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Nadine Elzein (elzein)

nadine.elzein(at)lmh.ox.ac.uk

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Determinism, 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Moral Obligation

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Nadine Elzein | almost 5 years

Bibliography

    Elzein, Nadine. 2010. “Conflicting Reasons and Freedom of the Will.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110(3): 399–407.
    Elzein, Nadine. 2013a. “Scepticism, Responsibility and Other Prickly Topics [on Dworkin (2011)].” Analysis 73(1): 107–118.
    Elzein, Nadine. 2013b. “Pereboom’s Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability.” Philosophical Studies 166(3): 553–573, doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0061-y.
    Elzein, Nadine. 2013c. “Basic Desert, Conceptual Revision, and Moral Justification.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 16(2): 212–225.
    Elzein, Nadine. 2017. “Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.” Acta Analytica 32(2): 169–191, doi:10.1007/s12136-016-0305-0.
    Elzein, Nadine. 2020. “Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.” Dialectica 74(1), doi:10.48106/dial.v74.i1.03.
    Elzein, Nadine and Pernu, Tuomas K. 2019. “To Be Able to, Or to Be Able Not to? That is the Question: A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15(2): 13–32, doi:10.31820/ejap.15.2.1.

Further References

    Dworkin, Ronald. 2011. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.