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Keith Simmons (simmons-k)

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Bibliography

    Bar-On, Dorit and Simmons, Keith. 2006. Deflationism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 607–631. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
    Bar-On, Dorit and Simmons, Keith. 2007. The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth.” in Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, edited by Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, pp. 61–89. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 6. London: Routledge.
    Blackburn, Simon and Simmons, Keith, eds. 1999. Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Littmann, Greg and Simmons, Keith. 2004. A Critique of Dialetheism.” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 314–335. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
    Simmons, Keith. 1989. Kant on Moral Worth.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 6(1): 85–100.
    Simmons, Keith. 1990. The Diagonal Argument and the Liar.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 19(3): 277–303.
    Simmons, Keith. 1993. Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Simmons, Keith. 1994. A Paradox of Definability: Richard’s and Poincaré’s Way Out.” History and Philosophy of Logic 15(1): 33–44.
    Simmons, Keith. 1999. Deflationary Truth and the Liar.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 28(5): 455–488.
    Simmons, Keith. 2000. Three Paradoxes: Circles and Singularities.” in Circularity, Definition, and Truth, edited by André Chapuis and Anil Gupta, pp. 333–354. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
    Simmons, Keith. 2002. Semantical and Logical Paradox.” in A Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Dale Jacquette, pp. 115–130. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470996751.
    Simmons, Keith. 2003. Reference and Paradox.” in Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 230–252. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Simmons, Keith. 2004. A Logico-Philosophical Tour: The Search for Certainty.” Philosophia Mathematica 12(2): 162–175.
    Simmons, Keith. 2005a. Truth.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Simmons, Keith. 2005b. A Berry and a Russell without Self-Reference.” Philosophical Studies 126(2): 253–261.
    Simmons, Keith. 2006. Deflationism and the Autonomy of Truth [on Hill (2002)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(1): 196–204.
    Simmons, Keith. 2007. Revenge and Context.” in Revenge of the Liar. New Essays on the Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 345–368. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199233915.001.0001.
    Simmons, Keith. 2009. Tarski’s Logic.” in Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 5: Logic from Russell to Church, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods, pp. 511–616. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.
    Simmons, Keith. 2018a. Semantic Singularities. Paradoxes of Reference, Predication, and Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198791546.001.0001.
    Simmons, Keith. 2018b. Contextual Theories of Truth and Paradox.” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by Michael Glanzberg, pp. 755–785. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.

Further References

    Hill, Christopher S. 2002. Thought and World. An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.