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Brian Weatherson (weatherson)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Philosophers' Imprint, CUSO-2022

Cited in the following articles

Avner Baz's Ordinary Language Challenge to the Philosophical Method of Cases, If Philosophers Aren't Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing?, Metalinguistic Monstrosity and Displaced Communication

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Bibliography

Egan, Andy, Hawthorne, Andy and Weatherson, Brian. 2005. “Epistemic Modals in Context.” in Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, edited by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, pp. 131–170. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199267408.001.0001.

Egan, Andy and Weatherson, Brian. 2004. “Prankster’s Ethics.” in Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 45–52. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Egan, Andy and Weatherson, Brian, eds. 2011a. Epistemic Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001.

Egan, Andy and Weatherson, Brian. 2011b. “Introduction: Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality.” in Epistemic Modality, edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, pp. 1–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001.

Hawthorne, John and Weatherson, Brian. 2004. “Chopping Up Gunk.” The Monist 87(3): 339–350.

Jehler, David and Weatherson, Brian. 2012. “Dogmatism, Probability and Logical Uncertainty.” in New Waves in Philosophical Logic, edited by Greg Restall and Gillian K. Russell, pp. 94–111. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maitra, Ishani and Weatherson, Brian. 2010. “Assertion, Knowledge, and Action.” Philosophical Studies 149(1): 99–118.

Marshall, Dan and Weatherson, Brian. 2018. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.

Marshall, Dan and Weatherson, Brian. 2023. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.

Shirreff, Patrick and Weatherson, Brian. 2017. “Relativism.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, and Alexander Miller, 2nd ed., pp. 787–803. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Hale and Wright (1997), doi:10.1002/9781118972090.

Weatherson, Brian. 1999. “Begging the Question and Bayesians.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30(4): 687–697.

Weatherson, Brian. 2000. “Stages, Worms, Slices and Lumps.” Unpublished manuscript.

Weatherson, Brian. 2001a. “Intrinsic Properties and Combinatorial Principles.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(2): 365–380. Reprinted in Francescotti (2014, 69–86).

Weatherson, Brian. 2001b. “Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals.” The Philosophical Quarterly 51.

Weatherson, Brian. 2002a. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2002/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.

Weatherson, Brian. 2002b. “Review of Wiggins (2001).” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 9(6).

Weatherson, Brian. 2003a. “The Problem of the Many.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/problem-of-many/.

Weatherson, Brian. 2003b. “Epistemicism, Parasites and Vague Names.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(2): 276–279.

Weatherson, Brian. 2003c. “Review of Sørensen (2001).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81: 290–292.

Weatherson, Brian. 2003d. “From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44(2): 111–123.

Weatherson, Brian. 2003e. “What Good Are Counterexamples?” Philosophical Studies 115(1): 1–31, doi:10.1023/a:1024961917413.

Weatherson, Brian. 2003f. “Are You a Sim?” The Philosophical Quarterly 53(212): 425–431.

Weatherson, Brian. 2004a. “Morality, Fiction and Possibility.” Philosophers' imprint 4(3).

Weatherson, Brian. 2004b. “Intuitions and Meanings.” Unpublished manuscript, “Intuitions”-workshop at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.

Weatherson, Brian. 2004c. “Luminous Margins.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(3): 373–383.

Weatherson, Brian. 2005a. “Can we do without Pragmatic Encroachment?” in Philosophical Perspectives 19: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 417–443. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Weatherson, Brian. 2005b. “Scepticism, Rationalism, and Externalism.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume I, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 311–331. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.001.0001.

Weatherson, Brian. 2005c. “True, Truer, Truest.” Philosophical Studies 123(1–2): 47–70.

Weatherson, Brian. 2005d. “Should we Respond to Evil with Indifference?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(3): 613–635.

Weatherson, Brian. 2006a. “The Asymmetric Magnets Problem.” in Philosophical Perspectives 20: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 479–492. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Weatherson, Brian. 2006b. “Questioning Contextualism.” in Aspects of Knowing. Epistemological Essays, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 133–150. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

Weatherson, Brian. 2006c. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.

Weatherson, Brian. 2006d. “Vague Terms with Sharp Boundaries: Reply to Greenough.” Unpublished manuscript.

Weatherson, Brian. 2007a. “The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 169–185.

Weatherson, Brian. 2007b. “Doing Philosophy with Words [on Soames (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 135(3): 429–437.

Weatherson, Brian. 2008. “Attitudes and Relativism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 22: Philosophy of Language, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 527–544. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.

Weatherson, Brian. 2009a. “Conditionals and Indexical Relativism.” Synthese 166(2): 333–357, doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9283-5.

Weatherson, Brian. 2009b. “David Lewis.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/david-lewis/.

Weatherson, Brian. 2010. “Vagueness as Indeterminacy.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 77–90. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.

Weatherson, Brian. 2011a. “No Royal Road to Relativism [Comments on Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009)].” Analysis 71(1): 133–143.

Weatherson, Brian. 2011b. “Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty [on Stalnaker (2008)].” Philosophical Studies 155(3): 445–456.

Weatherson, Brian. 2011c. “Defending Interest-Relative Invariantism.” Logos & Episteme 2(4): 591–609.

Weatherson, Brian. 2012a. “The Role of Naturalness in Lewis’s Theory of Meaning.” Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1(10).

Weatherson, Brian. 2012b. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.

Weatherson, Brian. 2012c. “Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.” in Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 75–103. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.

Weatherson, Brian. 2013a. “Ross on Sleeping Beauty [on Ross (2010)].” Philosophical Studies 163(2): 503–512.

Weatherson, Brian. 2013b. “Margins and Errors [on Williamson (2013)].” Inquiry 56(1): 63–76.

Weatherson, Brian. 2013c. “Disagreements, Philosophical, and Otherwise.” in The Epistemology of Disagreement, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, pp. 54–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001.

Weatherson, Brian. 2014a. “Running Risks Morally.” Philosophical Studies 167(1): 141–163.

Weatherson, Brian. 2014b. “David Lewis.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/david-lewis/.

Weatherson, Brian. 2014c. “The Problem of the Many.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/problem-of-many/.

Weatherson, Brian. 2014d. “Probability and Scepticism.” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 71–86. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.

Weatherson, Brian. 2014e. “Centrality and Marginalisation [on Cappelen (2012)].” Philosophical Studies 171(3): 517–533, doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0289-9.

Weatherson, Brian. 2015a. “Humean Supervenience.” in A Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 101–115. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118398593.

Weatherson, Brian. 2015b. “For Bayesians, Rational Modesty Requires Imprecision.” Ergo 2(20): 529–545.

Weatherson, Brian. 2015c. “Memory, Belief and Time.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(5–6): 692–715.

Weatherson, Brian. 2016a. “Reply to Eaton and Pickavance.” Philosophical Studies 173(12): 3231–3233.

Weatherson, Brian. 2016b. “Analytic – Synthetic and A Priori – A Posteriori.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 231–248. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.

Weatherson, Brian. 2017a. “Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress.” The Philosophical Quarterly 67(267): 370–386.

Weatherson, Brian. 2017b. “Interest-Relative Invariantism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, pp. 240–254. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Weatherson, Brian. 2018. “Interests, Evidence and Games.” Episteme 15(3): 329–344.

Weatherson, Brian. 2019. Normative Externalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001.

Weatherson, Brian. 2021. “David Lewis.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/david-lewis/.

Weatherson, Brian. 2023. “The Problem of the Many.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/problem-of-many/.

Weatherson, Brian and Marshall, Dan. 2012. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.

Further References

Cappelen, Herman. 2012. Philosophy without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001.

Cappelen, Herman and Hawthorne, John. 2009. Relativism and Monadic Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560554.001.0001.

Francescotti, Robert M., ed. 2014. A Companion to Intrinsic Properties. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Ross, Jacob. 2010. “Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas.” The Philosophical Review 119(4): 411–447.

Soames, Scott. 2003. Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 2: The Age of Meaning. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Sørensen, Roy A. 2001. Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stalnaker, Robert C. 2008. Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Lines of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.001.0001.

Wiggins, David. 2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612756.

Williamson, Timothy. 2013. “Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.” Inquiry 56(1): 1–14.