Meghan Sullivan (sullivan-m)
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Bibliography
Emery, Nina, Markosian, Ned and Sullivan, Meghan. 2020.
“Time.” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language;
Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/time/.
Finocchiaro, Peter and Sullivan, Meghan. 2016. “Yet another ‘Epicurean’
Argument.” in Philosophical Perspectives 30:
Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 135–159. Hoboken, New Jersey:
John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Greene, Preston and Sullivan, Meghan. 2015. “Against
Time Bias.” Ethics 125(4): 399–414, doi:10.1086/680910.
Inwagen, Peter van and Sullivan, Meghan. 2014.
“Metaphysics.” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language;
Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/metaphysics/.
Inwagen, Peter van, Sullivan, Meghan and Bernstein, Sara. 2023.
“Metaphysics.” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language;
Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/metaphysics/.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2011. “The
A-Theory: A Theory.” PhD dissertation, Rutgers, New
Jersey: Philosophy Department, Rutgers, The State University of New
Jersey.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2012a. “The
Minimal A-Theory.” Philosophical Studies 158(2):
149–174.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2012b. “Teaching & Learning Guide for: Problems with
Temporary Existence in Tense Logic.” Philosophy
Compass 7(4): 290–292.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2012c. “Problems for Temporary Existence in Tense
Logic.” Philosophy Compass 7(1): 43–57.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2014. “Change We Can Believe In (and Assert).”
Noûs 48(3): 474–495.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2016a. “An
A-Theory Without Tense Operators.” Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 46(4–5): 735–758. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and
McCullagh (2019).
Sullivan, Meghan. 2016b. “The Semantic Problem of Hiddenness.” in
Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief. New
Perspectives, edited by Adam Green and Eleonore Stump, pp. 35–52. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139939621.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2017a. “Are there Essential Properties? No.” in
Current Controversies in
Metaphysics, edited by Elizabeth Barnes, pp. 45–61. Current
Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2017b.
“Personal Volatility.” in
Philosophical Issues 27: Metaphysics, edited by
Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 343–363. Malden,
Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2017c.
“Boring Ontological Realism.” Res
Philosophica 94(3): 399–413.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2018a. Time Biases. A Theory of Rational Planning and Personal
Persistence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198812845.001.0001.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2018b. “Review of Skow (2015).” The
Philosophical Review 127(3): 418–422.
Sullivan, Meghan. 2022.
“Scheduling Deliberation.” in
Philosophical Perspectives 36: Metaphysics, edited
by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 329–344. Hoboken, New Jersey: John
Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12170.
Further References
Skow, Bradford. 2015. Objective
Becoming. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713272.001.0001.
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and McCullagh, Mark, eds. 2019. Williamson on Modality. London: Routledge,
doi:10.4324/9781315184074.