Alex Silk (silk-a)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Dunaway, Billy and Silk, Alex. 2014. “Wither Anankastics?” in Philosophical Perspectives 28: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 75–94. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Silk, Alex. 2013. “Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VIII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 195–222. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.001.0001.
Silk, Alex. 2014a. “Why ‘Ought’ Detaches: Or, Why You Ought to Get with My Friends (If You Want to Be My Lover).” Philosophers' imprint 14(7).
Silk, Alex. 2014b. “Accommodation and Negotiation with Context-Sensitive Expressions.” Thought 3(2): 115–123.
Silk, Alex. 2014c. “Evidence Sensitivity in Weak Necessity Deontic Modals.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 43(4): 691–723.
Silk, Alex. 2015a. “Nietzschean Constructivism: Ethics and Metaethics for All and None.” Inquiry 58(3): 244–280.
Silk, Alex. 2015b. “What Normative Terms Mean and Why it Matters for Ethical Theory.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume V, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 296–326. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744665.001.0001.
Silk, Alex. 2016. Discourse Contextualism. A Framework for Contextualist Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783923.001.0001.
Silk, Alex. 2017a. “How to Embed an Epistemic Modal: Attitude Problems and Other Defects of Character.” Philosophical Studies 174(7): 1773–1799.
Silk, Alex. 2017b. “Normative Language in Context.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 206–243. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805076.001.0001.
Silk, Alex. 2017c. “Critical Notice of Fletcher and Ridge (2014).” Analysis 77(1): 197–211.
Silk, Alex. 2018. “Metaethical Contextualism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, pp. 102–118. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315213217.

Further References

Fletcher, Guy and Ridge, Michael, eds. 2014. Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.