Stephen Finlay (finlay-s)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Björnsson, Gunnar and Finlay, Stephen. 2010. “Defending Metaethical Contextualism.” Ethics 121(1): 7–36.
Finlay, Stephen. 2004. “The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgment.” The Journal of Ethics 8: 205–233.
Finlay, Stephen. 2005a. “Value and Implicature.” Philosophers’ Imprint 5(4).
Finlay, Stephen. 2005b. “Emotive Theory of Ethics.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Finlay, Stephen. 2007a. “Four Faces of Moral Realism.” Philosophy Compass 2(6): 820–849.
Finlay, Stephen. 2007b. “Responding to Normativity.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume II, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 220–239. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Finlay, Stephen. 2008a. “The Error in the Error Theory.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(3): 347–369.
Finlay, Stephen. 2008b. “Too Much Morality.” in Morality and Self-Interest, edited by Paul Bloomfield, pp. 136–154. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305845.001.0001.
Finlay, Stephen. 2008c. “Self-Defence and the Right to Resist.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16(1): 85–100.
Finlay, Stephen. 2008d. “Motivation to the Means.” in Moral Psychology Today. Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will, edited by David K. Chan, pp. 173–192. Philosophical Studies Series n. 110. Dordrecht: Springer.
Finlay, Stephen. 2009a. “The Obscurity of Internal Reasons.” Philosophers’ Imprint 9(7).
Finlay, Stephen. 2009b. “Oughts and Ends.” Philosophical Studies 143(3): 315–340.
Finlay, Stephen. 2009c. “Against All Reason? Scepticism about the Instrumental Norm.” in Hume on Motivation and Virtue. New Essays, edited by Charles R. Pigden, pp. 155–178. Philosophers in Depth. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Finlay, Stephen. 2010a. “Recent Work on Normativity.” Analysis 70(2): 331–346.
Finlay, Stephen. 2010b. “Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume V, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 57–86. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Finlay, Stephen. 2014a. Confusion of Tongues. A Theory of Normative Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347490.001.0001.
Finlay, Stephen. 2014b. “The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement.” in Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, pp. 124–148. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.
Finlay, Stephen. 2015. “Review of Horty (2012).” The Philosophical Review 124(2): 286–289.
Finlay, Stephen. 2016. “ ‘Ought’: Out of Order.” in Deontic Modality, edited by Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman, pp. 169–199. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717928.001.0001.
Finlay, Stephen. 2017. “Disagreement Lost and Found.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 187–205. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805076.001.0001.
Finlay, Stephen. 2019. “A ‘Good’ Explanation of Five Puzzles About Reasons.” in Philosophical Perspectives 33: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 62–104. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12126.
Finlay, Stephen. 2020a. “Summary of Finlay (2014a).” Analysis 80(1): 99–101.
Finlay, Stephen. 2020b. “Reply to Worsnip (2020), Dowell (2020), and Koehn (2020).” Analysis 80(1): 131–147.
Finlay, Stephen and Plunkett, David. 2018. “Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, volume III, edited by John Gardner, Leslie Green, and Brian Leiter, pp. 49–86. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Finlay, Stephen and Schroeder, Mark. 2008. “Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/reasons-internal-external/.
Finlay, Stephen and Schroeder, Mark. 2012. “Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/reasons-internal-external/.
Finlay, Stephen and Schroeder, Mark. 2017. “Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/reasons-internal-external/.
Laskowski, Nicholas G. and Finlay, Stephen. 2018. “Conceptual Analysis in Metaethics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, pp. 536–551. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315213217.

Further References

Dowell, Janice L. 2020. “Finlay’s Methodology: Synthetic, Not Analytic [on Finlay (2014a)].” Analysis 80(1): 102–110.
Horty, John F. 2012. Reasons as Defaults. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.001.0001.
Koehn, Glen. 2020. “Fit for an End [on Finlay (2014a)].” Analysis 80(1): 110–122.
Worsnip, Alex. 2020. “Resisting Relativistic Contextualism: On Finlay’s Finlay (2014a).” Analysis 80(1): 122–131.