E.J. Coffman (coffman-ej)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Ballantyne, Nathan and Coffman, E. J. 2011. “Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality.” Philosophers' imprint 11(18).
Ballantyne, Nathan and Coffman, E. J. 2012. “Conciliationism and Uniqueness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(4): 657–670.
Coffman, E. J. 2006. “Defending Klein on Closure and Skepticism.” Synthese 151(2): 257–272.
Coffman, E. J. 2009. “Does Luck Exclude Control?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87(3): 499–504.
Coffman, E. J. 2010a. “Is Justified Belief Knowledge? Critical Notice of Sutton (2007).” Philosophical Books 51(1): 1–21.
Coffman, E. J. 2010b. “How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 13(2): 157–166.
Coffman, E. J. 2011a. “Clarke’s Defense of the Contrast Argument.” Dialectica 65(2): 267–275.
Coffman, E. J. 2011b. “Omnipresence and Tough Choices.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, volume III, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 41–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.001.0001.
Coffman, E. J. 2011c. “Does Knowledge Secure Warrant to Assert?” Philosophical Studies 154(2): 285–300.
Coffman, E. J. 2012. “Response to Stump (2012).” in Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind. New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, edited by Kelly James Clark and Michael C. Rea, pp. 144–151. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.001.0001.
Coffman, E. J. 2013. “Can Virtue Epistemology Capitalize on JTB’s Appeal?” in Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Baron Reed, pp. 199–222. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Coffman, E. J. 2014a. “Strokes of Luck.” Metaphilosophy 45(4–5): 477–508. Reprinted in Pritchard and Whittington (2015, 27–58).
Coffman, E. J. 2014b. “Lenient Accounts of Warranted Assertability.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 33–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Coffman, E. J. 2014c. “Replies to Long (2014) and Tucker (2014).” in Skeptical Theism. New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, pp. 76–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coffman, E. J. 2014d. “Contextualism and Interest-Relative Invariantism.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology, edited by Andrew Cullison, pp. 229–257. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Coffman, E. J. 2015. Luck: Its Nature and Significance for Human Knowledge and Agency. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coffman, E. J. 2016. “Incompatibilist Commitment and Moral Self-Knowledge: The Epistemology of Libertarianism.” in Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind, edited by Christoph Kelp and Jack C. Lyons, pp. 78–98. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1111/phis.12066.
Coffman, E. J. 2017. “Gettiered Belief.” in Explaining Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 15–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
Coffman, E. J. 2018. “Do we Decide Intentionally?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(4): 822–827.
Coffman, E. J. 2019. “Practical Decision and the Cognitive Requirements for Blameworthiness.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43: Moral Luck, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Andrew C. Khoury, pp. 119–135. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1111/misp.12108.
Coffman, E. J. and Deaton, Matt. 2013. “Problems for Foley’s Accounts of Rational Belief and Responsible Belief.” Res Philosophica 90(2): 147–160.
Coffman, E. J. and Smith, Donald. 2010. “The Fall of the Mind Argument and Some Lessons about Freedom.” in Action, Ethics, and Responsibility, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, pp. 127–148. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 6. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014731.001.0001.
Coffman, E. J. and Warfield, Ted A. 2005. “Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 25–44. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Coffman, E. J. and Warfield, Ted A. 2007. “Alfred Mele’s Metaphysical Freedom?” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10(2): 185–194.
Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Coffman, E. J. 2006. “Three Arguments against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36(4): 535–564.

Further References

Long, Todd R. 2014. “Minimal Skeptical Theism.” in Skeptical Theism. New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, pp. 63–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pritchard, Duncan and Whittington, Lee John, eds. 2015. The Philosophy of Luck. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119030614.
Stump, Eleonore. 2012. “Atonement and the Cry of Dereliction From the Cross.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4(1): 1–17.
Sutton, Jonathan. 2007. Without Justification. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Tucker, Christopher. 2014. “Why Skeptical Theism Isn’t Skeptical Enough.” in Skeptical Theism. New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, pp. 45–62. Oxford: Oxford University Press.