Helen Steward (steward-h)

Mentionné.e sur les pages du portail suivantes

Contributions à Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Hyman, John and Steward, Helen, eds. 2004. Agency and Action. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Steward, Helen. 1990. “Identity Statements and the Necessary A Posteriori.” The Journal of Philosophy 87: 385–398.
Steward, Helen. 1997a. The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250647.001.0001.
Steward, Helen. 1997b. “On the Notion of Cause ‘Philosophically Speaking’ .” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 125–128.
Steward, Helen. 2008. “Fresh Starts.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108: 197–217.
Steward, Helen. 2009a. “Fairness, Agency and the Flicker of Freedom.” Noûs 43(1): 64–93.
Steward, Helen. 2009b. “Animal Agency.” Inquiry 52(3): 217–231.
Steward, Helen. 2009c. “The Truth in Compatibilism and the Truth of Libertarianism.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 12(2): 167–179.
Steward, Helen. 2009d. “Sub-intentional Actions and the Over-Mentalization of Agency.” in New Essays on the Explanation of Action, edited by Constantine Sandis, pp. 295–312. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Steward, Helen. 2009e. “Free Will.” in Central Issues of Philosophy, edited by John Shand, pp. 152–164. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.
Steward, Helen. 2011. “Perception and the Ontology of Causation.” in Perception, Causation, and Objectivity, edited by Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, and Naomi Eilan, pp. 139–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.001.0001.
Steward, Helen. 2012a. A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552054.001.0001.
Steward, Helen. 2012b. “Actions as Processes.” in Philosophical Perspectives 26: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 373–388. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Steward, Helen. 2013a. “Processes, Continuants, and Individuals.” Mind 122(487): 781–812, doi:10.1093/mind/fzt080.
Steward, Helen. 2013b. “Responses [to Broadie (2013; Boxer 2013; Ford 2013; Frost 2013; Hinshelwood 2013; Douskos 2013; Clancy 2013; Garnett 2013)].” Inquiry 56(6): 681–706.
Steward, Helen. 2014a. “Causing Things and Doing Things.” in Hart on Responsibility, edited by Christopher G. Pulman, pp. 71–90. Philosophers in Depth. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Steward, Helen. 2014b. “Précis of A Metaphysics for Freedom (Steward 2012a).” Res Philosophica 91(3): 513–518.
Steward, Helen. 2014c. “Replies to Clarke (2014), Bishop (2014) and Beebee (2014).” Res Philosophica 91(3): 547–557.
Steward, Helen. 2015a. “What is a Continuant?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 89: 109–123.
Steward, Helen. 2015b. “Agency Incompatibilism and Divine Agency.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7(3): 67–78.
Steward, Helen. 2015c. “Helping It.” in Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, edited by Andrei A. Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell, pp. 153–164. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Steward, Helen. 2016a. “Review of Soteriou (2013).” Mind 125(498): 605–608.
Steward, Helen. 2016b. “Libertarianism as a Naturalistic Position.” in Free Will and Theism. Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns, edited by Kevin Timpe and Daniel Speak, pp. 158–171. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743958.001.0001.
Steward, Helen. 2017. “Action as Downward Causation.” in Philosophy of Action, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 195–215. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Steward, Helen. 2018a. “Occurrent States.” in Process, Action, and Experience, edited by Rowland Stout, pp. 102–119. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198777991.001.0001.
Steward, Helen. 2018b. “Morgan’s Canon: Animal Psychology in the Twentieth Century and Beyond.” in Animals. A History, edited by Peter Adamson and G. Fay Edwards, pp. 293–318. Oxford Philosophical Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Steward, Helen. 2020. “Free Will and External Reality: Two Scepticisms Compared.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120(1): 1–20.

Further References

Beebee, Helen. 2014. “Radical Indeterminism and Top-Down Causation [on Steward (2012a)].” Res Philosophica 91(3): 537–545.
Bishop, John. 2014. “Causal Pluralism and the Problem of Natural Agency [on Steward (2012a)].” Res Philosophica 91(3): 527–536.
Boxer, Karin E. 2013. Rethinking Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695324.001.0001.
Broadie, Sarah. 2013. “Agency and Determinism in A Metaphysics for Freedom [on Steward (2012a)].” Inquiry 56(6): 571–582.
Clancy, Sean. 2013. “A Strong Compatibilist Account of Settling [on Steward (2012a)].” Inquiry 56(6): 653–665.
Clarke, Randolph. 2014. “Agency and Incompatibilism [on Steward (2012a)].” Res Philosophica 91(3): 519–525.
Douskos, Christos. 2013. “The Linguistic Argument for Intellectualism.” Synthese 190(12): 2325–2340.
Ford, Anton. 2013. “Is Agency a Power of Self-Movement? [on Steward (2012a)].” Inquiry 56(6): 597–610.
Frost, Kim. 2013. “Action as the Exercise of a Two-Way Power [on Steward (2012a)].” Inquiry 56(6): 611–624.
Garnett, Michael. 2013. “Freedom and Unpredictability [on Steward (2012a)].” Inquiry 56(6): 666–680.
Hinshelwood, Alec. 2013. “The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Settling: Some Anscombean Reservations [on Steward (2012a)].” Inquiry 56(6): 625–638.
Soteriou, Matthew. 2013. The Mind’s Construction. The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678457.001.0001.