Christopher S. Hill (hill-cs)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bennett, David J. and Hill, Christopher S., eds. 2014a. Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.001.0001.
Bennett, David J. and Hill, Christopher S. 2014b. “A Unity Pluralist Account of the Unity of Experience.” in Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, edited by David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill, pp. 233–254. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.001.0001.
Brewer, Bill, Bruijn, David de, Hill, Christopher S., Pautz, Adam, Rosenhagen, T. Raja, Vuletić, Miloŝ and Wu, Wayne. 2018. “Discussion of Brewer (2018).” Analytic Philosophy 59(1): 19–32.
Carlstrom, Ian F. and Hill, Christopher S. 1978. “Review of Sosa (1975).” Philosophy of Science 45(1): 155–158.
Creary, Lewis G. and Hill, Christopher S. 1975. “Review of Lewis (1973).” Philosophy of Science 42: 341–344.
Emery, Nina and Hill, Christopher S. 2017. “Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment (2014).” Analysis 77(1): 134–148.
Gozzano, Simone and Hill, Christopher S., eds. 2012a. New Perspectives on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gozzano, Simone and Hill, Christopher S. 2012b. “Introduction.” in New Perspectives on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical, edited by Simone Gozzano and Christopher S. Hill, pp. 1–15. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 1976. “Toward a Theory of Meaning for Belief Sentences.” Philosophical Studies 30: 209–226.
Hill, Christopher S. 1977. “Of Bats, Brains, and Minds.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38: 100–106.
Hill, Christopher S. 1979. “Covenant Theology and the Concept of ‘A Public Person’ .” in Powers, Possessions and Freedom. Essays in Honour of C.B. Macpherson, edited by Alkis Kontos. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 1981. “Why Cartesian Intuitions are Compatible with the Identity Thesis.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42: 254–265.
Hill, Christopher S. 1982. “On a Revised Version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63(3): 236–242.
Hill, Christopher S. 1984. “In Defense of Type Materialism.” Synthese 59: 295–320.
Hill, Christopher S. 1985. “On Getting to Know Others.” Philosophical Topics 13(2): 257–265.
Hill, Christopher S. 1987. “Rudiments of a Theory of Reference.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28(2): 200–219.
Hill, Christopher S. 1988a. “Introspective Awareness of Sensations.” Topoi 7: 11–24.
Hill, Christopher S. 1988b. “Intentionality, Folk Psychology, and Reduction [on Nelson (1988)].” in Perspectives on Mind, edited by Herbert R. Otto and James Alan Tuedio, pp. 169–180. Synthese Library n. 194. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Hill, Christopher S. 1991. Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 1996. “Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(3): 567–581.
Hill, Christopher S. 1997. “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophical Studies 87: 61–85.
Hill, Christopher S. 1998. “Chalmers on the Apriority of Modal Knowledge.” Analysis 58: 20–26.
Hill, Christopher S. 1999. “Truth in the Realm of Thoughts.” Philosophical Studies 96: 87–121.
Hill, Christopher S. 2001. “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: Reconciling Deflationary Semantics with Correspondence Intuitions.” Philosophical Studies 104(3): 292–321.
Hill, Christopher S. 2002. Thought and World. An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 2004. “Ouch! An Essay on Pain.” in Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. An Anthology, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro, pp. 339–362. Advances in Consciousness Research n. 56. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Hill, Christopher S. 2005a. “Remarks on Papineau (2004).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(1): 147–154.
Hill, Christopher S. 2005b. “Ow! The Paradox of Pain.” in Pain. New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede, pp. 75–98. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 2006a. “Replies to Marian David (2006),Anil Gupta (2006), and Keith Simmons (2006).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(1): 205–222.
Hill, Christopher S. 2006b. “Précis of Hill (2002).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(1): 174–222.
Hill, Christopher S. 2006c. “Harman on Self Referential Thoughts.” in Philosophical Issues 16: Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest Sosa, pp. 346–357. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Hill, Christopher S. 2006d. “Perceptual Consciousness: How It Opens Directly Onto the Wolrd, Preferring the World to the Mind.” in Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford, pp. 249–272. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 2006e. “Modality, Modal Epistemology, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness.” in The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, pp. 205–236. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.001.0001.
Hill, Christopher S. 2009a. Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 2009b. “Critical Notice of Goldberg (2007).” Philosophical Books 50(2): 112–123.
Hill, Christopher S. 2010a. “Intentionality Downsized.” in Philosophical Issues 20: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 144–169. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Hill, Christopher S. 2010b. “I Love Machery’s Book, but Love Concepts More [on Machery (2009)].” Philosophical Studies 149(3): 411–421.
Hill, Christopher S. 2012a. Virtue, Rules, and Justice. Kantian Aspirations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 2012b. “Reply to Byrne (2012) and Dretske (2012).” Philosophical Studies 161(3): 503–511.
Hill, Christopher S. 2012c. “Précis of Hill (2009a).” Philosophical Studies 161(3): 483–487.
Hill, Christopher S. 2012d. “Locating Qualia: Do They Reside in the Brain or in the Body and the World?” in New Perspectives on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical, edited by Simone Gozzano and Christopher S. Hill, pp. 127–149. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 2013. “Concepts, Teleology, and Rational Revision.” in The A Priori in Philosophy, edited by Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow, pp. 134–157. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001.
Hill, Christopher S. 2014. Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665822.001.0001.
Hill, Christopher S. 2015. “Visual Awareness and Visual Qualia.” in Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World. Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim, edited by Terence E. Horgan, Marcelo Sabatés, and David Sosa, pp. 167–189. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139939539.
Hill, Christopher S. 2016a. “Précis of Hill (2014).” Philosophical Studies 173(3): 827–829.
Hill, Christopher S. 2016b. “Replies to Byrne (2016) McGrath (2016) and McLaughlin (2016).” Philosophical Studies 173(3): 861–872.
Hill, Christopher S. 2016c. “Deflationism: The Best Thing since Pizza and Quite Possibly Better.” Philosophical Studies 173(12): 3169–3180.
Hill, Christopher S. 2016d. “Perceptual Relativity.” Philosophical Topics 44(2): 179–200.
Hill, Christopher S. 2016e. “Goldman on Knowledge of Mind.” in Goldman and His Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith, pp. 259–279. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Hill, Christopher S. 2016f. “Conceivability and Possibility.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 326–347. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.
Hill, Christopher S. 2017. “Fault Lines in Familiar Concepts of Pain.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain, edited by Jennifer Corns, pp. 60–70. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Hill, Christopher S. 2020a. “Consciousness and Memory.” in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 520–537. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 2020b. “Appearance and Reality.” in Philosophical Issues 30: Perceptual Evidence, edited by Matthew McGrath and Susanna Schellenberg, pp. 175–191. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12179.
Hill, Christopher S. 2022. Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192867766.001.0001.
Hill, Christopher S. and Bennett, David J. 2008. “The Perception of Size and Shape.” in Philosophical Issues 18: Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 294–315. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Hill, Christopher S. and McLaughlin, Brian P. 1998. “There are Fewer Things in Reality than are Dreamt of in Chalmers’ Philosophy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58.
Hill, Christopher S. and Schechter, Joshua. 2007. “Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief.” in Philosophical Issues 17: The Metaphysics of Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 102–122. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Further References

Brewer, Bill. 2018. “Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason.” Analytic Philosophy 59(1): 1–18.
Byrne, Alex. 2012. “Hmm…Hill on the Paradox of Pain [on Hill (2009a)].” Philosophical Studies 161(3): 489–496.
Byrne, Alex. 2016. “The Epistemic Significance of Experience.” Philosophical Studies 173(4): 947–967.
David, Marian A. 2006. “A Substitutional Theory of Truth? [on Hill (2002)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(1): 182–189.
Dretske, Fred I. 2012. “Chris Hill’s Consciousness Hill (2009a).” Philosophical Studies 161(3): 497–502.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2007. Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gupta, Anil. 2006. “Remarks on Hill (2002).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(1): 190–195.
Kment, Boris. 2014. Modality and Explanatory Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604685.001.0001.
Lewis, David. 1973. Counterfactuals. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Cited after republication as Lewis (2001).
Lewis, David. 2001. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Republication of Lewis (1973).
Machery, Edouard. 2009. Doing without Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.001.0001.
McGrath, Matthew. 2016. “Hill on Epistemology [on Hill (2014)].” Philosophical Studies 173(3): 841–849.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2016. “Hill on Phenomenal Consciousness [on Hill (2014)].” Philosophical Studies 173(3): 851–860.
Nelson, Raymond J. 1988. “Mechanism and Intentionality: The New World Knot.” in Perspectives on Mind, edited by Herbert R. Otto and James Alan Tuedio, pp. 137–158. Synthese Library n. 194. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Papineau, David. 2004. Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001.
Simmons, Keith. 2006. “Deflationism and the Autonomy of Truth [on Hill (2002)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(1): 196–204.
Sosa, Ernest, ed. 1975. Causation and Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.