Andy Egan (egan-a)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Davies, Martin Kinsey and Egan, Andy. 2013. “Delusion: Cognitive Approaches – Bayesian Inference and Compartmentalization.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, edited by K. W. M. [Bill] Fulford, Martin Kinsey Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, George Graham, John Z. Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton, pp. 689–730. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press.
Doggett, Tyler and Egan, Andy. 2007. “Wanting Things You Don’t Want. The Case for an Imaginative Analogue of Desire.” Philosophers’ Imprint 7(9).
Doggett, Tyler and Egan, Andy. 2012. “How to Feel About Terrible, Non-existent Mafiosi.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84(2): 277–306.
Egan, Andy. 2004. “Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(1): 48–66. Reprinted in Jackson and Priest (2004, 49–67).
Egan, Andy. 2006a. “Appearance Properties?” Noûs 40(3): 495–521.
Egan, Andy. 2006b. “Secondary Qualities and Self-Location.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(1): 97–119.
Egan, Andy. 2007a. “Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory.” The Philosophical Review 116(1): 93–114.
Egan, Andy. 2007b. “Review of Baghramian (2004).” Mind 116(462): 387–390.
Egan, Andy. 2007c. “Epistemic Modals, Relativism, and Assertion.” Philosophical Studies 133(1): 1–22.
Egan, Andy. 2007d. “Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(2): 205–219.
Egan, Andy. 2008a. “Pretense for the Complete Idiom.” Noûs 42(3): 381–409.
Egan, Andy. 2008b. “Seeing and Believing: Perception, Belief Formation and the Divided Mind.” Philosophical Studies 140(1): 47–63.
Egan, Andy. 2009a. “Billboards, Bombs and Shotgun Weddings.” Synthese 166(2): 251–279, doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9284-4.
Egan, Andy. 2009b. “Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception.” in Delusion and Self-Deception. Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation, edited by Tim[othy John] Bayne and Jordi Fernández, pp. 263–280. London: Routledge.
Egan, Andy. 2010a. “Disputing about Taste.” in Disagreement, edited by Richard H. Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 247–286. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001.
Egan, Andy. 2010b. “Projectivism without Error.” in Perceiving the World, edited by Bence Nanay, pp. 68–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195386196.001.0001.
Egan, Andy. 2011a. “Comments on Gendler (2011).” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 65–79.
Egan, Andy. 2011b. “Relativism about Epistemic Modals.” in A Companion to Relativism, edited by Steven D. Hales, pp. 219–241. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444392494.
Egan, Andy. 2012a. “Comments on Cohen (2009).” Analytic Philosophy 53(3): 306–312.
Egan, Andy. 2012b. “Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50(4): 557–582.
Egan, Andy. 2014. “There’s Something Funny About Comedy: A Case Study in Faultless Disagreement.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 1): 73–100.
Egan, Andy. 2017. “Relativism about Epistemic Modals.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, and Alexander Miller, 2nd ed., pp. 843–864. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Hale and Wright (1997), doi:10.1002/9781118972090.
Egan, Andy. 2018. “De Se Pragmatics.” in Philosophical Perspectives 32: Philosophy of Language, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 144–164. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12115.
Egan, Andy and Elga, Adam Newman. 2005. “I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid.” in Philosophical Perspectives 19: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 77–93. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Egan, Andy, Hawthorne, Andy and Weatherson, Brian. 2005. “Epistemic Modals in Context.” in Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, edited by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, pp. 131–170. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199267408.001.0001.
Egan, Andy and Kindermann, Dirk. 2020. “De Se Relativism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, edited by Martin Kusch, pp. 518–527. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351052306.
Egan, Andy and Titelbaum, Michael G. 2022. “Self-Locating Beliefs.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/self-locating-beliefs/.
Egan, Andy and Weatherson, Brian. 2004. “Prankster’s Ethics.” in Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 45–52. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Egan, Andy and Weatherson, Brian, eds. 2011a. Epistemic Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001.
Egan, Andy and Weatherson, Brian. 2011b. “Introduction: Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality.” in Epistemic Modality, edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, pp. 1–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001.

Further References

Baghramian, Maria. 2004. Relativism. London: Routledge.
Cohen, Jonathan. 2009. The Red and the Real. An Essay on Color Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.001.0001.
Gendler, Tamar Szabó. 2011. “On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias.” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 33–63.
Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham, eds. 2004. Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199274550.001.0001.