning, Intentionality, and Speech Acts.” in John Searle and His Critics, edited by Ernest LePore and Robert van Gulick, pp. 81–101. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Searle, John R. 1991d. “Reponse: The Mind-Body Problem.” in John Searle and His Critics, edited by Ernest LePore and Robert van Gulick, pp. 141–147. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Searle, John R. 1991e. “Response: Perception and the Satisfactions of Intentionality.” in John Searle and His Critics, edited by Ernest LePore and Robert van Gulick, pp. 181–191. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Searle, John R. 1991f. “Response: Reference and Intentionality.” in John Searle and His Critics, edited by Ernest LePore and Robert van Gulick, pp. 227–241. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Searle, John R. 1991g. “Response: The Background of Intentionality and Action.” in John Searle and His Critics, edited by Ernest LePore and Robert van Gulick, pp. 289–299. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Searle, John R. 1991h. “Response: Explanation in the Social Sciences.” in John Searle and His Critics, edited by Ernest LePore and Robert van Gulick, pp. 335–341. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Searle, John R. 1991i. “Response: Applications of the Theory.” in John Searle and His Critics, edited by Ernest LePore and Robert van Gulick, pp. 385–391. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Searle, John R. 1991j. “Yin and Yang Strike Out [reply to Fodor (1991).” in The Nature of Mind, edited by David M. Rosenthal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John R. 1992a. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001.
Searle, John R. 1992b. “Conversation.” in (On) Searle on Conversation, edited by Herman Parret and Jef Verschueren, pp. 1–34. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Searle, John R. 1993a. “The World Turned Upside Down.” in Working Through Derrida, edited by Gary B. Madison. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
Searle, John R. 1993b. “The Problem of Consciousness.” in Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness, edited by Gregory R. Bock and Joan Marsh, pp. 61–69. Ciba Foundation Symposium n. 174. New York: Wiley Publishing Inc. Simultaneously published as Searle (1993c), republished in Casati, Smith and White (1994, 1–10) and Michael and Hawthorne (1994, 179–190).
Searle, John R. 1993c. “The Problem of Consciousness.” Consciousness and Cognition 2: 310–319.
Searle, John R. 1994a. “Literary Theory and Its Discontents.” New Literary History 25: 637–667.
Searle, John R. 1994b. “What’s Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind?” in The Mind-Body Problem. A Guide to the Current Debate, edited by Richard Warner and Tadeusz Szubka, pp. 277–298. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Searle, John R. 1994c. “Structure and Intention in Language: A Reply to Knapp and Michaels (1994).” New Literary History 25: 677–681.
Searle, John R. 1994d. “The Connection Principle and the Ontology of the Unconscious: A Reply to Fodor and LePore (1994).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 847–855.
Searle, John R. 1994e. “Animal Minds.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19: Philosophical Naturalism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 206–219. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Searle, John R. 1995a. The Construction of Social Reality. London: Penguin Books.
Searle, John R. 1995b. La redécouverte de l’esprit. Paris: Gallimard. Traduction de Searle (1992a) par C. Tiercelin.
Searle, John R. 1995c. “Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science [on Davies (1989)].” in Connectionism – Debates on Psychological Explanation, edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham F. Macdonald, pp. 331–355. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Searle, John R. 1997a. “The Explanation of Cognition.” in Thought and Language, edited by John M. Preston, pp. 103–126. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, John R. 1997b. “Does the Real World Exist?” in Realism/Antirealism in Epistemology, edited by Christopher B. Kulp, pp. 15–52. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Searle, John R. 1998a. Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World. New York: Basic Books.
Searle, John R. 1998b. “How to Study Consciousness Scientifically.” in Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates, edited by Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak, and Alwyn C. Scott, pp. 15–30. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Searle, John R. 1998c. La construction sociale de la réalité. Paris: Gallimard.
Searle, John R. 1998d. “Truth: A Reconsideration of Strawson’s Views.” in The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn, pp. 385–401. The Library of Living Philosophers n. 26. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Searle, John R. 1998e. “Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society.” Analyse & Kritik 20(2): 143–158.
Searle, John R. 1999. “Fact and Value, ‘Is’ and ‘Ought,’ and Reasons for Action.” in Twenty-Five Year Commemoration to the Life of Hans Kelsen (1898–1973), edited by G. O. Mazur. New York: Semenko Foundation. Reprinted in Searle (2008a, 161–180).
Searle, John R. 2000a. “Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 7: 3–22.
Searle, John R. 2000b. “Mental Causation, Conscious and Unconscious: A Reply to Meijers (2000).” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8(2): 171–177.
Searle, John R. 2001a. Rationality in Action. The Jean Nicod Lectures. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Searle, John R. 2001b. “Rationality and Action.” in Foundations of Cognitive Science, edited by João Branquinho, pp. 197–210. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John R. 2001c. “Précis of Searle (2001a).” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 4(2): 66–69.
Searle, John R. 2001d. “Reply to Smith, B. (2001).” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 4(2): 75–77.
Searle, John R. 2001e. “Reply to Zaibert (2001).” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 4(2): 84–86.
Searle, John R. 2001f. “Reply to Moural (2001).” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 4(2): 91–94.
Searle, John R. 2001g. “J.L. Austin (1911–1960).” in A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Aloysius P. [Al] Martinich and David Sosa, pp. 218–230. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998656.
Searle, John R. 2001h. “The Classical Model of Rationality and Its Weaknesses.” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium: Rationality and Irrationality, edited by Berit Brogaard and Barry Smith, pp. 311–324. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 29. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. Reprinted in Grewendorf and Meggle (2002, 311–326).
Searle, John R. 2002a. Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, John R. 2002b. “Twenty-One Years in the Chinese Room.” in Views into the Chinese Room. New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, edited by John M. Preston and Mark Bishop. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Searle (2008a).
Searle, John R. 2002c. “Why I Am Not a Property Dualist.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 9. Reprinted in Searle (2008a, 152–160).
Searle, John R. 2002d. “Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality.” in Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality. Discussions with John Searle, edited by Günther Grewendorf and Georg Meggle, pp. 3–16. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy n. 79. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Searle, John R. 2003a. “Philosophy in a New Century.” Journal of Philosophical Research 28(suppl.): 3–22. Reprinted in Searle (2008a, 4–25).
Searle, John R. 2003b. “Contemporary Philosophy in the United States.” in The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, edited by Nicholas Bunnin and Eric P. Tsui-James, 2nd ed., pp. 1–22. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. First edition: Bunnin and Tsui-James (1996).
Searle, John R. 2003c. “Reply to Barry Smith, B. (2003).” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 62(1): 299–309, doi:10.1111/1536-7150.t01-1-00012.
Searle, John R. 2003d. “Social Ontology and Political Power.” in Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality, edited by Frederick F. Schmitt, pp. 195–210. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Reprinted in Smith, B., Mark and Ehrlich (2008, 19–34).
Searle, John R. 2005a. “What is an Institution?” Journal of Institutional Economics 1(1): 1–22, doi:10.1017/S1744137405000020.
Searle, John R. 2005b. “The Phenomenological Illusion.” in Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Experience and Analysis, edited by Maria Elisabeth Reicher and Johann Christian Marek. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 33. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. Reprinted in Searle (2008a, 107–136).
Searle, John R. 2005c. “The Self as a Problem in Philosophy and Neurobiology.” in The Lost Self: Pathologies of the Brain and Identity, edited by Todd E. Feinberg and Julian Paul Keenan. New York: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Searle (2008a, 137–151).
Searle, John R. 2005d. “Desire, Deliberation and Action.” in Logic, Thought and Action, edited by Daniel Vanderveken, pp. 49–78. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science n. 2. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/1-4020-3167-x.
Searle, John R. 2006a. “Social Ontology: Some Basic Principles.” Anthropological Theory 6(1): 12–29. Reprinted in Searle (2008a, 26–52).
Searle, John R. 2006b. “Culture and Fusion. Reply to D’Andrade.” Anthropological Theory 6(1): 40–44.
Searle, John R. 2007a. “Biological Naturalism.” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, edited by Max Velmans and Susan Schneider, pp. 325–334. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Searle, John R. 2007b. “Social Ontology: The Problem and Steps toward a Solution.” in Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts. Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 11–28. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6104-2.
Searle, John R. 2007c. “Neuroscience, Intentionality and Free Will: Reply to Habermas [on Habermas (2007)].” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10(1): 69–76.
Searle, John R. 2007d. “What is Language: Some Preliminary Remarks.” in John Searle’s Philosophy of Language. Force, Meaning and Mind, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 15–48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, John R. 2007e. “Illocutionary Acts and the Concept of Truth.” in Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, edited by Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, pp. 31–40. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 6. London: Routledge.
Searle, John R. 2007f. “Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society.” in Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and their Representation , edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, pp. 3–17. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199250981.001.0001.
Searle, John R. 2008a. Philosophy in a New Century. Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, John R. 2008b. “The Unity of the Proposition.” in Philosophy in a New Century. Selected Essays, pp. 181–196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, John R. 2008c. “The Turing Test: 55 Years Later.” in Parsing the Turing Test: Philosophical and Methodological Issues in the Quest for the Thinking Computer, edited by Roger Epstein, Gary Roberts, and Grace Beber, pp. 139–150. Berlin: Springer. Reprinted in Searle (2008a, 53–66).
Searle, John R. 2010a. Making the Social World. The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195396171.001.0001.
Searle, John R. 2010b. “The Unity of the Proposition.” Conceptus: Zeitschrift für Philosophie 39(96): 41–60.
Searle, John R. 2011a. “Summary [of Searle (2010a)].” Analysis 71(4): 695–696.
Searle, John R. 2011b. “Replies [on Fotion (2011; Tuomela 2011; Rust 2011).” Analysis 71(4): 733–741.
Searle, John R. 2011c. “Wittgenstein and the Background.” American Philosophical Quarterly 48(2): 119–128.
Searle, John R. 2012a. “Meaning as a Biological and Social Phenomenon.” in Prospects for Meaning, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 553–566. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Searle, John R. 2012b. “Intentionality.” in Intentionality. Historical and Systematic Perspectives, edited by Alessandro Salice, pp. 9–22. Basic Philosophical Concepts. München: Philosophia Verlag, doi:10.2307/j.ctv2nrzhb6.
Searle, John R. 2013a. “Reconciling the Basic Reality and the Human Reality – Post Kantian Themes.” in Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, volume 1, edited by Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca, and Margit Ruffing, pp. 407–430. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Searle, John R. 2013b. “Intentions, Actions and Explanations.” in Acting Intentionally and Its Limits: Individuals, Groups, Institutions, edited by Gottfried Seebass, Michael Schmitz, and Peter M. Gollwitzer, pp. 47–56. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Searle, John R. 2014. “Recollections of J.L. Austin.” in J.L. Austin on Language, edited by Brian Garvey, pp. 1–12. Philosophers in Depth. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Searle, John R. 2015. Seeing Things as They Are. A Theory of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385157.001.0001.
Searle, John R. 2017. “Status Functions.” in The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, edited by Marija Jankovic and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 300–312. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Searle, John R. 2018. “Are there Non-Propositional Intentional States?” in Non-Propositional Intentionality, edited by Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague, pp. 259–271. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198732570.001.0001.
Searle, John R. and Ferraris, Maurizio. 2018. Il denaro e i suoi inganni. Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore s.p.a.
Searle, John R., Kiefer, Ferenc and Bierwisch, Manfred, eds. 1980. Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics. Synthese Language Library n. 10. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Searle, John R. and Vanderveken, Daniel. 1985. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, John R. and Vanderveken, Daniel. 2005. “Speech Acts and Illocutionary Logic.” in Logic, Thought and Action, edited by Daniel Vanderveken, pp. 109–132. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science n. 2. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/1-4020-3167-x.
Further References
Anderson, Curtis Anthony and Owens, Joseph, eds. 1990. Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. CSLI Lecture Notes n. 20. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Benacerraf, Paul. 1964. “Comments [on Searle (1962)].” in Knowledge and Experience: Proceedings of the 1962 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, edited by C. D. Rollins, pp. 43–49. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Casati, Roberto, Smith, Barry and White, Graham, eds. 1994. Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 21. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Caton, Charles E., ed. 1963. Philosophy and Ordinary Language. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
Davies, Martin Kinsey. 1989. “Tacit Knowledge and Subdoxastic States.” in Reflections on Chomsky, edited by Alexander George, pp. 131–152. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Macdonald and Macdonald (1995, 309–330).
Fann, Kuang T., ed. 1969. Symposium on J.L. Austin. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1991. “Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room.” in The Nature of Mind, edited by David M. Rosenthal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. and LePore, Ernest. 1994. “What is the Connection Principle?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 837–845.
Fotion, Nicholas. 2011.“Searle (2010a) on Human Rights.” Analysis 71(4): 697–706.
French, Peter A., Uehling, Theodore E., Jr. and Wettstein, Howard K., eds. 1977. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2: Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Second, enlarged edition: French, Uehling and Wettstein (1979).
French, Peter A., Uehling, Theodore E., Jr. and Wettstein, Howard K., eds. 1979. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2: Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. First edition: French, Uehling and Wettstein (1977).
Furberg, Mats. 1963. Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts: A Main Theme in J.L. Austin’s Philosophy. Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckerii Aktiebolag.
Grewendorf, Günther and Meggle, Georg, eds. 2002. Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality. Discussions with John Searle. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy n. 79. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2007. “The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10(1): 13–50.
Haugeland, John, ed. 1981. Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Jacquette, Dale. 1989. “Adventures in the Chinese Room.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49: 605–623.
Khatchadourian, Haig. 1961. The Coherence Theory of Truth: A Critical Evaluation. Beirut: American University.
Klemke, Elmer Daniel, ed. 1968. Essays on Frege. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
Knapp, Steven and Michaels, Walter Benn. 1994. “Reply to John Searle (1994a).” New Literary History 25: 669–675.
Macdonald, Cynthia and Macdonald, Graham F., eds. 1995. Philosophy of Psychology – Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Meijers, Anthonie. 2000. “Mental causation and Searle’s impossible Conception of unconscious intentionality.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8(2): 155–170.
Michael, Michaelis S. and Hawthorne, John, eds. 1994. Philosophy in Mind: the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Philosophical Studies Series n. 60. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Published under the name “John O’Leary-Hawthorne” .
Moural, Josef. 2001. “Two Worries Relating to Searle’s Theory of Rationality [on Searle (2001a)].” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 4(2): 87–90.
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