Justin D'Arms (darms)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

D’Arms, Justin. 2002. “Envy.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/envy/.
D’Arms, Justin. 2005a. “Two Arguments for Sentimentalism.” in Philosophical Issues 15: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 1–21. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
D’Arms, Justin. 2005b. “Relationality, Relativism, and Realism about Moral Value [on Railton (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 126(3): 433–448.
D’Arms, Justin. 2008a. “Prinz’s Theory of Emotions [on Prinz (2004)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(3): 712–719.
D’Arms, Justin. 2008b. “Sentimental Rules and Moral Disagreement: Comment on Nichols (2008).” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 279–290. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
D’Arms, Justin. 2009. “Envy.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/envy/.
D’Arms, Justin. 2013. “Value and the Regulation of the Sentiments.” Philosophical Studies 163(1): 3–13.
D’Arms, Justin. 2014. “Velleman on Reacting and Valuing [on Velleman (2009)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(7): 23–29.
D’Arms, Justin. 2016. “Envy.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/envy/.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2000a. “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(1): 65–90, doi:10.2307/2653403.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2000b. “Sentiment and Value.” Ethics 110(4): 722–748.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2003. “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism).” in Philosophy and the Emotions, edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis, pp. 127–146. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/S1358246100007931.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2006. “Sensibility Theory and Projectivism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, edited by David Copp, pp. 186–218. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195147790.001.0001.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2009. “Regret and Irrational Action.” in Reasons for Action, edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall, pp. 179–199. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2010. “Demystifyng Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, edited by Peter Goldie, pp. 585–615. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235018.001.0001.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2014. “Wrong Kinds of Reason and the Opacity of Normative Force.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume IX, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 215–244. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709299.001.0001.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel, eds. 2015. Moral Psychology and Human Agency. Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717812.001.0001.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2017. “Whither Sentimentalism? On Fear, the Fearsome, and the Dangerous.” in Ethical Sentimentalism. New Perspectives, edited by Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber, pp. 250–267. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316105672.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2023. Rational Sentimentalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199256402.001.0001.
Jacobson, Daniel and D’Arms, Justin. 2006. “Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume I, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 99–126. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further References

Nichols, Shaun. 2008. “Sentimentalism Naturalized.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 255–274. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
Prinz, Jesse J. 2004. Gut Reactions. A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Philosophy of Mind Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780195309362.001.0001.
Railton, Peter. 2003. Facts, Values, and Norms. Essays towards a Morality of Consequence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613982.
Velleman, David J. 2009. How We Get Along. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.