David Enoch (enoch)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Enoch, David. 2003. “How Noncognitivists Can Avoid Wishful Thinking.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 41(4): 527–545, doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2003.tb00965.x.
Enoch, David. 2006. “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive of Action.” The Philosophical Review 115(2): 169–198.
Enoch, David. 2007a. “An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume II, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 21–50. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Enoch, David. 2007b. “Rational Capacity as a Condition on Blame [on Smith (2004)].” Philosophical Books 48(2): 109–123.
Enoch, David. 2007c. “Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference?” Philosophical Studies 133(2): 285–311.
Enoch, David. 2009. “Can there be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism about Practical Reason?” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 12(3): 319–339.
Enoch, David. 2010a. “How Objectivity Matters.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume V, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 111–152. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Enoch, David. 2010b. “The Epistemological Challenge to Metanormative Realism: How Best to Understand It, and How to Cope with It.” Philosophical Studies 148(3): 413–438.
Enoch, David. 2010c. “Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement.” Mind 119(476): 953–997.
Enoch, David. 2010d. “Moral Luck and the Law.” Philosophy Compass 5(1): 42–54.
Enoch, David. 2011a. Taking Morality Seriously. A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.001.0001.
Enoch, David. 2011b. “Giving Practical Reasons.” Philosophers' imprint 11(4).
Enoch, David. 2011c. “On Mark Schroeder’s Hypotheticalism: A Critical Notice of Schroeder (2007).” The Philosophical Review 120(3): 423–446.
Enoch, David. 2011d. “Shmagency Revisited.” in New Waves in Metaethics, edited by Michael Sean Brady, pp. 208–233. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/9780230294899.
Enoch, David. 2011e. “Reason-Giving and the Law.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, volume I, edited by Leslie Green and Brian Leiter, pp. 1–38. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606443.001.0001.
Enoch, David. 2012. “Being Responsible, Taking Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency.” in Luck, Value, and Commitment. Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams, edited by Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang, pp. 95–132. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.001.0001.
Enoch, David. 2014a. “Précis of Enoch (2011a).” Philosophical Studies 168(3): 819–821.
Enoch, David. 2014b. “In Defence of Enoch (2011a): Reply to Manne and Sobel (2014), Lenman (2014) and Joyce (2014).” Philosophical Studies 168(3): 853–865.
Enoch, David. 2014c. “A Defense of Moral Deference.” The Journal of Philosophy 111(5): 229–258.
Enoch, David. 2015. “Against Public Reason.” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, volume I, edited by David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall, pp. 112–143. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669530.001.0001.
Enoch, David. 2016a. “Indispensability Arguments in Metaethics: Even Better than in Mathematics?” in Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability, edited by Uri D. Leibowitz and Neil Sinclair, pp. 236–254. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198778592.001.0001.
Enoch, David. 2016b. “What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116(1): 21–48.
Enoch, David. 2017. “Political Philosophy and Epistemology: The Case of Public Reason.” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, volume III, edited by David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall, pp. 132–165. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801221.001.0001.
Enoch, David. 2018a. “Non-Naturalistic Realism in Metaethics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, pp. 29–42. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315213217-2.
Enoch, David. 2018b. “Against Utopianism: Noncompliance and Multiple Agents.” Philosophers' imprint 18(16).
Enoch, David. 2019a. “How Principles Ground.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XIV, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 1–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198841449.001.0001.
Enoch, David. 2019b. “Playing the Hand You’re Dealt: How Moral Luck Is Different From Morally Significant Plain Luck (And Probably Doesn’t Exist).” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43: Moral Luck, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Andrew C. Khoury, pp. 257–270. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1111/misp.12115.
Enoch, David. 2021. “Constitutivism: On Rabbits, Hats, and Holy Grails.” in The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Chang and Kurt L. Sylvan, pp. 336–348. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Enoch, David and Fisher, Talia. 2021. “Does Legal Epistemology Rest on a Mistake? On Fetishism, Two-Tier System Design, and Conscientious Fact-Finding.” in Philosophical Issues 31: Law and Epistemology, edited by Alexander A. Guerrero, pp. 85–103. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12203.
Enoch, David and McPherson, Tristram. 2017. “What do you Mean ‘This isn’t the Question’?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47(6): 820–840.
Enoch, David and Schechter, Joshua. 2008. “How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(3): 547–579.
Enoch, David, Spectre, Levi and Fisher, Talia. 2012. “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 40(3): 197–224, doi:10.1111/papa.12000.
Schechter, Joshua and Enoch, David. 2006. “Meaning and Justification: the Case of Modus Ponens.” Noûs 40(4): 687–715.

Further References

Joyce, Richard. 2014. “Taking Moral Skepticism Seriously.” Philosophical Studies 168(3): 843–851.
Lenman, James. 2014. “Deliberation, Schmeliberation: Enoch’s Indispensability Argument.” Philosophical Studies 168(3): 835–842.
Manne, Kate and Sobel, David. 2014. “Disagreeing about How to Disagree.” Philosophical Studies 168(3): 823–834.
Schroeder, Mark. 2007. Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.001.0001.
Smith, Michael A. 2004. Ethics and the A Priori. Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511606977.