Michael G. Titelbaum (titelbaum)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Egan, Andy and Titelbaum, Michael G. 2022. “Self-Locating Beliefs.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/self-locating-beliefs/.
Hart, Casey and Titelbaum, Michael G. 2015. “Intuitive Dilation?” Thought 4(4): 252–262.
Kopec, Matthew and Titelbaum, Michael G. 2016. “The Uniqueness Thesis.” Philosophy Compass 11(4): 189–200.
Pettigrew, Richard and Titelbaum, Michael G. 2014. “Deference done right.” Philosophers' imprint 14(35).
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2008. “The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs.” The Philosophical Review 117(4): 555–606.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2010a. “Not Enough There There Evidence, Reasons, and Language Independence.” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 477–528. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2010b. “Tell Me You Love Me: Bootstrapping, Externalism, and No-Lose Epistemology.” Philosophical Studies 149(1): 119–134.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2012. “An Embarrassment for Double-Halfers.” Thought 1(2): 146–151.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2013a. Quitting Certainties. A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.001.0001.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2013b. “Ten Reasoning to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem.” Philosophy Compass 8(11): 1003–1017.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2015a. “Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason).” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume V, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 253–294. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0009.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2015b. “How to Derive a Narrow-Scope Requirement from Wide-Scope Requirements.” Philosophical Studies 172(2): 535–542.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2015c. “Continuing On.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(5–6): 670–691.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2015d. “Reply to Kim’s ‘Two Versions of Sleeping Beauty’ [Kim (2015)].” Erkenntnis 80(6): 1237–1243.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2016. “Self-Locating Credences.” in The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, edited by Alan Hájek and Christopher R. Hitchcock, pp. 666–680. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.001.0001.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2019a. “Return to Reason.” in Higher-Order Evidence. New Essays, edited by Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 226–245. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2019b. “Reasons Without Reasons For.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XIV, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 189–215. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198841449.001.0001.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2022a. Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198707608.001.0001.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2022b. Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192863140.001.0001.

Further References

Kim, Namjoong. 2015. “Titelbaum’s Theory of De Se Updating and Two Versions of Sleeping Beauty.” Erkenntnis 80(6): 1217–1236.