Alex Worsnip (worsnip)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Fogal, Daniel and Worsnip, Alex. 2021. “Which Reasons? Which Rationality?” Ergo 8(11): 306–343, doi:10.3998/ergo.1148.
Kiesewetter, Benjamin and Worsnip, Alex. 2023. “Structural Rationality.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/rationality-structural/.
Pittard, John and Worsnip, Alex. 2017. “Metanormative Contextualism and Normative Uncertainty.” Mind 126(501): 155–193.
Rulli, Tina and Worsnip, Alex. 2016. “IIA, Rationality, and the Individuation of Options.” Philosophical Studies 173(1): 205–221.
Worsnip, Alex. 2014. “Disagreement about Disagreement? What Disagreement about Disagreement?” Philosophers' imprint 14(18).
Worsnip, Alex. 2015a. “Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.” Synthese 192(8): 2617–2646.
Worsnip, Alex. 2015b. “Hobbes and Normative Egoism.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 97(4): 481–512.
Worsnip, Alex. 2015c. “Possibly False Knowledge.” The Journal of Philosophy 112(5): 225–246.
Worsnip, Alex. 2015d. “Two Kinds of Stakes.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96: 307–324.
Worsnip, Alex. 2016a. “Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(3): 549–562.
Worsnip, Alex. 2016b. “Moral Reasons, Epistemic Reasons and Rationality.” The Philosophical Quarterly 66(263): 341–361.
Worsnip, Alex. 2016c. “Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch’s Analogy.” Thought 5(4): 226–235.
Worsnip, Alex. 2017a. “Cryptonormative Judgments.” European Journal of Philosophy 25(1): 3–24.
Worsnip, Alex. 2017b. “Contextualism and Knowledge Norms.” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, pp. 177–189. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Worsnip, Alex. 2018a. “What is (In)coherence?” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XIII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 184–206. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0009.
Worsnip, Alex. 2018b. “Eliminating Prudential Reasons.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume VIII, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 236–257. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198828310.001.0001.
Worsnip, Alex. 2018c. “The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96(1): 3–44, doi:10.1111/phpr.12246.
Worsnip, Alex. 2019a. “What to Believe About Your Belief that You’re in the Good Case.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume VI, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 206–233. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001.
Worsnip, Alex. 2019b. “Can Your Total Evidence Mislead About Itself?” in Higher-Order Evidence. New Essays, edited by Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 298–316. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001.
Worsnip, Alex. 2019c. “Immorality and Irrationality.” in Philosophical Perspectives 33: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 220–253. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12132.
Worsnip, Alex. 2020. “Resisting Relativistic Contextualism: On Finlay’s Finlay (2014).” Analysis 80(1): 122–131.
Worsnip, Alex. 2021a. Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780197608142.001.0001.
Worsnip, Alex. 2021b. “The Skeptic and the Climate Change Skeptic.” in The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology, edited by Michael Hannon and Jeroen de Ridder, pp. 469–479. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Worsnip, Alex. 2023. “Suspiciously Convenient Beliefs and the Pathologies of (Epistemological) Ideal Theory.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47: Genealogy of Belief: You Just Believe That Because …, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Yuval Avnur, pp. 237–268. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.5840/msp2023111449.

Further References

Finlay, Stephen. 2014. Confusion of Tongues. A Theory of Normative Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347490.001.0001.