Savas L. Tsohatzidis (tsohatzidis)

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 1986. “Four Types of Counterexample to the Latest Test for Perlocutionary Act Names.” Linguistics and Philosophy 9(2): 219–223.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 1993. “Speaking of Truth-Telling: The View from wh-Complements.” The Journal of Pragmatics 19: 271–279.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L., ed. 1994a. Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 1994b. “Ways of Doing Things with Words: An Introduction.” in Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 1–27. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 1994c. “The Gap between Speech Acts and Mental States.” in Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 220–233. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 1994d. “Speaker Meaning, Sentence Meaning and Metaphor.” in Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 365–373. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 1997. “More Telling Examples: A Response to Holton (1997).” The Journal of Pragmatics 28: 629–636.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 2001. “The Mode of Existence of Illocutionary Negation.” Erkenntnis 54: 205–214.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L., ed. 2007a. John Searle’s Philosophy of Language. Force, Meaning and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L., ed. 2007b. Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts. Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6104-2.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 2007c. “Introduction.” in Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts. Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 1–10. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6104-2.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 2007d. “Searle’s Derivation of Promissory Obligation.” in Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts. Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 203–218. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6104-2.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 2007e. “Introduction.” in John Searle’s Philosophy of Language. Force, Meaning and Mind, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 1–13. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 2007f. “Yes-No Questions and the Myth of Content Invariance.” in John Searle’s Philosophy of Language. Force, Meaning and Mind, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 244–266. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 2012. “How to Forget that ‘Know’ is Factive.” Acta Analytica 27(4): 449–459.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 2013. “Self-Reference and the Divorce between Meaning and Truth.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 22(4): 445–452.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 2015a. “A Problem for the Logic of ‘Because’ .” Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 25(1): 46–49.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 2015b. “Truth Ascriptions, Falsity Ascriptions, and the Paratactic Analysis of Indirect Discourse.” Logique et Analyse 58(232): 527–534.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L., ed. 2017a. Interpreting J.L. Austin. Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316421840.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 2017b. “Introduction.” in Interpreting J.L. Austin. Critical Essays, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 1–14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316421840.
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 2017c. “Performativity and the ‘True/ False Fetish’ .” in Interpreting J.L. Austin. Critical Essays, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 96–118. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316421840.

Further References

Holton, Richard. 1997. “Some Telling Examples: Reply to Tsohatzidis (1993).” The Journal of Pragmatics 28: 625–628.