Sarah Wright (wright-sa)

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Schmidtz, David and Wright, Sarah. 2004. “What Nozick Did for Decision Theory.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28: The American Philosophers, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 282–294. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Wright, Sarah. 2010a. “Internalist Virtues and Knowledge.” Acta Analytica 25(2): 119–132.
Wright, Sarah. 2010b. “Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism.” Metaphilosophy 41(1–2): 95–114.
Wright, Sarah. 2011a. “Hume on Testimony: A Virtue-Theoretic Defense.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 28(3): 247–265.
Wright, Sarah. 2011b. “Knowledge and Social Roles: A Virtue Approach.” Episteme 8(1): 99–111.
Wright, Sarah. 2012. “How Boots Befooled the King: Wisdom, Truth, and the Stoics.” Acta Analytica 27(2): 113–126.
Wright, Sarah. 2013. “A Neo-Stoic Approach to Epistemic Agency.” in Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Baron Reed, pp. 262–275. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wright, Sarah. 2014a. “The Dual-Aspect Norms of Belief and Assertion: A Virtue Approach to Epistemic Norms.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 239–258. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Wright, Sarah. 2014b. “The Stoic Epistemic Virtues of Groups.” in Essays in Collective Epistemology, edited by Jennifer Lackey, pp. 122–141. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.001.0001.
Wright, Sarah. 2015. “Comments on Fumerton (2015).” Episteme 12(2): 219–223.
Wright, Sarah. 2016. “Epistemic Authority, Epistemic Preemption, and the Intellectual Virtues.” Episteme 13(4): 555–570.
Wright, Sarah. 2019. “Are Epistemic Virtues a Kind of Skill?” in The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, edited by Heather Battaly, pp. 58–68. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315712550.

Further References

Fumerton, Richard A. 2015. “What the Internalist should Say to the Tortoise.” Episteme 12(2): 209–217.