Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (steglichpetersen)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Dennett, Daniel C. and Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2008. “The Philosophical Lexicon.” 7th edition: Dennett and Lambert (1978).
Praëm, Sara Kier and Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2015. “Philosophical Thought Experiments as Heuristics for Theory Discovery.” Synthese 192(9): 2827–2842.
Rasmussen, Mattias Skipper, Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn and Bjerring, Jens Christian. 2018. “A Higher-Order Approach to Disagreement.” Episteme 15(1): 80–100.
Reisner, Andrew and Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn, eds. 2011a. Reasons for Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reisner, Andrew and Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2011b. “Introduction.” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 1–10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skipper, Mattias and Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn, eds. 2019a. Higher-Order Evidence. New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001.
Skipper, Mattias and Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2019b. “Introduction.” in Higher-Order Evidence. New Essays, edited by Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 1–12. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2003a. “Davidson, Truth, and Semantic Unity.” SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy 4(2): 124–146.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2003b. “Review of Neale (2001).” SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy 4(1): 177–181.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2005. “Williamson on Knowledge, Action and Causation.” SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy 6(1): 15–28.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2006. “Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation.” South African Journal of Philosophy / Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif Vir Wysbegeerte 25(2): 171–176.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2008a. “Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism?” Dialectica 62(4): 541–547.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2008b. “Against Essential Normativity of the Mental.” Philosophical Studies 140(2): 263–283.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2009. “Weighing the Aim of Belief.” Philosophical Studies 145(3): 395–405.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2010a. “The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Glüer and Wikforss (2010).” Mind 119(475): 749–755.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn, ed. 2010b. Metaphysics: 5 Questions. Copenhagen: Automatic Press.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2011a. “Against Essential Mental Normativity Again.” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 50(2): 333–346.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2011b. “How to Be a Teleologist about Epistemic Reasons.” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 13–33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2013. “The No Guidance Argument.” Theoria 79(3): 279–283.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2014. “Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification.” in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan, pp. 204–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.001.0001.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2015. “The Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Two Puzzles Resolved.” Erkenntnis 80(5): 1013–1021.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2016. “A Reply to Céspedes’ Defense of Causal Contrastivism (cespedes:2015?).” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 48(143): 93–98.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2017. “Fictional Persuasion and the Nature of Belief.” in Art and Belief, edited by Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley, and Paul Noordhof, pp. 174–193. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805403.001.0001.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2018. “Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief.” in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 260–280. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2019. “Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.” in Higher-Order Evidence. New Essays, edited by Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 209–225. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001.

Further References

Dennett, Daniel C. and Lambert, Karel. 1978. The Philosophical Lexicon. 7th ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers. 8th edition: Dennett and Steglich-Petersen (2008).
Glüer, Kathrin and Wikforss, Åsa Maria. 2010. “The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Steglich-Petersen (2010a).” Mind 119(475): 757–761.
Neale, Stephen. 2001. Facing Facts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199247153.001.0001.