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Nadine Elzein (elzein)

Email: nadine.elzein(at)lmh.ox.ac.uk

Auf folgenden Portalseiten erwähnt

Articles of Dialectica, Dialectica 74(1), 2020, The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective, Editorial, Consciousness, Revelation, and Confusion, In Defence of Facts: Grounding, Essential Properties and the Unity Problem, Why Strevens' Counterexample to Lewis's 'Causation as Influence' is Effective, A Note on Accuracy-Dominance Vindications of Consistency, Review of Soames (2018), Review of Oppy (2018), Review of Antonelli (2018)

Zitiert in den folgenden Artikeln

Determinism, 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Moral Obligation

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Determinism, 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Moral Obligation

Beta version. This is a page made for testing purposes. For the official version of the article, please visit to OJS webpage at https://dialectica.philosophie.ch/.
Nadine Elzein | almost 5 years

Bibliography

    Elzein, Nadine. 2010. “Conflicting Reasons and Freedom of the Will.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110(3): 399–407.
    Elzein, Nadine. 2013a. “Scepticism, Responsibility and Other Prickly Topics [on Dworkin (2011)].” Analysis 73(1): 107–118.
    Elzein, Nadine. 2013b. “Pereboom’s Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability.” Philosophical Studies 166(3): 553–573, doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0061-y.
    Elzein, Nadine. 2013c. “Basic Desert, Conceptual Revision, and Moral Justification.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 16(2): 212–225.
    Elzein, Nadine. 2017. “Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.” Acta Analytica 32(2): 169–191, doi:10.1007/s12136-016-0305-0.
    Elzein, Nadine. 2020. “Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.” Dialectica 74(1), doi:10.48106/dial.v74.i1.03.
    Elzein, Nadine and Pernu, Tuomas K. 2019. “To Be Able to, Or to Be Able Not to? That is the Question: A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15(2): 13–32, doi:10.31820/ejap.15.2.1.

Further References

    Dworkin, Ronald. 2011. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.