Keith DeRose (derose-k)

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Bibliography

DeRose, Keith. 1991a. “Epistemic Possibilities.” The Philosophical Review 100: 581–605.
DeRose, Keith. 1991b. “Plantinga, Presumption, Possibility and the Problem of Evil.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21(4): 497–512.
DeRose, Keith. 1992. “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(4): 913–929, doi:10.2307/2107917.
DeRose, Keith. 1995. “Solving the Skeptical Problem.” The Philosophical Review 104(1): 1–52, doi:10.2307/2186011.
DeRose, Keith. 1996. “Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 568–580.
DeRose, Keith. 1998. “Simple ‘Might’’s, Indicative Possibilites and the Open Future.” The Philosophical Quarterly 48.
DeRose, Keith. 1999a. “Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?” in Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 385–413. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
DeRose, Keith. 1999b. “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense.” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, edited by John Greco and Ernest Sosa, pp. 187–205. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9781405164863.
DeRose, Keith. 2000a. “Ought we to Follow our Evidence?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(3): 697–706.
DeRose, Keith. 2000b. “Now You Know It, Now You Don’t.” in Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 5: Epistemology, edited by Richard Cobb-Stevens, pp. 91–106. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center.
DeRose, Keith. 2002. “Knowledge, Assertion, and Context.” The Philosophical Review 111(2): 167–203, doi:10.1215/00318108-111-2-167.
DeRose, Keith. 2004a. “The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(2): 346–350.
DeRose, Keith. 2004b. “Single Scoreboard Semantics.” Philosophical Studies 119(1–2): 1–21.
DeRose, Keith. 2004c. “Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses.” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by John Greco, pp. 22–41. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470756140.ch3.
DeRose, Keith. 2005a. “The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(219): 172–198.
DeRose, Keith. 2005b. “Direct Warrant Realism.” in God and the Ethics of Belief. New Essays in Philosophy of Religion, edited by Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell, pp. 150–173. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DeRose, Keith. 2006. “ ‘Bamboozled by Our Own Words’: Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments against Contextualism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(2): 316–338.
DeRose, Keith. 2008. “Gradable Adjectives: A Defence of Pluralism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(1): 141–160.
DeRose, Keith. 2009. The Case for Contextualism. Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.001.0001.
DeRose, Keith. 2010a. “The Conditionals of Deliberation.” Mind 119(473): 1–42.
DeRose, Keith. 2010b. “Insensitivity is Back, Baby!” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 161–187. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
DeRose, Keith. 2011a. “Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys.” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 81–110.
DeRose, Keith. 2011b. “Questioning Evidentialism.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 137–146. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
DeRose, Keith. 2012. “Conditionals, Literal Content, and ‘DeRose’s Thesis’: A Reply to Barnett (2012).” Mind 121(482): 443–455.
DeRose, Keith. 2017a. The Appearance of Ignorance. Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. II. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, doi:10.1163/22105700-20191398.
DeRose, Keith. 2017b. “Contextualism and Fallibilism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, pp. 145–155. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
DeRose, Keith. 2018a. The Appearance of Ignorance. Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context: Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199564477.001.0001.
DeRose, Keith. 2018b. “Delusions of Knowledge Concerning God’s Existence.” in Knowledge, Belief, and God. New Insights in Religious Epistemology, edited by Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz, pp. 288–301. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198798705.001.0001.
DeRose, Keith and Grandy, Richard E. 1999. “Conditional Assertions and ‘Biscuit’ Conditionals.” Noûs 33(3): 405–420.
DeRose, Keith and Warfield, Ted A., eds. 1999. Skepticism: a Contemporary Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further References

Barnett, David James. 2012. “Future Conditionals and DeRose’s Thesis.” Mind 121(482): 407–442.