Daniel C. Dennett (dennett)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Dennett, Daniel C. 1969. Content and Consciousness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Second edition: Dennett (1986a).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1971. “Intentional Systems.” The Journal of Philosophy 68: 87–106. Reprinted in Dennett (1978a, 3–22) and in Haugeland (1981, 220–242).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1973. “Mechanism and Responsibility.” in Essays on Freedom of Action, edited by Ted Honderich. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Reprinted in Dennett (1978a, 233–255), doi:10.4324/9781315719481.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1974. “Comments on Wilfrid Sellars (1974).” Synthese 27(3): 439–444.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1975a. “Why the Law of Effect Will Not Go Away.” Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior ?? 169–176. Reprinted in Lycan (1990) and Dennett (1978a, 71–89).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1975b. “Brain Writing and Mind Reading.” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume VII: Language, Mind, and Knowledge, edited by Keith Gunderson, pp. 403–415. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Dennett (1978a, 39–51).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1976a. “Conditions of Personhood.” in The Identities of Persons, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, pp. 175–196. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. Reprinted in Dennett (1978a, 267–285), doi:10.1525/9780520353060.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1976b. “Are Dream Experiences?” The Philosophical Review 85(2): 151–177. Reprinted in Dennett (1978a, 129–148).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1977. “A Cure for the Common Code?” Mind 86: 265–280. Reprinted in Dennett (1978a, 90–108).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978a. Brainstorms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Dennett (2017a).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978b. “Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume IX: Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, edited by C. Wade Savage, pp. 201–228. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Dennett (1978a, 149–173).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978c. “Skinner Skinned.” in Brainstorms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, pp. 53–70. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Dennett (2017a).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978d. “Where I Am?” in Brainstorms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, pp. 310–323. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Dennett (2017a).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978e. “Reply to Arbib and Gunderson.” in Brainstorms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, pp. 23–38. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Dennett (2017a).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978f. “Two Approaches to Mental Images.” in Brainstorms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, pp. 174–189. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Dennett (2017a).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978g. “Why You Can’t Make a Computer That Feels Pain.” Synthese 38. Reprinted in Dennett (1978a, 190–231).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978h. “The Abilities of Men and Machines.” in Brainstorms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, pp. 256–266. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Dennett (2017a).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978i. “On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want.” in Brainstorms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, pp. 286–299. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Dennett (2017a).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978j. “How to Change Your Mind.” in Brainstorms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, pp. 300–309. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Dennett (2017a).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978k. “Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind.” American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 249–261.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978l. “Review of Casey (1976).” The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9(3): 139–143.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1979a. “On the absence of phenomenology.” in Body, Mind, and Method. Essays in Honor of Virgil C. Aldrich, edited by Donald F. Gustafson and Bangs L. Tapscott, pp. 93–114. Synthese Library n. 138. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1979b. “The Onus Re Experiences: A Reply to Emmett.” Philosophical Studies 35: 315–318.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1979c. “Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology.” in Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence, edited by Martin H. Ringle. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press. Reprinted in Dennett (1978a, 109–127).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1981a. “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works.” in Scientific Explanation, edited by Anthony F. Heath, pp. 53–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Dennett (1987a, 13–36).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1981b. “Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology.” in Reduction, Time, and Reality. Studies in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences, edited by Richard A. Healey, pp. 37–62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Dennett (1987a, 43–68) and in Christensen and Turner (1993, 121–143).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1981c. “Wondering Where the Yellow Went.” The Monist 64(1): 102–108.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1981d. “Making Sense of Ourselves.” Philosophical Topics 12(1): 63–81. Reprinted in Lycan (1990) and Dennett (1987a, 83–102).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1982a. “Beyond Belief.” in Thought and Object – Essays on Intentionality, edited by Andrew Woodfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Dennett (1987a, 117–202).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1982b. “Recent Work in Philosophy of Interest to AI.” Artificial Intelligence 19(1): 3–5.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1982c. “How to Study Human Consciousness Empirically, or, Nothing Comes to Mind.” Synthese 53: 159–180.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1983a. “Styles of Mental Representation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83: 213–226. Reprinted in Dennett (1987a, 213–226).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1983b. “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ Defended.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6: 343–390. Reprinted in Dennett (1987a, 237–268).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1984a. Elbow Room – The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1984b. “Review of Fodor (1983).” Contemporary Psychology 29: 285–286.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1984c. “Recent Work in Philosophy II.” Artificial Intelligence 22(3): 231–233.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1984d. “I Could Not Have Done Otherwise – So What?” The Journal of Philosophy 81(10): 553–565, doi:10.5840/jphil1984811022.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1984e. “Can Machines Think?” in How We Know, edited by M. Shafto. New York: Harper & Row.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1984f. “Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI.” in Minds, Machines, and Evolution: Philosophical Studies, edited by Christopher Hookway, pp. 129–152. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Pylyshyn (1987, 41–64).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1984g. “Systèmes intentionnels.” Philosophie 1: 55–80. Intentional Systems, 1969, trad. J. Khalfa.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1985. “Why Belief in Belief? (Review of Stich (1983)).” Contemporary Psychology 30: 949.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1986a. Content and Consciousness. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. First edition: Dennett (1969).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1986b. “Julian Jaynes’ Software Archaeology.” Canadian Psychology 27: 149–154.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1986c. “The logical geography of computational approaches: A view from the east pole.” in The Representation of Knowledge and Belief, edited by Myles Brand and Robert M. Harnish, pp. 59–79. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1986d. “Is there an Autonomous ‘Knowledge Level’?” in Meaning and Cognitive Structure: Issues in the Computational Theory of Mind, edited by Zenon W. Pylyshyn and William Demopoulos. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Co.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987a. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987b. “Evolution, Error, and Intentionality.” in The Intentional Stance, pp. 287–322. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987c. “Fast Thinking.” in The Intentional Stance, pp. 323–338. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987d. “Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast.” in The Intentional Stance, pp. 339–350. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987e. “Setting Off on the Right Foot.” in The Intentional Stance, pp. 1–12. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987f. “Reflections [on Dennett (1981a)]: Real Patterns, Deeper Facts, and Empty Questions.” in The Intentional Stance, pp. 37–42. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987g. “Reflections [on Dennett (1981b)]: Instrumentalism Reconsidered.” in The Intentional Stance, pp. 69–82. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987h. “Reflections [on Dennett (1981d)]: When Frogs (and Others) Make Mistakes.” in The Intentional Stance, pp. 103–116. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987i. “Reflections [on Dennett (1982a)]: About Aboutness.” in The Intentional Stance, pp. 203–212. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987j. “Reflections [on Dennett (1983a)]: The Language of Thought Reconsidered.” in The Intentional Stance, pp. 227–236. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987k. “Reflections [on Dennett (1983b)]: Interpreting Monkeys, Theorists, and Genes.” in The Intentional Stance, pp. 269–286. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1988a. “Quining Qualia.” in Consciousness in Contemporary Science, edited by Anthony J. Marcel and Edoardo Bisiach. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1988b. “Review of Fodor (1987).” The Journal of Philosophy 85: 384–389.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1988c. “Précis of Dennett (1987a).” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11: 495–546.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1988d. “Fear of Darwin’s optimizing rationale.” Unpublished manuscript, University of California at Los Angeles.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1988e. “The Evolution of Consciousness.” Unpublished manuscript, University of California at Los Angeles.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1989a. “The Moral First Aid Manual.” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, volume 8, edited by Sterling M. McMurrin. vol. 8. Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1989b. “The Origins of Selves.” Cogito 3: 163–173.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1989c. “Cognitive Ethology: Hunting for Bargains or a Wild Goose Chase?” in No-Goals and Own Goals, edited by Alan Montefiore. London: Unwin Hyman.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1990a. La stratégie de l’interprète. Paris: Gallimard. Traduction de Dennett (1983a) par Pascal Engel.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1990b. “The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1990c. “Artificial Life: A Feast for the Imagination.” Biology and Philosophy 5(4): 489–492.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1990d. “Ways of Establishing Harmony.” in Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 18–27. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in McLaughlin (1991, 119–130).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1991a. Consciousness Explained. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown; Co.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1991b. “Real Patterns.” The Journal of Philosophy 88(1): 27–51, doi:10.2307/2027085.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1991c. “Granny’s Campaign for Safe Science.” in Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Georges Rey, pp. 87–94. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1991d. “Mother Nature versus the Walking Encyclopedia.” in Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, edited by William M. Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich, and David E. Rumelhart, pp. 21–29. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1991e. “Two Contrasts: Folk Craft vs Folk Science and Belief vs Opinion.” in The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science, edited by John D. Greenwood, pp. 135–148. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1991f. “Lovely and Suspect Qualities.” in Philosophical Issues 1: Consciousness, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 37–43. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1992. “The Self as the Center of Narrative Gravity.” in.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1993a. “Caveat Emptor.” Consciousness and Cognition 2(1): 48–57.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1993b. “Living on the Edge.” Inquiry 36: 135–159.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1993c. “Précis of Dennett (1991a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 889–931.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1993d. “Review of Newell (1992).” Artificial Intelligence 59(1–2): 285–294.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1993e. La conscience expliquée. Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob. Traduction de Dennett (1991a) par Pascal Engel.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1993f. “Back from the Drawing Board.” in Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind, edited by Bo Dahlbom, pp. 203–235. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994a. “The Practical Requirements for Making a Conscious Robot.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series A: Physical Sciences and Engineering 349(1689): 133–146.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994b. “Instead of qualia.” in Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience, edited by Antti Revonsuo and Matti Kamppinen. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994c. “Language and Intelligence.” in What is Intelligence?, edited by Jean Khalfa, pp. 161–178. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994d. “The Myth of Original Intentionality.” in Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Essays on the Intentionality of Machines, edited by Eric Dietrich, pp. 91–107. New York: Academic Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994e. “Cognitive Science as Reverse Engineering. Several Meanings of ‘Top-Down’ and ‘Bottom-Up’ .” in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IX: Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Swede, August 7-14, 1991, edited by Dag Prawitz, Brian Skyrms, and Dag Westerståhl, pp. 679–691. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics n. 134. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994f. “Scale Up in the Fox Islands Thorofare [Reply to Fox (1994)].” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 506–510.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994g. “Dretske’s Blind Spot [Reply to Dretske (1994)].” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 511–517.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994h. “Truth-Makers, Cow-Sharks, and Lecterns [reply to McLaughlin and Hawthorne (1994)].” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 517–530.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994i. “Superficialism versus Hysterical Realism [reply to Rey (1994)].” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 530–537.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994j. “Otto and the Zombies [Reply to Levine (1994) and van Gulick (1994)].” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 537–542.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994k. “Higher-Order Thoughts and Mental Blocks [Reply to Rosenthal (1994) and Block (1994)].” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 543–551.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994l. “Qualia Refuse to Go Quietly [Reply to Tolliver (1994) and White (1994)].” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 551–558.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1994m. “Luck, Regret, and Kinds of Persons [Reply to Slote (1994) and Rovane (1994)].” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 558–568.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995a. “Artificial Life As Philosophy.” in Artificial Life: An Overview, edited by Christopher G. Langton, pp. 291–292. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995b. “Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why?” Social Research 62: 691–710.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995c. “Cog: Steps toward Consciousness in Robots.” in Conscious Experience, edited by Thomas Metzinger, pp. 471–488. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995d. “Do Animals Have Beliefs?” in Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science, edited by Herbert L. Roitblat and Jean-Arcady Meyer. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995e. “Postscript to Dennett (1987b).” in Contemporary Materialism. A Reader, edited by Paul K. Moser and J. D. Trout, pp. 286–288. London: Routledge.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995f. “Is Perception the ‘Leading Edge’ of Memory.” in Memory and Oblivion, edited by A. Spafadora. ? ?
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995g. “The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2: 322–326.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995h. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning of Life. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995i. “The Path Not Taken.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18(2): 252–253. Reprinted in Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere (1997, 417–420).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1996a. Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness. New York: Basic Books.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1996b. “Producing Future by Telling Stories.” in The Robot’s Dilemma Revisited: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence, edited by Kenneth M. Ford and Zenon W. Pylyshyn, pp. 1–7. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Co.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1996c. “Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 4–6. Reprinted in Shear (1997, 33–36).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1996d. “Seeing is Believing – or is it?” in Perception, edited by Kathleen A. Akins, pp. 158–172. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science n. 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1997a. “Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds.” in Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness, edited by Masao Ito, Yasushi Miyashita, and Edmund T. Rolls, pp. 17–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1997b. “How to do Other Things with Words.” in Thought and Language, edited by John M. Preston, pp. 219–236. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1997c. “The Role of Language in Intelligence.” in Sprache und Denken / Language and Thought, pp. 42–55. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1998a. Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1998b. “The Myth of Double Transduction.” in Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates, edited by Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak, and Alwyn C. Scott, pp. 97–108. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1998c. “Reflections on Language and Mind.” in Language and Thought. Interdisciplinary Themes, edited by Peter Carruthers and Jill Boucher, pp. 284–294. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2000a. Darwin est-il dangereux? Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob. Traduction de Dennett (1995h) par Pascal Engel.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2000b. “With a Little Help from my Friends.” in Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, edited by Don Ross, Andrew Brook, and David L. Thompson, pp. 327–388. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2000c. “The Case for Rorts.” in Rorty and His Critics, edited by Robert B. Brandom, pp. 91–100. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2000d. “Making Tools for Thinking.” in Metarepresentation: a Multidisciplinary Perspective, edited by Dan Sperber, pp. 17–30. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science n. 10. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2001a. “Are we Explaining Consciousness Yet?” Cognition 79(1–2): 221–237.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2001b. “Things about Things.” in Foundations of Cognitive Science, edited by João Branquinho, pp. 133–144. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2001c. “The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition?” in Philosophy at the New Millenium, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 27–43. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2001d. “The Evolution of Culture.” The Monist 84(3): 305–324.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2002a. “Reply to Clark (2002).” in Philosophy of Mental Representation, edited by Hugh Clapin, pp. 91–93. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2002b. “Brian Cantwell Smith on Evolution, Objectivity, and Intentionality.” in Philosophy of Mental Representation, edited by Hugh Clapin, pp. 222–236. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2002c. “Re-Introducting The Concept of Mind.” The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2002d. “Review of Sober and Wilson (1998).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(3): 692–696.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2003a. Freedom Evolves. New York: Viking Press / Penguin Books.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2003b. “In Darwin’s Wake, Where am I?” in The Cambridge Companion to Darwin, edited by Jonathan Hodge and Gregory Radick, 1st ed., pp. 357–376. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2004a. Théorie évolutionniste de la liberté. Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2004b. “Commentary on Dupré (2001).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(2): 473–483.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2005a. Sweet Dreams. Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2005b. “Natural Freedom [on Dennett (2003a)].” Metaphilosophy 36(4): 449–459.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2006a. Breaking the Spell. New York: Viking Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2006b. “Two Steps Closer on Consciousness.” in Paul Churchland, edited by Brian L. Keeley, pp. 193–210. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2007a. “What RoboMary Knows.” in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, edited by Torin Alter and Sven Walter, pp. 15–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2007b. “Atheism and Evolution.” in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, edited by Michael Martin, pp. 135–148. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2009. “Intentional Systems Theory.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 339–350. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2010a. Content and Consciousness. London: Routledge.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2010b. “The Evolution of ‘Why?’ .” in Reading Brandom. On Making It Explicit, edited by Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy Wanderer, pp. 48–62. London: Routledge.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2011a. “Quine in My Life.” American Philosophical Quarterly 48(3): 305–314.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2011b. “Homunculi Rule: Reflections on Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection by Peter Godfrey Smith.” Biology and Philosophy 26(4): 475–488.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2013a. “Kinds of Things – Towards a Bestiary of the Manifest Image.” in Scientific Metaphysics, edited by Don Ross, James Ladyman, and Harold Kincaid, pp. 96–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696499.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2013b. “The Evolution of Reasons.” in Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications, edited by Bana Bashour and Hans D. Muller, pp. 47–62. Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 13. London: Routledge.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2014. Intuition Pumps and other Tools for Thinking. London: Penguin Books.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2015. “Why and How Does Consciousness Seem the Way it Seems?” in Open MIND, edited by Thomas Metzinger and Jennifer M. Windt. Frankfurt a.M.: MIND Group, Philosophisches Seminar der Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2016a. “Darwin and the Overdue Demise of Essentialism.” in How Biology Shapes Philosophy. New Foundations for Naturalism, edited by David Livingstone Smith, pp. 9–22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781107295490.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2016b. “What to Do While Religions Evolve Before Our Very Eyes References.” in The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher, edited by Mark B. Couch and Jessica Pfeifer, pp. 273–288. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199381357.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2017a. Brainstorms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Anniversary edition, wiht a new introduction by the author; first edition: Dennett (1978a), doi:10.7551/mitpress/11146.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2017b. “Jonathan Bennett’s Rationality.” in Ten Neglected Classics of Philosophy, edited by Eric Schliesser, pp. 256–272. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199928903.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2018a. “Reflections on Kukla (2018).” in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, edited by Bryce Huebner, pp. 32–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2018b. “Reflections on Zawidzki (2018).” in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, edited by Bryce Huebner, pp. 57–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2018c. “Reflections on De Brigard (2018).” in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, edited by Bryce Huebner, pp. 92–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2018d. “Reflections on Jackendoff (2018).” in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, edited by Bryce Huebner, pp. 127–131. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2018e. “Reflections on Rosenthal (2018).” in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, edited by Bryce Huebner, pp. 165–170. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2018f. “Reflections on Prinz (2018).” in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, edited by Bryce Huebner, pp. 196–201. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2018g. “Reflections on Clark (2018).” in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, edited by Bryce Huebner, pp. 219–223. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2018h. “Reflections on Godfrey-Smith (2018).” in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, edited by Bryce Huebner, pp. 250–253. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2018i. “Reflections on Faucher and Poirier (2018).” in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, edited by Bryce Huebner, pp. 290–294. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001.
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Further References

Baker, Lynne Rudder. 2018. “Dennett on Breaking the Spell.” in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, edited by Bryce Huebner, pp. 331–344. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001.
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Block, Ned. 2007. Consciousness, Function, and Representation. Collected Papers, Volume 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/2111.001.0001.
Block, Ned, Flanagan, Owen, Jr. and Güzeldere, Güven, eds. 1997. The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Casey, Edward S. 1976. Imagining: A Phenomenological Study. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
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