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Nick Bostrom (bostrom)

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Bibliography

    Bostrom, Nick. 1999. “The Doomsday Argument is Alive and Kicking.” Mind 108(431): 539–551.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2000a. “Observer-Relative Chances in Anthropic Reasoning?” Erkenntnis 52(1): 93–108.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2000b. “What we should Say to the Skeptic.” Unpublished manuscript.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2001. “The Doomsday Argument, Adam & Eve, UN\(^{++}\), and Quantum Joe.” Synthese 127(3): 359–387.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2002a. Anthropic Bias. Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2002b. “Self-Locating Belief in Big Worlds: Cosmology’s Missing Link to Observation.” The Journal of Philosophy 99(12): 607–623.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2003. “Are we Living in a Computer Simulation?” The Philosophical Quarterly 53(211): 243–255, doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00309.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2005. “The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson (2003).” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(218): 90–97.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2008. “The Future of Humanity.” in New Waves in Philosophy of Technology, edited by Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, Evan Selinger, and Søren Riis, pp. 186–215. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2009a. “Pascal’s Mugging.” Analysis 69(3): 443–445.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2009b. “The Simulation Argument: Some Explanations [in Reply to Brueckner (2008)].” Analysis 69(3): 458–461.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2009c. “The Future of Humanity.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology, edited by Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, Stig Andur Pedersen, and Vincent F. Hendricks, pp. 551–557. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444310795.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2011. “Note on Heterologicality.” Analysis 71(2): 252–260.
    Bostrom, Nick and Ćirković, Milan M. 2003. “The Doomsday Argument and the Self-Indication Assumption. Reply to Olum (2002).” The Philosophical Quarterly 53(210): 83–91.
    Bostrom, Nick and Kulczycki, Marcin. 2011. “A Patch for the Simulation Argument.” Analysis 71(1): 54–62.
    Bostrom, Nick and Yudkowsky, Eliezer. 2014. “The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence.” in The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence, edited by Keith Frankish and William M. Ramsey, pp. 316–334. Cambridge Handbooks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Further References

    Brueckner, Anthony. 2008. “The Simulation Argument Again.” Analysis 68(3): 224–226.
    Olum, Ken D. 2002. “The Doomsday Argument and the Number of Possible Observers.” The Philosophical Quarterly 52(207): 164–184.
    Weatherson, Brian. 2003. “Are You a Sim?” The Philosophical Quarterly 53(212): 425–431.