While most of the literature on morality and determinism focuses on
threats to moral responsibility, determinism might be thought to
threaten morality on separate grounds. Haji draws on the popular
principle that “ought” implies “can”, in order to show that determinism
undermines deontic morality (1998, 1999, 2002,
2019). Similar arguments are presented by Lockie (2018), although Lockie, unlike
Haji, does not intend to defend scepticism about obligation, but rather
to show that any such scepticism is inherently self-defeating.
By “deontic morality”, Haji has in mind any moral use of the terms
“ought” and “ought not”, as well as moral judgements of right and wrong.
While he concedes that judgements of moral “good” and “bad” may still
make sense within a deterministic framework, he argues that the
action-demanding normative terms associated with obligations and
prohibitions would be seriously undermined. Determinism precludes moral
duty.
However, as Haji himself makes explicit, in order to reach this
conclusion, we need not only an “ought” implies “can” principle, but
also an “ought” implies “able not to” principle (2002, 28). A similar principle is found
in Lockie’s work (2018,
181). I will argue, firstly, that even if we accept the popular
“ought” implies “can” principle, there are good reasons to reject any
“ought” implies “able not to” principle. Secondly, without the “ought”
implies “able not to” principle, such arguments are limited to
establishing a much weaker conclusion; we cannot conclude that there are
no moral duties at all, only that there are no unfulfilled
moral duties. Thirdly, while this weaker conclusion may look similarly
problematic at first sight, from a practical perspective it actually
makes very little difference to morality.
Determinism, Ability, and “ought”
Implies “can”
The principle that “ought” implies “can” has certainly seemed
compelling to many, although it’s not uncontroversial. Haji originally calls his “ought”
implies “can” principle “K”, and then later “Kant’s Law/Obligation”. But
for present purposes, let us simply call this sort of principle “OIC” (so
as to match the broader class of principles under discussion). Haji (2002, 14)
formulates his version of OIC roughly as follows:
OIC.
As of time \(t\), an agent \(S\), ought morally to do something \(A\) at time \(t\)* (where \(t\)* may either be \(t\) or a time later than \(t\)) only if \(S\) can, as of \(t\), do \(A\) at \(t\)*; and, as of \(t\), \(S\)
ought not to do \(A\) at \(t\)* only if \(S\) can, as of \(t\), not do \(A\) at \(t\)*.
According to this principle, an agent only ought to do something if
she actually can do it, and ought only to refrain from doing something
if she actually can refrain from doing it.
The Analysis of “can”
Given that there are broad variations in the way that we might
interpret “can”, there are also variations in the way
that we might interpret OIC. Haji’s (2002, 23) most moderate definition is as
follows:
Moderate OIC. Agent \(S\) ought to do something \(A\), only if \(S\) has the opportunity to do \(A\), is physically and psychologically able
to do \(A\), and \(A\)’s accomplishment is not “strictly out
of \(S\)’s control”.
While this is taken to be the bare minimum required for ability, Haji
adds that it may also require being motivationally able, and having the
right sort of “know-how” (2002, 16–24).
Physical and psychological possibility are fairly straightforward
notions. Plausibly an agent is only “able” to perform actions that are
consistent with their psychological characteristics and their physical
abilities. The inclusion of the stipulation that the agent must be
“psychologically able” may, however, seem controversial. It means that
an agent with a strong aversion, say, may count as unable to do
something, even if she could succeed in doing it should she choose to.
One reason we might nonetheless endorse this reading, as Haji points
out, is that it is natural to suppose that an agent with a serious
enough phobia might be excused for her failure to do something that her
phobia prevents her from doing. For instance, we would not typically
consider an agent “able” to save a drowning child if a severe phobia
rendered her incapable of entering the water (Haji 2002, 22).
Moreover, endorsing a relatively strong sense of “can” may prove
indispensable to the argument as a whole. That is because the argument
aims to establish that the ability to do otherwise is ruled out by
determinism, where this involves the very same sense of ability
for which it will be true that “ought” implies “can”. Any weakening of
the sense of “can” utilised in the OIC principle may risk introducing a
corresponding weakening of the argument for supposing that determinism
rules out the ability to do otherwise in precisely that sense. For
example, Haji notes that if we supposed a merely conditional analysis of
“can” would do, according to which the ability to do otherwise simply
requires that the agent could do otherwise if she chose to, then this
would make it dubious to suppose that determinism rules this ability out
(2002, 67–68).
In fact, Haji argues that even if such conditional abilities are
present, determinism robs us of the opportunity to do otherwise. If any
factors, internal or external, prevent an agent from exercising
some skill they have, then this will constitute a barrier to their
having the opportunity to exercise it (2002, 22).
Finally, the “control” requirement is supposed, at the very least, to
rule out having the “ability” to do things that happen purely by fluke
(Haji 2002, 22). In
analysing such control, Haji cites Vihvelin, who states: “We make
judgments about ability on the basis of evidence of a reliable causal
correlation between someone’s attempts to do a certain kind of act and
the success of her attempts.” (2000, 142). This sort of control
neither entails nor is entailed by possession of the other senses of
“ability”. Plausibly, an agent’s phobia may make her psychologically and
motivationally unable to purchase a pet snake, but doing so may not be
“strictly out of her control”; were she to try, she could reliably
succeed. Similarly, if a golf novice hits a hole in one on her first
attempt, this certainly shows that she is physically able to hit a hole
in one, but if it is an unrepeatable fluke, then it will still be
“strictly out of her control”.
Determinism and
Obligations
Haji and Lockie use rather complex arguments to reach the conclusion
that determinism rules out all obligations. Moreover, Lockie’s argument
incorporates the additional goal of showing that any argument in favour
of determinism would be self-defeating, and Haji’s argument incorporates
his attempt to show that if nothing is obligatory, then nothing is right
or wrong either. I am not going to address the latter part of Lockie’s
argument, and I am not going to consider
whether Haji is right to suppose that wrongness and rightness depend on
obligation. While this claim has been contested, I
am happy to grant it. Moreover, in what follows, it is the status of
actions as obligatory (rather than right or wrong) that will be the
prime focus. So for present purposes, we can work with a simplified
version of the argument, which might go as follows:
If determinism is true, no agent is ever able to act otherwise
than they do act. (basic premise)
If no agent is ever able act otherwise than they do act, then no
agent ever has an obligation to act otherwise than they do act. (premise
derivable from OIC)
If determinism is true, no agent ever has an obligation to act
otherwise than they do act. (from 1 and 2, via hypothetical
syllogism)
While 3 is an interesting conclusion, it is weaker than the the one
that is ultimately defended by either Haji or Lockie. It does not entail
that if determinism is true, there are no obligations, merely that that
there are no unfulfilled obligations. It leaves open that
agents sometimes both have and fulfil moral duties. In order to reach
the stronger conclusion, that there are no obligations at all, Haji
introduces a parallel principle, which he calls “CK” (2002, 28). Lockie (2018, 182) puts
forward a similar principle. Elsewhere, Haji gives the same sort of
principle different titles, such as “Kant’s Law/Impermissible” (Haji 2019, 8) or
“Obligation/Alternate” (Haji and Herbert 2018a, 186). Let
us simply call this whole class of principles “OIANT principles” (for
“ought” implies “able not to”). Haji (2002, 28) defines the relevant sort
of principle, omitting the temporal indices, as follows:
OIANT. If one ought to do \(A\), then one can refrain from doing \(A\) (and if one ought not to do \(A\), then one can do \(A\)).
If we grant OIANT, we can also establish that there are
no obligations to do what we actually do, given our inability to do
otherwise. A simplified argument of this form runs as follows:
If determinism is true, no agent is ever able to act otherwise
than they do act. (basic premise)
If no agent is ever able act otherwise than they do act, then no
agent ever has an obligation not to act otherwise than they do act.
(premise derivable from OIANT)
If determinism is true, no agent ever has an obligation not to
act otherwise than they do act. (from 1 and 2, via hypothetical
syllogism)
If determinism is true, no agent has an obligation to act as they
actually do act. (from 3, an equivalence through double
negation)
The final step from 3 to 4 is valid provided we grant that “not
acting otherwise” entails “acting as one actually does”. For present
purposes, “acting as one actually does” should be understood broadly, so
as to be fulfilled if the agent does not act otherwise; hence it should
include the agent’s inaction, if the agent in question is not actually
doing anything. Granted this broad reading, it should be uncontroversial
that “not acting otherwise” directly entails “acting” as one actually
does. It should be similarly obvious, granted this broad reading, that
premise 2 is entailed by OIANT.
The first argument shows that, given determinism, no agent has an
obligation to act otherwise than they do act. The second argument shows
that, given determinism, no agent has an obligation to act as they
actually do either. Between the two arguments, this rules out all moral
obligations.
While the first argument appears compelling, the second argument
seems considerably weaker. The principle upon which it rests, OIANT,
seems more dubious than the principle invoked by the first argument, OIC. If we
reject the argument from OIANT to the conclusion that if determinism
were true, no one would be obligated to do what they actually do, then
we are left with a weaker conclusion: that if determinism were true, no
one would be morally obligated to act otherwise than they do act.
How Plausible is OIANT?
Haji offers various lines of argument in favour of accepting OIANT:
the first is a simple appeal to symmetry between OIC and OIANT.
Lockie’s work also draws on the intuition that there ought to be
symmetry between such principles. However, even if we doubt that there
is any obvious inherent reason to suppose that the two
principles are symmetrical, we might argue that we ought to accept such
symmetry on the basis that both principles are taken to be motivated
primarily by a two-way freedom requirement (this seems to be the
supposed basis of the symmetry for Haji). Haji also offers a
“theory-fuelled” argument, which appeals to a particular analysis of
obligation. I will argue that OIANT is, at least on the face of it,
inherently implausible before going on to deal with each of these
arguments in turn.
The Prima Facie Implausibility
of OIANT
It has already been noted that psychological ability is crucially
included in the definition of “able to” invoked in Haji’s OIC and OIANT
principles. In light of this, however, “ought” implies “able not to” has
some undesirable implications. Many actions that seem obviously morally
prohibited are also psychological impossibilities for most
psychiatrically well-adjusted individuals. For instance, my psychology
is such that I could not take a chainsaw and use it to saw off the arms
of a small child. To be clear, I don’t mean a child that has gangrene,
say, and needs those limbs removed urgently on pain of death, but a
perfectly healthy child; one whose limbs I have no reason to remove. In
fact, I could not do such a thing even if I were offered
reasons, if they were of the wrong sort: e.g., I could not saw off the
arms of a child for a monetary incentive (even if I were offered a very
reasonable market rate). Does this entail that it is not morally
obligatory for me to refrain from sawing off the arms of small
children?
This conclusion seems counterintuitive. It is the fact that such an
action would be morally reprehensible which may well, in this case,
explain both my irresistible aversion to it and my
reasons for supposing that it is morally obligatory that one refrains
from such behaviour.
Unlike Haji, I think it is plausible to suppose that my inability to
do such a thing entails that I cannot be held responsible for not doing
it, and hence deserve no praise. The moral expectation
that I refrain from dismembering small children is a very easy standard
for me to meet. It seems close to the bare minimum you might reasonably
expect of me, so I hardly deserve a medal. But it seems one thing to say
that I don’t deserve praise, and quite another to say that sawing off
the arms of small children would not be morally impermissible. We are
usually quite happy to talk about being psychologically compelled to do
things that we also have a duty to do. We might even suppose that it is
the very fact that something is perceived as morally prohibited
that (at least sometimes) explains an agent’s psychological aversion to
doing it.
The principle that “ought” entails “able not to” surely seems
dubious. We ought to accept it only if we are offered very compelling
arguments.
The Defence from Apparent
Symmetry
The first argument appeals to the apparent symmetry between “ought”
implies “can” principles and “ought not” implies “can” principles (along
with, presumably, the latter’s complement stipulation, that “ought”
implies “able not to”). Haji argues “that it is difficult to see why
control requirements of deontic obligatoriness would differ, in this
respect from control requirements of deontic wrongness” (2002, 29). He interprets
OIC as
postulating an alternative possibilities condition as a control
requirement for obligatory actions, and supposes that similar
considerations would count in favour of accepting an alternative
possibilities condition on prohibited ones.
Even “ought” implies “can” is controversial, but it has a strong
history of philosophical support behind it and it seems highly
intuitive. “ought” implies “able not to”, in contrast, has nothing like
the same standing. As Nelkin notes, the principle is not usually seen as
axiomatic, and the alleged symmetry that Haji sees between these sorts
of principle is hardly obvious (2011, 102).
In fact, I think there is a plausible basis for “ought” implies “can”
that simply has no parallel in the case of “ought” implies “able not
to”. The appeal of “ought” implies “can” principles may in fact
not rest on any control requirement that involves alternative
possibilities. More plausibly, their appeal may be grounded in the
simple idea that it is unreasonable to demand the impossible. We may
well suppose that it is unreasonable to demand the impossible
without supposing that this rests on a control requirement that
involves alternative possibilities.
Any demand that is impossible to meet will, by an obvious logical
entailment, also be a demand with respect to which the agent lacks
two-way control. But there is no entailment in the other direction.
There is certainly no logical entailment from the plausible idea that it
is unreasonable to demand the impossible to the far less plausible claim
that it is unreasonable to demand the unavoidable.
If there are cases in which we are plausibly required to do something
that we also cannot refrain from doing, then we have good reason to
suppose that it is the unreasonableness of the demand to do the
impossible that is doing all of the work in rendering principles like OIC
plausible, and that two-way control is irrelevant. Of course, we have
already examined such a case: the case of morally abhorrent actions that
an agent is also psychologically incapable of.
Moreover, think about cases in which it is uncertain whether or not
one is physically capable of committing some wrong. For example, I think
that it would be morally impermissible for me to leave the house with a
kitchen knife and stab to death the first person I see. However, I have
absolutely no idea whether I could physically succeed in such
an endeavour, even supposing I tried my best. It seems absurd to suppose
that I should first have to be in a position to know whether I could
succeed in order to work out whether stabbing an innocent bystander is
morally impermissible (appeal to some theory of normative ethics ought
to settle that question quite irrespective of my
abilities).
There is also a clear a disparity here with respect to duty and
prohibition. Plausibly, I can only be morally required to save the
drowning child if I am capable of it. If it is uncertain whether I will
be physically able to, then we might plausibly say that I have a duty to
try, even if I could not have a duty to succeed in my attempt. In
contrast, it barely seems coherent to assert that it would be
impermissible for me to try to stab someone to death while
asserting at the same time that it would not be impermissible for me to
actually stab someone to death. For one thing, I could hardly
succeed in such an attempt without first making the
attempt, so if the latter is prohibited, it seems the former must be
too. Moreover, it seems that the very reason we are prohibited from
attempting certain things is precisely because it would be wrong to
actually do those things, so a stand-alone prohibition against
attempting would typically make very little sense unless coupled with a
prohibition against actually doing what one is attempting to do.
Moreover, there are obvious reasons why we might expect such an
asymmetry. In general, having a duty to do something might be thought to
depend on our having strong moral reasons to do it. One would expect
moral reasons to behave in ways that parallel reasons of any other sort,
such as, for instance, epistemic or prudential ones. And reasons of
every other sort seem to be asymmetric with respect to our abilities in
precisely the way that I claim moral reasons are. Perhaps it cannot be
true that an agent ought to believe something if she is incapable of
believing it. But it does not seem to follow that she could not have
good reason to believe something that she is incapable of doubting (if a
belief is indubitable, this is typically thought to be a point in its
favour). Or consider prudential reasons. If you are starving hungry
(barring any conflicting considerations) you have good reason to eat. If
you are incapable of eating, this would undermine those reasons. But
it’s not at all obvious that if you cannot resist eating, that would in
any way weaken the reasons you have in favour of eating.
There are clear grounds for supposing that our reasons are limited to
those things that we are able to do, while not being similarly limited
to what we are able to avoid. Our reasons are typically based on some
sort of independent value that’s at stake. If a reason for
performing some action or believing some proposition is based on some
value (e.g., good evidence or a strong moral or prudential case), then
insofar as we are capable of sensitivity to that value, we will be
sensitive to the reasons it generates. But there would be no point at
all in possessing a parallel capacity for insensitivity towards
those same values. Here’s another way to put the point: if we are
violating some core value, we had better have a good excuse for doing
so. Being incapable of respecting the value certainly is a good
excuse. If we are instead respecting the value, we need no excuse for
doing so, so no parallel ability to do otherwise is called for in order
to render our behaviour intelligible. That something is impossible is,
in itself, a reason for not bothering. In contrast, the fact
that we cannot avoid choosing to do something doesn’t undermine the
rationale for doing it at all. In some cases, it may well be the very
strength of the rationale in favour of performing some action or
adopting some belief that explains why doing so might be
irresistible to us.
Demanding the impossible is unreasonable on the basis that an
inability to do something may render one’s otherwise bad or
irrational behaviour perfectly reasonable in the circumstances. This is
not dependent on any alternative possibilities requirement for control,
as evidenced by the fact that a person’s perfectly decent but
unavoidable behaviour may well be entirely reasonable and explicable,
even if they cannot resist this behaviour, on the basis that it is
explained by their sensitivity to certain values. Such an explanation
would more plausibly be weakened by introducing the additional
ability to be insensitive to those values as opposed to being
strengthened by it.
Moreover, whether a demand constitutes a demand for the impossible is
asymmetric with respect to what the agent must do and what the
agent cannot do. While it is unreasonably demanding to expect
an agent to do the impossible, it is in no way similarly unreasonably
demanding to expect an agent to do the inevitable. Since the requirement
is so easily met, quite the opposite seems to be true; the inevitability
is, if anything, evidence for the conclusion that such a requirement is
undemanding. But in any case, there is certainly no parallel
entailment of demandingness. This is precisely why psychiatrically
well-adjusted individuals don’t deserve medals for not dismembering
small children.
We cannot support OIANT then, by a simple appeal to the
alleged symmetry with OIC. Moreover, it is not all all obvious
that the insistence on symmetry can be propped up with the consideration
that both OIC and OIANT depend on a
two-way freedom.
The “Theory-Fuelled”
Defence
The “theory-fuelled” defence draws on Feldman’s analysis of
obligation in terms of the comparative value of the possible worlds
accessible to agents (1986). More recently, Haji calls
this the “doing the best we can” model (DBWC) (2019; see also Haji and
Herbert 2018a).
In short, the analysis contends that we are morally obligated to
actualise the best world that we can actualise of all of those
“accessible” to us, where “best” is understood in terms of a ranking of
the “deontic” or “intrinsic” value of worlds, according to whichever
theory of normative ethics is endorsed (e.g., for a utilitarian it may
be the world with the greatest sum of utility, for a Kantian it may the
world in which we act in accordance with universalisable maxims, whereas
for a virtue ethicist it may be the world in which we best act in
accordance with the virtues).
There needn’t be a unique best world; perhaps various worlds
are tied for first place. But we are obligated to actualise a
best world. However, some facts may be “unalterable”; there are certain
states of affairs that would occur in every possible world accessible to
us (e.g., the sun will rise tomorrow, various statements about the past
will be true, etc.) If those states of affairs occur in all of the
worlds that are accessible to us, then it is trivially true that they
will also occur in all of the best worlds accessible to us. But
now we have a problem: it appears that anything unalterable will
automatically be obligatory. We will automatically be obligated to
actualise any world that we cannot avoid actualising. Yet this is
counterintuitive; it seems intuitively wrong to say that I have a moral
duty to actualise a world in which the sun rises tomorrow or to
actualise a world in which certain statements about the past are
true.
Haji’s solution is to appeal to an OIANT principle. That
is, we assume that further to supposing that we can only be obligated to
bring about states of affairs that are accessible to us, we must
also suppose that we can only be obligated to bring about any
particular state of affairs on the explicit condition we are
also able to actualise a world in which those states of affairs
do not obtain.
Perhaps this is one way to maintain a DBWC theory consistent with
ensuring that the unalterable should not automatically be obligatory.
But it is not the only way, and it’s hardly obvious that it is the most
plausible way. For instance, instead of endorsing OIANT, we could instead
add the (far more compelling) stipulation that we can only be obligated
to bring about any outcome insofar as that outcome is causally dependent
on our intentions.
In fact, Haji’s claim that the relevant sort of ability for duty
requires that actions not be “strictly out of one’s control” commits to
precisely this. More recently, Haji and Herbert have defended the claim
that the sort of ability relevant to duty ought to be robust, in the
sense that requires, among other things, that it is strongly agentive,
where this involves being brought about by an agent
intentionally (2018a, 2018b).
However, if having a duty requires that we are able to fulfil that duty
in precisely this robust sense, this already rules out having the duty
to bring about some unalterable states of affairs; it rules out
precisely having the obligation to bring about states of affairs that
will occur independently of our intentions, and hence rules out having
such obligations as seeing to it that the sun rises tomorrow.
Moreover, this plausibly explains why it seems intuitively obvious
that we are obligated to refrain from dismembering small
children, even if not refraining from such behaviour is a psychological
impossibility, consistent with the fact that it does not seem
plausible that we are obligated to see to it that the sun rises
tomorrow. Since the very point of moral duties is to guide our
intentions, we should expect those duties to be limited in scope to
those outcomes that are dependent on our intentional behaviour.
Short of having some independent reason to favour a solution that
requires us to invoke OIANT over the principle that duties are
limited to intention-dependent states of affairs, it seems we ought to
favour the latter. While OIANT principles seem inherently
problematic, the principle that one cannot be obligated to bring about a
state of affairs that will happen independently of one’s intentions
seems like a basic truism. Given the ready availability of this
solution, a state of affairs being unalterable need not make it
automatically obligatory (even if we explicitly reject OIANT). Importantly, however, the fact that
some state of affairs is unalterable doesn’t rule out our
having an obligation to bring it about either.
Haji and Herbert further note that if we explicitly presume
that if something is unalterable, then it cannot be obligatory, this
would also provide a basis from which to argue in favour of OIANT
principles (2018a,
188). But I am arguing precisely that we have no good independent
reason to accept such a presumption. The fact that I am not robustly
capable of committing certain morally heinous acts may well establish
that my avoidance of such acts is unalterable. But the point is
precisely that we have no good reason to suppose that this is
inconsistent with it being obligatory that I refrain from committing
those acts. So while the presumption that unalterability rules out
obligatoriness could certainly provide a basis for accepting an OIANT
principle (via a fairly obvious entailment), such a presumption is
itself no more plausible than the OIANT principles it is
invoked to establish and is no less in need of independent
justification.
In sum then, it seems that we have no reason to accept OIANT.
Recall, however, that OIANT was a crucial component of the
argument to the conclusion that determinism entails that nobody ought
morally to do anything. Without it, we are entitled only to the weaker
claim that, given determinism, no one ought morally to act otherwise
than they do. We must now assess whether, from a practical perspective,
this weaker conclusion turns out to be just as destructive.
The following section assesses the implications of embracing just the
weaker conclusion entailed by determinism and OIC, given a rejection of
OIANT. In particular, the aim is to
question whether this weaker conclusion alone should be
regarded as destructive to deontic morality, even if we follow Haji in
supposing that no one has a duty to do otherwise.
The Lack of Obligation to Act
Otherwise
The conclusion that nobody is obligated to act otherwise than they
actually do may seem problematic enough. Let us call this claim
“Unfulfilled Obligation Scepticism” (UOS):
UOS.
If an agent \(S\), as of a time
\(t\), actualises a world in which
state of affairs \(p\) occurs, this
entails that \(S\) had no moral
obligation, as of \(t\), to actualise a
world in which state of affairs \(p\)
does not occur.
This means that only our actual choices and actions could
possibly count as obligatory. We may sometimes both have and fulfil
moral obligations, but we can never have a moral obligation that we
contravene. Perhaps this alone undermines deontic morality. UOS may
seem to threaten moral deliberation, obligation, or motivation,
rendering them practically unintelligible. Let’s examine these potential
threats in turn.
UOS and Moral Deliberation
Firstly, it might be argued that UOS renders moral deliberation practically
impossible. By “moral deliberation”, I mean reasoning about what to do
in advance of deciding, rather than reasoning about how to appraise an
action that has already occurred.
There are several reasons why UOS might look problematic. We always know
in advance that there is no way that our actions will possibly count as
“forbidden” at the time that we perform them. Moreover, whether we are
obligated to perform any action seems closely dependent on whether we
choose to, so we might suppose that UOS robs us of any intelligible way to give
rational weight to our purported duties prior to actually making a
choice.
Suppose that Ada is a highly rational moral agent, who has recently
become convinced of the truth of UOS. She believes that she can only be
morally obligated to do something if she does in fact do it. She now
faces the following situation: Ada’s uncle has arranged in his will for
her to receive all of his fortune should he die. However, he is planning
to change his will when he visits the solicitor’s office later today.
Her uncle has two small children and had previously supposed that his
wealthy wife’s ample income would stand them in good stead should he
suddenly die, so he had planned to leave his fortune to Ada, his
favourite niece. However, his wife has just died in a freak accident
(leaving her fortune to her husband). If he should suddenly die too, his
children would now be left orphaned and destitute, while Ada would
receive all of his wealth, including that of his late wife. In contrast,
Ada has a decent job and a reasonably high income of her own. She will
be fine without a substantial inheritance. He is therefore planning to
change his will, leaving the bulk of his fortune to his children and a
much more modest sum for Ada. She can appreciate the reasonableness of
her uncle’s decision.
However, while she is alone visiting him, he collapses unconscious,
and appears to be dying of a heart attack. No one else knows that Ada is
visiting. She could easily walk away without calling an ambulance. She
would then be rich enough to buy that Ferrari she always wanted. As a
rational moral agent, Ada certainly would have supposed that she had a
moral obligation to call an ambulance prior to being persuaded
of the truth of UOS. But she must now work out what bearing
this principle has. Should it change the way that she morally
deliberates?
I endorse the idea that we ought to do the best we can, where this
involves being obligated to bring about the best of the
intention-dependent states of affairs accessible to us. So Ada ought to
actualise the best intention-dependent state of affairs she can. This
only seems to require two abilities: firstly, she must be able to
compare the deontic value of the worlds that would result from various
rival intentions, and secondly, she needs to suppose that she can
actualise the best of them. We ought to ask whether UOS poses any obstacle to
her doing either of these things.
Firstly, let’s think about her ability to assess the value of the
intention-dependent states of affairs between which she is deliberating.
On virtually any theory of normative ethics, the world in which she
calls an ambulance will look superior to the world in which she does not
call an ambulance. If she doesn’t call an ambulance, she will perform no
morally admirable actions, and her greed and cruelty will result in an
innocent man dying, and his children being left orphaned and destitute.
If she does call an ambulance, she will have done a good deed, and
through her fairness and kindness, she would ensure that he survives to
care for his children. For deontologists, virtue ethicists and
consequentialists alike then, the world in which she calls an ambulance
will be ranked morally superior to those in which she refrains.
Does she need assurance of her duty in advance? It seems not. On any
plausible DBWC analysis, moral duties are not going to be stand-alone
considerations that exert their moral pressure on us independently of
the other facts about the situation. A world \(w\) that we might actualise does not count
as morally superior to some other world \(w'\) on the basis that we are
morally obligated to actualise \(w\)
instead of \(w'\) (that supposition
would render the DBWC account entirely vacuous). The explanation is
always the other way around: we are morally obligated to favour
actualising \(w\) over \(w'\) precisely because we have
some independent basis to suppose that \(w\) is superior to \(w'\). The obligation arises because one
of these worlds has a higher “intrinsic value”. Values are conceptually
prior to obligations: duties are the conceptual outputs of values.
But the point needn’t rest on accepting a DBWC analysis either. Quite
independently of whether one accepts that analysis, it is a mistake to
think that duty is conceptually prior to moral value. Consider Kant.
There can be few theorists who afford duty a more fundamental status.
Yet even for Kant, duties are not independent additional substantive
reasons for acting; they are derived from considerations about the
rational wills of other agents, which confer on them a status as ends in
themselves. While Kant encourages us to act “from duty”, as opposed to
merely “in conformity with duty” (1998, 10–11), he certainly doesn’t
suppose that duties exist and exert pressure independently of the values
that give rise to them; respecting duty is simply the same thing as
respecting other rational beings. It’s hard to imagine any plausible
system of ethics according to which duties are not derived from some
prior moral value.
Perhaps it will be accepted that Ada (as a rational agent with some
theory of normative ethics up her sleeve) knows that the world in which
she calls an ambulance for her uncle is better than the world in which
she refrains from calling an ambulance (i.e., she knows that there are
substantive moral considerations in favour of calling an ambulance).
Granted that she knows this, she must also know she is obligated to call
an ambulance insofar as she can. But given determinism, we may worry
that she has no reason to think that she can.
This concern is misguided. Firstly, we must dispense with any idea
that if her intention is determined, then her actions are fixed no
matter what she intends. To reason like this would be to commit the
“fatalist’s fallacy”: even if her action is predetermined, this does not
entail that it isn’t conditional upon her intentions. If she is
determined to call an ambulance, this will be because it is
determined that her deliberative process culminates in her forming an
intention to call an ambulance, and this brings it about that she calls
an ambulance. Determinism does not make our attempts to act causally
ineffective.
Secondly, she has no reason to suspect, in advance of making up her
mind, that she cannot call an ambulance. While it is possible that
determinism robs her of the ability to call an ambulance, it might just
as easily rob her of the ability to refrain. She has no reason to favour
the presumption that her calling an ambulance is impossible over the
presumption that it is inevitable. The only way that she can find out
which of these she is determined to do is by reaching a
decision.
From an epistemic perspective, both decisions remain open. As Pereboom (2001,
147–148), Fischer (2006), and Jeppsson (2016) have
all argued, such epistemic openness is all we need in order for it to be
rational to make a value-driven choice. As Fischer puts the point, if
one were asked to choose which of two doors to walk through, and told
that behind one them is a million dollars while behind the other there
is a den of rattlesnakes, it would be ludicrous to suppose that the
truth of determinism might weaken the rational case in favour of
choosing the door with the money, or that one would be forced to just
“wait and see what happens” instead of making a value-driven choice
(2006,
329).
Moreover, suppose we grant that determinism introduces a doubt about
whether Ada can call an ambulance (we should not grant this, given the
deliberatively irrelevant nature of the “doubt”, when both options
remain epistemically open, but suppose we grant it anyway). Doubts about
whether we can do things do not usually weaken our rationale for
trying when there is something morally significant at stake.
Obviously, sometimes failure comes with other off-putting risks; you may
be reluctant to dive into the river to save the drowning child, but it
is usually the risk to your own life rather than the possibility of
failing in your attempt that causes such reluctance. There is always
some risk of failure, even with the simplest actions,
regardless of determinism. One is “always at the mercy of the world”, as
O’Shaughnessy famously notes (1973, 370). But it would be
very strange for anyone to suppose that this should stop us from even
attempting to bring about better outcomes.
Suppose that Sofia is in a hospital when the main power supply fails.
Luckily, there is a short-term emergency power supply that will keep the
electricity going for five minutes, during which time the back-up
generator can be activated, saving the lives of hundreds of patients
whose life-support machines will otherwise fail. Now suppose that Sofia
is the only person with access to the button that activates the back-up
generator. There would be something seriously wrong with Sofia if she
reasoned as follows: “I only ought to activate the back-up generator if
I can. But there is no guarantee that this button works, so I don’t know
that I can. I therefore see no reason to bother pressing it”.
Ordinarily, we do not need a guarantee that we can do something before
we attempt to do it when there are morally significant outcomes at
stake.
There seems to be no reason to suppose that UOS poses any serious
obstacle to moral deliberation. Nonetheless, something emerges from this
picture that might seem troubling. Essentially, we can escape being
duty-bound to do things simply by choosing not to do them. If Ada does
not call an ambulance, it will turn out, once her choice has been made,
that she has done nothing wrong. Her choosing not to call an ambulance
conveniently establishes that she had no moral obligation to call one.
Moral obligations become easily escapable.
On the one hand, it may be argued that there is something
conceptually amiss about the idea of a moral obligation that could
easily be escaped; we might think that inescapability is an essential
condition of moral duty. Hence we would still have a serious threat to
deontic morality if it turned out that all of our purported “duties”
were easily escapable. On the other hand, the worry may be about
motivation; perhaps it will be accepted that we could have duties that
were easily escapable, but we might wonder why anybody would comply with
them.
UOS and Moral Obligation
The problem of easy escapability arises because we seem to have some
power over whether we do certain things: even if causal determinism
entails that we are unable to do otherwise, it does not entail that our
actions are “strictly out of our control”; there is often a reliable
causal correlation between our attempts to do things and the success of
those attempts. UOS thus seems to give us a further power
that might seem unpalatable; the power to escape being duty-bound to do
something merely by choosing not to do it.
We may well be aware of the fact that in forming the intention to act
as we do, we will also be conjuring up proof that we lack any ability to
do otherwise, and will therefore be actualising a situation in which we
have no duty to do otherwise. This may appear to leave our moral duties
precariously at the mercy of our wills. I see two reasons why this
implication might look problematic; the first appeals to a Kantian
notion of obligation, and the second rests on a broader conceptual
concern about the inescapability of duty.
Firstly, philosophers influenced by Kant may suppose that moral
duties are necessarily “categorical imperatives”. Kant distinguished
hypothetical imperatives, which depend on our contingent aims and
desires, from categorical ones, which apply to us necessarily regardless
of our contingent aims and desires (1998, 25). When one is morally
obligated to do something, the obligation is inescapable in the sense
that one ought to do it (insofar as one can) regardless of whether one
wants to do it.
Kant’s claim that moral duties are categorical imperatives is
controversial. While this claim is plausibly at the core of any
objectivist analysis of meta-ethics, many philosophers favour
subjectivism. If moral duties are grounded in our subjective aims and
desires, they will not be “inescapable” in this Kantian sense. But I am inclined to side with Kant
here, so I will not pursue this line of argument. I doubt that anything
without the character of a categorical imperative could seriously count
as a “moral obligation”.
UOS
is, however, perfectly consistent with the claim that moral duties are
categorical imperatives. The DBWC notion of moral obligation certainly
does not entail that moral duties depend on an agent’s subjective aims
and desires (with the possible exception of certain duties towards
oneself, if there are any). The reason why we are morally obligated to
actualise certain possible worlds is because they are the most valuable
of the ones that we are able to actualise, according to our favoured
theory of normative ethics. And the reason why determinism, given Haji’s
argument, entails that we are never obligated to actualise alternative
worlds is not because we do not want to actualise those worlds,
but because we cannot actualise them.
Ada should call an ambulance if she can. This has nothing to do with
whether she wants to call an ambulance, and everything to do with the
fact that the world in which she calls an ambulance is more valuable
than the world in which she does not. It is not more valuable because
her own subjective aims and desires deem it to be (perhaps she prefers
the world in which she inherits a fortune and buys a Ferrari). It is
more valuable because of the comparatively high worth of her character,
her actions, and/or the likely outcome of those actions. More generally,
whatever your favoured analysis of obligation, I maintain that it is
these sorts of substantive moral considerations that ground Ada’s
duties, and these need not leave her duties precariously contingent on
her subjective aims and desires.
While it may be an essential feature of moral obligations that they
are categorical imperatives then, this is not inconsistent with UOS. There
is, however, a stronger sense in which it might be claimed that moral
duties are necessarily inescapable. We might suppose that there is
something wrong with the idea that there could be duties that are opted
into; duties that we could have escaped being subject to in the first
place. This sense does seem plausibly to be threatened by UOS, but
it’s doubtful that this really is an essential feature of duty at
all.
Promise-making is a prime example of a duty that has to be opted
into. We typically suppose that we are duty-bound to keep our promises,
even if we could have escaped taking on such a duty in the first place.
The important point is that we did not escape taking on this
duty. Consider another example: it is obligatory to feed one’s children
as opposed to letting them starve. Nonetheless, many of us are under no
such obligation, because we have chosen not to have children. While the
same means of contraception were presumably available to many of those
who chose to have children, citing this fact would hardly get them off
the hook for letting their children starve. Again, the fact that they
could, in theory, have escaped the obligation does not usually imply
that they cannot have a genuine obligation if they did not
actually escape it.
There seems to be no sense of inescapability such that it both
plausibly qualifies as an essential feature of moral obligation and is
plausibly ruled out by UOS.
UOS and Moral Motivation
Perhaps it is not moral obligation that is threatened by UOS, but
moral motivation. While we may intelligibly have duties that
are escapable in the sense specified by UOS, the worry may be
that this would threaten any basis that we might have for complying with
them.
Return to Ada: suppose we accept that her ability to easily escape
being duty-bound does not undermine her duty, so long as she doesn’t in
fact escape it. We might now worry about what sort of motivational basis
Ada could have to incur the duty: by merely not bothering to call an
ambulance, she can ensure that she had no obligation to call one in the
first place. She only has a duty insofar as she willingly opts into it.
Given that she stands to gain so much from not opting into it, we might
wonder what incentive she could have for opting in.
We have already noted that duties do not, however, provide extra
reasons for action that exert pressure on us independently of the moral
considerations that give rise to them (see 3.1). I maintain that a competent moral
agent acts out of duty not merely because it is her duty, but
because she cares about the substantive moral considerations which
underpin the duty (in terms of any DBWC analysis, these considerations
determine the relative values of the rival intention-dependent worlds
that she might choose to actualise). It is only if we accept the dubious
assumption that the desire not to contravene a duty is the sole
basis of moral motivation (and that the desire to fulfil duties is
always curiously absent) that UOS seems to seriously undermine moral
motivation.
Putting aside the possibility of determinism and UOS, let’s think about
ordinary cases that parallel the sort of escapability of duty that we
are contemplating. Suppose that Aisha believes that she ought to give
blood so long as she is eligible to. She also knows that she has a blood
donation appointment in one month’s time. Now suppose that she is
planning to go on holiday before the appointment, and she is trying to
decide where to go. She suddenly remembers that if she opts for the
destination in sub-Saharan Africa instead of the destination in Europe,
this will stop her from being eligible to give blood for at least a
year. If it stops her from being eligible to give blood, it will also
remove any moral duty that she has to give blood. Should we expect this
to motivate her to opt for sub-Saharan Africa instead of Europe? Insofar
as Aisha counts as a competent moral agent, I very much doubt that we
should expect this. She may even regard it as a reason not to
opt for the destination in sub-Saharan Africa.
Competent moral agents typically care about their duties because they
care about the moral pressures that give rise to them. The reason why
Aisha may be willing to incur the duty, even though she has been given
an easy way of escaping it is because she cares about people who need
blood transfusions. It is because of those people, after all, that she
even takes herself to have a duty to give blood if she is
eligible to; she thinks that the world in which she contributes to the
supplies of blood banks is better than the world in which she does not.
All those car crash victims and children with leukaemia are not going to
just go away because she is not personally duty-bound to help
them. If she didn’t care about these people, she might just as easily
contravene the moral duty as escape it.
This brings us to the crux of the issue: the very same
considerations that count in favour of fulfilling the duty, should you
have it, count just as strongly in favour of opting into the duty, if
you need to do so in order to fulfil it. And the very same
considerations that count in favour of opting out of the duty, if you
can, count just as strongly in favour of contravening the duty, if you
cannot. In no case then, does the fact that the duty can only be
fulfilled if opted into (i.e., UOS) change the agent’s reasons for
deciding either way. Just like Aisha, the reasons that Ada has for
fulfilling her duty to call an ambulance for her uncle (should she have
such a duty) also count in favour of incurring the duty if she needs to
incur it in order to fulfil it. And the same reasons she has to opt out
of incurring the duty would count in favour of contravening the duty if
its existence did not depend on her opting into it. In no case does it
appear rational for her to arrive at a different decision, given UOS, than
she would have arrived at without it.
It’s unclear why anyone would be keenly motivated not to contravene a
duty, while at the same time caring so little about fulfilling one. Such
a mindset seems to be directly inconsistent with the sort of sensitivity
to value that characterises competent moral deliberation. What exactly
is the imagined psychology of an agent who is highly motivated by an
aversion to contravening duties while also trying to avoid fulfilling
them? Such an agent, despite her thorough commitment to not contravening
duties, would be completely indifferent to the moral pressures that
actually give rise to duties, as well as being positively
averse to fulfilling a duty if it’s possible to escape it. Even
if it were possible for an agent to have this bizarre attitude towards
moral pressures, this certainly does not capture the way most of us
morally deliberate.
A competent moral agent typically reasons from
considerations about the respective values of the courses of action
between which she is deliberating to conclusions about what she
ought morally to do. The moral landscape for anyone who reasons in this
way seems to be largely untouched by UOS. So it does not appear to pose a
serious threat to moral motivation.
Conclusion
Haji argues, similarly to Lockie, that there could be no moral
obligations at all if determinism were true. In order to establish this
conclusion, however, we must invoke both an “ought” implies “can”
principle and an “ought” implies “able not to” principle. In section 1, I argued that without OIANT, we could
establish only the weaker conclusion that there are no
unfulfilled moral duties. In section 2, I argued that we ought to reject OIANT,
and hence that only the weaker conclusion has been plausibly
established. Finally, in section 3, I argued
that while this weaker conclusion may initially look just as damaging,
it actually has surprisingly little practical importance for morality.
While I believe (contra Haji, and in agreement with Lockie) that
determinism plausibly threatens moral responsibility, I deny that it
poses any serious independent threat to deontic morality.
I admit that aspects of this thesis seem paradoxical. It seems odd to
suppose that if determinism is true, this entails that nobody ever
violates a moral duty. The air of paradox arises, I think, from two
sources. Firstly, from the fact that we do not know in advance what we
are capable of doing, since we do not know in advance which actions are
impossible and which are inevitable. This means that acting otherwise
remains an epistemically and pragmatically live option when we
contemplate our potential moral duties in advance. Secondly, it may well
be that the sense of “can” typically used in relation to principles like
OIC is
actually distinct from the sense of “can” according to which determinism
robs us of the opportunity to do otherwise.
I have granted for the sake of argument that OIC is true and that we
can use a single sense of “can” both in formulating OIC and in defence of the
incompatibilist claim that nobody can do otherwise if determinism is
true. This has the upshot that nobody can be obligated to act otherwise
if determinism is true, and hence that there are no unfulfilled duties
in a deterministic world. If that conclusion seems too counterintuitive
to accept, then an alternative strategy would be to question whether we
should accept all of the following three theses: (1) that OIC is
true, (2) that determinism may well be true, and (3) that no one can do
otherwise if determinism is true in precisely the same senses of “can”
according to which “ought” implies “can”. My goal has been to argue that
even if we accept all three, the threat to morality might not
be as all-encompassing as it seems. Whether we should accept all three
is another question entirely.