Nadine Elzein (elzein)
Adresse email :
nadine.elzein(at)lmh.ox.ac.uk
Mentionné.e sur les pages du portail suivantes
Articles of Dialectica, Dialectica 74(1), 2020, The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective, Editorial, Consciousness, Revelation, and Confusion, In Defence of Facts: Grounding, Essential Properties and the Unity Problem, Why Strevens' Counterexample to Lewis's 'Causation as Influence' is Effective, A Note on Accuracy-Dominance Vindications of Consistency, Review of Soames (2018), Review of Oppy (2018), Review of Antonelli (2018)Cité.e dans les articles suivants
Determinism, 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Moral ObligationContributions à Philosophie.ch
Bibliography
Elzein, Nadine. 2010. “Conflicting Reasons and Freedom of the Will.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110(3): 399–407.
Elzein, Nadine. 2013a. “Scepticism, Responsibility and Other Prickly Topics [on Dworkin (2011)].” Analysis 73(1): 107–118.
Elzein, Nadine. 2013b. “Pereboom’s Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability.” Philosophical Studies 166(3): 553–573, doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0061-y.
Elzein, Nadine. 2013c. “Basic Desert, Conceptual Revision, and Moral Justification.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 16(2): 212–225.
Elzein, Nadine. 2017. “Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.” Acta Analytica 32(2): 169–191, doi:10.1007/s12136-016-0305-0.
Elzein, Nadine. 2020. “Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.” Dialectica 74(1), doi:10.48106/dial.v74.i1.03.
Elzein, Nadine and Pernu, Tuomas K. 2019. “To Be Able to, Or to Be Able Not to? That is the Question: A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15(2): 13–32, doi:10.31820/ejap.15.2.1.
Further References
Dworkin, Ronald. 2011. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.