Clayton Littlejohn (littlejohn-c)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Alvarez, Maria and Littlejohn, Clayton. 2017. “When Ignorance is No Excuse.” in Responsibility. The Epistemic Condition, edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland, pp. 64–81. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779667.001.0001.
Côté-Bouchard, Charles and Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018. “Knowledge, Reasons, and Errors About Error Theory.” in Metaepistemology. Realism and Anti-Realism, edited by Christos Kyriacou and Robin McKenna, pp. 147–172. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria and Littlejohn, Clayton, eds. 2024. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2008. “From E=K to Scepticism?” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(233): 679–684.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2009a. “ ‘Ought,’ ‘Can,’ and Practical Reasons.” American Philosophical Quarterly 46(4): 363–372.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2009b. “The Externalist’s Demon.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39(3): 399–434.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2009c. “On the Coherence of Inversion.” Acta Analytica 24(2): 127–137.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2011a. “Evidence and Knowledge.” Erkenntnis 74(2): 241–262.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2011b. “Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism.” Analytic Philosophy 52(1): 35–48.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2011c. “Evidence and Armchair Access.” Synthese 179(3): 479–500.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2011d. “Reasons and Belief’s Justification.” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 111–130. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2012. Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2013a. “No Evidence is False.” Acta Analytica 28(2): 145–159.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2013b. “Disagreement and Defeat.” in Disagreement and Skepticism, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 169–192. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 46. London: Routledge.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2013c. “The Russellian Retreat.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113(3): 293–320.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2013d. “A Note Concerning Justification and Access.” Episteme 10(4): 369–386.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2014a. “Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth.” Erkenntnis 79(6): 1355–1365.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2014b. “Introduction.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 1–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2014c. “The Unity of Reason.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 135–154. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2014d. “Fake Barns and False Dilemmas.” Episteme 11(4): 369–389.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2015a. “Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?” in Philosophical Perspectives 29: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 217–248. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2015b. “Knowledge and Awareness [on Pritchard (2012)].” Analysis 75(4): 596–603.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2017. “How and Why Knowledge is First.” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 19–45. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018a. “Evidence and Its Limits.” in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 115–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018b. “Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96(2): 257–272, doi:10.1111/phpr.12271.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018c. “The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism.” in Epistemic Consequentialism, edited by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn, pp. 23–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779681.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018d. “Objectivism and Subjectivism in Epistemology.” in The Factive Turn in Epistemology, edited by Veli Mitova, pp. 142–160. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316818992.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018e. “Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 529–552. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.24.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018f. “Knowledge and Normativity.” in The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History, Volume 4: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington and Markos Valaris, pp. 249–268. London: Bloomsbury Academic, doi:10.5040/9781474258814.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018g. “Gettier Cases and Evidence.” in The Gettier Problem, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 48–65. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316827413.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2020a. “Moore’s Paradox and Assertion.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 707–725. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2020b. “Do You See What I Know? On Reasons, Perceptual Evidence, and Epistemic Status.” in Philosophical Issues 30: Perceptual Evidence, edited by Matthew McGrath and Susanna Schellenberg, pp. 205–220. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12181.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2021. “Eleven Angry Men.” in Philosophical Issues 31: Law and Epistemology, edited by Alexander A. Guerrero, pp. 227–239. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12197.
Littlejohn, Clayton and Turri, John, eds. 2014. Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.

Further References

Pritchard, Duncan. 2012. Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001.