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Nick Bostrom (bostrom)

Menzionato/a in queste pagine del portale

Sternstunde Philosophie: Präsentation, Filosofix, de la philosophie en concentré et en dessin animé, Philosophie de la réalité virtuelle - Philosophy of VR, Philosophie jenseits der Ratio?, Keine Zukunft ohne Theorie, Amélioration humaine: du sujet au projet perfectible, Wenn Fiction Wirklichkeit wird, Utopie der vollständigen Kontrolle, Der Untergang der Menschheit?, Der Transhumanismus als politische Bewegung, Brève introduction au transhumanisme, Liegt die Zukunft der Philosophie im Rechner?

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Should we Hope Apparent Atrocities Are Illusory?

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Bibliography

    Bostrom, Nick. 1999. “The Doomsday Argument is Alive and Kicking.” Mind 108(431): 539–551.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2000a. “Observer-Relative Chances in Anthropic Reasoning?” Erkenntnis 52(1): 93–108.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2000b. “What we should Say to the Skeptic.” Unpublished manuscript.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2001. “The Doomsday Argument, Adam & Eve, UN\(^{++}\), and Quantum Joe.” Synthese 127(3): 359–387.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2002a. Anthropic Bias. Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2002b. “Self-Locating Belief in Big Worlds: Cosmology’s Missing Link to Observation.” The Journal of Philosophy 99(12): 607–623.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2003. “Are we Living in a Computer Simulation?” The Philosophical Quarterly 53(211): 243–255, doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00309.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2005. “The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson (2003).” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(218): 90–97.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2008. “The Future of Humanity.” in New Waves in Philosophy of Technology, edited by Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, Evan Selinger, and Søren Riis, pp. 186–215. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2009a. “Pascal’s Mugging.” Analysis 69(3): 443–445.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2009b. “The Simulation Argument: Some Explanations [in Reply to Brueckner (2008)].” Analysis 69(3): 458–461.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2009c. “The Future of Humanity.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology, edited by Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, Stig Andur Pedersen, and Vincent F. Hendricks, pp. 551–557. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444310795.
    Bostrom, Nick. 2011. “Note on Heterologicality.” Analysis 71(2): 252–260.
    Bostrom, Nick and Ćirković, Milan M. 2003. “The Doomsday Argument and the Self-Indication Assumption. Reply to Olum (2002).” The Philosophical Quarterly 53(210): 83–91.
    Bostrom, Nick and Kulczycki, Marcin. 2011. “A Patch for the Simulation Argument.” Analysis 71(1): 54–62.
    Bostrom, Nick and Yudkowsky, Eliezer. 2014. “The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence.” in The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence, edited by Keith Frankish and William M. Ramsey, pp. 316–334. Cambridge Handbooks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Further References

    Brueckner, Anthony. 2008. “The Simulation Argument Again.” Analysis 68(3): 224–226.
    Olum, Ken D. 2002. “The Doomsday Argument and the Number of Possible Observers.” The Philosophical Quarterly 52(207): 164–184.
    Weatherson, Brian. 2003. “Are You a Sim?” The Philosophical Quarterly 53(212): 425–431.