Joseph Shieber (shieber-j)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Shieber, Joseph. 1999. “On the Tenability of Non-Factualism with Regard to the A Priori.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80: 379–390.
Shieber, Joseph. 2009a. “Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion.” Philosophia 37(1): 169–181.
Shieber, Joseph. 2009b. “Locke on Testimony: A Reexamination.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 26(1): 21–41.
Shieber, Joseph. 2009c. “Personal Responsibility and Middle Knowledge: A Challenge for the Molinist.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66(2): 61–70.
Shieber, Joseph. 2010. “On the Possibility of Conceptually Structured Experience: Demonstrative Concepts and Fineness of Grain.” Inquiry 53(4): 383–397.
Shieber, Joseph. 2012a. “Against Credibility.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(1): 1–18.
Shieber, Joseph. 2012b. “A Partial Defense of Intuition on Naturalist Grounds.” Synthese 187(2): 321–341.
Shieber, Joseph. 2015. Testimony. A Philosophical Introduction. London: Routledge.
Shieber, Joseph. 2017. “Looks and the Immediacy of Visual Objectual Knowledge.” Analysis 77(4): 741–750.
Shieber, Joseph. 2019. “Expanding the Scope of Reflective Knowledge: From MINE to OURS.” in Philosophical Issues 29: Epistemology, edited by Lisa Miracchi, pp. 241–253. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12151.
Shieber, Joseph. 2020. “Socially Distributed Cognition and the Epistemology of Testimony.” in The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, edited by Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, and Jeremy Wyatt, pp. 87–95. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Shieber, Joseph. 2022. “Challenging the Ability Intuition: From Personal to Extended to Distributed Belief-Forming Processes.” in Philosophical Issues 32: Epistemology, edited by John Greco and Deborah Perron Tollefsen, pp. 351–366. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12222.
Shieber, Joseph. 2023. “An Idle and Most False Imposition: Truth-Seeking vs. Status-Seeking and the Failure of Epistemic Vigilance.” Philosophic Exchange 52.