P. Kyle Stanford (stanford)

Mentionné.e sur les pages du portail suivantes

Contributions à Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

O’Connor, Cailin, Fulton, Nathan, Wagner, Elliott and Stanford, P. Kyle. 2012. “Deus Ex Machina: A Cautionary Tale for Naturalists [on Kitcher (2011)].” Analyse & Kritik 34(1): 51–62.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 1998. “Reference and Natural Kind Terms: The Real Essence of Locke’s View.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79(1): 78–97. Reprinted in Anstey (2006).
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2002. “The Manifest Connection: Causation, Meaning, and David Hume.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 40(3): 339–360.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2006. Exceeding our Grasp. Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195174089.001.0001.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2009. “Underdetermination of Scientific Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/scientific-underdetermination/.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2010. “Protecting Rainforest Realism [review of Ladyman and Ross (2007)].” Metascience 19.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2013. “Underdetermination of Scientific Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/scientific-underdetermination/.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2015a. “Reading Nature: Realist, Instrumentalist, and Quietist Interpretations of Scientific Theories.” in Physical Theory. Method and Interpretation, edited by Lawrence Sklar, pp. 94–126. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195145649.001.0001.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2015b. “ ‘Atoms Exist’ is Probably True, and Other Facts That should Not Comfort Scientific Realists.” The Journal of Philosophy 112(8): 397–416.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2016. “Naturalism without Scientism.” in The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, edited by Kelly James Clark, pp. 91–108. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118657775.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2017a. “So Long, and Thanks for All the Fish: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science.” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. New Essays, edited by Matthew H. Slater and Zanja Yudell, pp. 127–140. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199363209.001.0001.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2017b. “Unconceived Alternatives and the Strategy of Historical Ostension.” in The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism, edited by Juha Saatsi, pp. 212–224. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780203712498.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2017c. “Underdetermination of Scientific Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/scientific-underdetermination/.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2018. “A Fond Farewell to ‘Approximate Truth’?” Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 9(1): 78–81.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2023. “Underdetermination of Scientific Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/scientific-underdetermination/.
Stanford, P. Kyle and Kitcher, Philip. 2000. “Refining the Causal Theory of Reference for Natural Kind Terms.” Philosophical Studies 97: 99–129.

Further References

Anstey, Peter R., ed. 2006. John Locke. Critical Assessments. Volume III: Metaphysics. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. London: Routledge.
Kitcher, Philip. 2011. The Ethical Project. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Ladyman, James and Ross, Don. 2007. Every Thing Must Go. Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press. With David Spurrett and John Collier, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001.