David M. Rosenthal (rosenthal-dm)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Rosenthal, David M., ed. 1971. Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Second edition: Rosenthal (2000a).
Rosenthal, David M. 1976. “The Necessity of Foreknowledge.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 22–25. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Rosenthal, David M. 1980. “Keeping Matter in Mind.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: Studies in Epistemology, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 295–322. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Rosenthal, David M. 1983. “Emotions and the self.” in Emotion: Philosophical Studies, edited by K. S. Irani and Gerald E. Myers. New York: Haven Publications.
Rosenthal, David M. 1984. “Armstrong’s Causal Theory of Mind.” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 79–119. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Rosenthal, David M. 1986a. “Will and the Theory of Judgement.” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, pp. 405–434. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. Reprinted in Chappell (1997), doi:10.1525/9780520907836.
Rosenthal, David M. 1986b. “Two Concepts of Consciousness.” Philosophical Studies 49: 329–359.
Rosenthal, David M. 1987. “Intentionality.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 151–184. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Silvers (1989, 311–340).
Rosenthal, David M. 1989. “Postscript to Rosenthal (1987).” in Rerepresentation: Readings in the Philosophy of Language, edited by Stuart Silvers, pp. 341–344. Philosophical Studies Series n. 40. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Rosenthal, David M. 1990a. “The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality.” in Philosophical Issues 1: Consciousness, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 15–36. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Rosenthal, David M. 1990b. “Why are Verbally Expressed Thoughts Conscious?” Bielefeld: ZIF.
Rosenthal, David M., ed. 1991. The Nature of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosenthal, David M. 1993a. “State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness.” Consciousness and Cognition 2(3): 355–363, doi:10.1006/ccog.1993.1029.
Rosenthal, David M. 1993b. “Higher-Order Thoughts and the Appendage Theory of Consciousness.” Philosophical Psychology 6: 155–166.
Rosenthal, David M. 1993c. “Multiple Drafts and Higher-Order Thoughts.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 911–918.
Rosenthal, David M. 1993d. “Thinking that One Thinks.” in Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, edited by Martin Kinsey Davies and Glyn W. Humphreys, pp. 197–223. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Burri (1997, 259–287).
Rosenthal, David M. 1994. “First-Person Operationalism and Mental Taxonomy.” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 319–349.
Rosenthal, David M. 1995a. “Moore’s Paradox and Consciousness.” in Philosophical Perspectives 9: AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 313–333. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Rosenthal, David M. 1995b. “Multiple Drafts and the Facts of the Matter.” in Conscious Experience, edited by Thomas Metzinger, pp. 359–372. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
Rosenthal, David M. 1995c. “Self-Knowledge and Moore’s Paradox.” Philosophical Studies 77(2–3): 195–209.
Rosenthal, David M. 1997a. “Apperception, Sensation, and Dissociability.” Mind and Language 12: 206–223.
Rosenthal, David M. 1997b. “A Theory of Consciousness.” in The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates, edited by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan Jr., and Güven Güzeldere, pp. 729–754. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Adapted from a ZiF Technical Report, Bielefeld, 1990.
Rosenthal, David M. 1998. “Consciousness and Its Expression.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22: Philosophy of Emotions, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 294–309. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Rosenthal, David M. 1999a. “The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences.” in Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, edited by Denis Fisette, pp. 95–118. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 62. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9193-5.
Rosenthal, David M. 1999b. “Sensory Quality and the Relocation Story.” Philosophical Topics 26(1–2): 321–350.
Rosenthal, David M., ed. 2000a. Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. 2nd ed. Readings in Philosophy. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co. First edition: Rosenthal (1971).
Rosenthal, David M. 2000b. “Introspection and Self-Interpretation.” Philosophical Topics 28(2): 201–234.
Rosenthal, David M. 2000c. “Consciousness, Interpretation, and Consciousness.” Protosociology 14.
Rosenthal, David M. 2000d. “Consciousness and metacognition.” in Metarepresentation: a Multidisciplinary Perspective, edited by Dan Sperber, pp. 265–297. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science n. 10. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosenthal, David M. 2000e. “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments.” Consciousness and Cognition 9: 203–214.
Rosenthal, David M. 2000f. “Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts [Reply to Balog (2000), Nelson (2000) and Rey (2000)].” Consciousness and Cognition 9: 231–242.
Rosenthal, David M. 2000g. “Content, Interpretation, and Consciousness.” in Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, edited by Don Ross, Andrew Brook, and David L. Thompson, pp. 287–308. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Rosenthal, David M. 2001. “Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field.” Consciousness and Cognition 10: 85–93.
Rosenthal, David M. 2002a. “Explaining Consciousness.” in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by David J. Chalmers, pp. 406–421. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosenthal, David M. 2002b. “The Timing of Conscious States.” Consciousness and Cognition 11: 215–220.
Rosenthal, David M. 2002c. “How Many Kinds of Consciousness?” Consciousness and Cognition 11(4): 653–665, doi:10.1016/S1053-8100(02)00017-X.
Rosenthal, David M. 2003a. “Deux concepts de conscience.” in Philosophie de l’esprit, vol. 2: Problèmes et perspectives, edited by Denis Fisette and Pierre Poirier, pp. 151–194. Textes clés. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin. Traduction de Rosenthal (1986a) par Donald Ipperciel.
Rosenthal, David M. 2003b. “Unity of Consciousness and the Self.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103: 325–352.
Rosenthal, David M. 2004a. “Being Conscious of Ourselves.” The Monist 87(2): 159–181.
Rosenthal, David M. 2004b. “Subjective Character and Reflexive Content [on Perry (2001)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(1): 191–198.
Rosenthal, David M. 2004c. “Varieties of Higher-Order Theory.” in Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. An Anthology, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro, pp. 17–44. Advances in Consciousness Research n. 56. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Rosenthal, David M. 2006. “Experience and the Physical.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(10–11): 117–128.
Rosenthal, David M. 2009. “Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 239–252. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Rosenthal, David M. 2010a. “Consciousness, the Self and Bodily Location.” Analysis 70(2): 270–276.
Rosenthal, David M. 2010b. “How to Think about Mental Qualities.” in Philosophical Issues 20: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 368–393. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Rosenthal, David M. 2010c. “Expressing One’s Mind [on Bar-On (2004)].” Acta Analytica 25(1): 21–34.
Rosenthal, David M. 2011. “Exaggerated Reports: Reply to Block (2011).” Analysis 71(3): 431–437.
Rosenthal, David M. 2015. “Quality Spaces and Sensory Modalities.” in Phenomenal Qualities. Sense, Perception, and Consciousness, edited by Paul Coates and Sam Coleman, pp. 33–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.001.0001.
Rosenthal, David M. 2018. “Seeming to Seem.” in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, edited by Bryce Huebner, pp. 133–164. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001.

Further References

Balog, Katalin. 2000. “Comments on Rosenthal (2000e).” Consciousness and Cognition 9: 215–219.
Bar-On, Dorit. 2004. Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199276285.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2011. “The Higher Order Approach to Consciousness is Defunct.” Analysis 71(3): 419–431.
Burri, Alex. 1997. Sprache und Denken / Language and Thought. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Chappell, Vere C., ed. 1997. Descartes’s Meditations, Critical Essays. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Nelson, T. O. 2000. “Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Metacognition.” Consciousness and Cognition 9: 220–223.
Perry, John R. 2001. Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Rey, Georges. 2000. “Role, Not Content: Comments on Rosenthal (2000e).” Consciousness and Cognition 9: 224–230.
Silvers, Stuart, ed. 1989. Rerepresentation: Readings in the Philosophy of Language. Philosophical Studies Series n. 40. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.