Mark Schroeder (schroeder-m)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Finlay, Stephen and Schroeder, Mark. 2008. “Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/reasons-internal-external/.
Finlay, Stephen and Schroeder, Mark. 2012. “Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/reasons-internal-external/.
Finlay, Stephen and Schroeder, Mark. 2017. “Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/reasons-internal-external/.
Liberman, Alida and Schroeder, Mark. 2016. “Commitment: Worth the Weight.” in Weighing Reasons, edited by Errol Lord and Barry Maguire, pp. 104–120. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0005.
Milona, Michael and Schroeder, Mark. 2019. “Desiring under the Proper Guise.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XIV, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 121–143. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0006.
Ross, Jacob and Schroeder, Mark. 2013. “Reversibility or Disagreement.” Mind 122(485): 43–84.
Ross, Jacob and Schroeder, Mark. 2014. “Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88(2): 259–288.
Ross, Jacob and Schroeder, Mark. 2016. “On Losing Disagreements: Spencer’s Attitudinal Relativism [on Spencer (2016)].” Mind 125(498): 541–551.
Schmitt, Johannes and Schroeder, Mark. 2011. “Supervenience Arguments under Relaxed Assumptions.” Philosophical Studies 155(1): 133–160. Reprinted in Schroeder (2014a, 96–123).
Schroeder, Mark. 2004. “The Scope of Instrumental Reason.” in Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 337–364. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Schroeder (2014a, 147–172).
Schroeder, Mark. 2005a. “Realism and Reduction: The Quest for Robustness.” Philosophers’ Imprint 5(1).
Schroeder, Mark. 2005b. “The Hypothetical Imperative?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(3): 357–372. Reprinted in Schroeder (2014a, 201–215).
Schroeder, Mark. 2005c. “Cudworth and Normative Explanations.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1(3). Reprinted in Schroeder (2014a, 19–41), https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/15.
Schroeder, Mark. 2006. “Not So Promising After All: Evaluator-Relative Teleology and Common-Sense Morality.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87(3): 348–356.
Schroeder, Mark. 2007a. Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2007b. “Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and ‘Good’ .” Ethics 117(2): 265–295.
Schroeder, Mark. 2007c. “Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons.” Noûs 41(1): 138–160.
Schroeder, Mark. 2007d. “The Humean Theory of Reasons.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume II, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 195–219. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Schroeder (2014a, 60–81).
Schroeder, Mark. 2007e. “Reasons and Agent-Neutrality.” Philosophical Studies 135(2): 279–306. Reprinted in Schroeder (2014a, 42–59).
Schroeder, Mark. 2008a. Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2008b. “What is the Frege-Geach Problem?” Philosophy Compass 3(4): 703–720.
Schroeder, Mark. 2008c. “Expression for Expressivists.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 86–116. Reprinted in Schroeder (2015a, 31–54).
Schroeder, Mark. 2008d. “How Does the Good Appear to Us?” Social Theory and Practice 34(1): 119–130.
Schroeder, Mark. 2008e. “Having Reasons.” Philosophical Studies 139(1): 57–71.
Schroeder, Mark. 2008f. “How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation.” Noûs 42(4): 573–599.
Schroeder, Mark. 2008g. “Value Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/value-theory/.
Schroeder, Mark. 2009a. “Huemer’s Clarkeanism [on Huemer (2005)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(1): 197–204.
Schroeder, Mark. 2009b. “Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons.” Philosophical Studies 143(2): 223–248. Reprinted in Schroeder (2014a, 173–199).
Schroeder, Mark. 2009c. “Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices.” Ethics 119(2): 257–309. Reprinted in Schroeder (2015a, 135–180).
Schroeder, Mark. 2009d. “Buck-Passers’ Negative Thesis.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 12(3): 341–347.
Schroeder, Mark. 2009e. “A Matter of Principle [joint critical notice of Dancy (2004) and of McKeever and Ridge (2006)].” Noûs 43(3): 568–580.
Schroeder, Mark. 2010a. Noncognitivism in Ethics. London: Routledge.
Schroeder, Mark. 2010b. “Schroeder (2008a): Summary.” Analysis 70(1): 101–104.
Schroeder, Mark. 2010c. “Getting Noncognitivism Out of the Woods [Reply to Alwood (2010) and Wedgwood (2010)].” Analysis 70(1): 129–139.
Schroeder, Mark. 2010d. “Value and the Right Kind of Reason.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume V, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 25–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schroeder, Mark. 2010e. “How to be an Expressivist about Truth.” in New Waves in Truth, edited by Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Cory D. Wright, pp. 282–298. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Reprinted in Schroeder (2015a, 97–114).
Schroeder, Mark. 2011a. “Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.” Noûs 45(2): 328–344.
Schroeder, Mark. 2011b. “Ought, Agents, and Actions.” The Philosophical Review 120(1): 1–41.
Schroeder, Mark. 2011c. “How Not to Avoid Wishful Thinking.” in New Waves in Metaethics, edited by Michael Sean Brady, pp. 126–140. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/9780230294899_7.
Schroeder, Mark. 2011d. “What does it take to ‘Have’ a Reason?” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 201–222. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schroeder, Mark. 2012a. “Précis of Schroeder (2007a).” Philosophical Studies 157(3): 431–434.
Schroeder, Mark. 2012b. “Reply to Shafer-Landau (2012), McPherson (2012) and Dancy (2012).” Philosophical Studies 157(3): 463–474.
Schroeder, Mark. 2012c. “Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 160(2): 265–285.
Schroeder, Mark. 2012d. “Skorupski on Schroeder (2008a).” Analysis 72(4): 735–739.
Schroeder, Mark. 2012e. “Value Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/value-theory/.
Schroeder, Mark. 2012f. “Philosophy of Language for Metaethics.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 705–715. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Schroeder, Mark. 2013a. “Scope for Rational Autonomy.” in Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Baron Reed, pp. 297–310. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. Reprinted in Schroeder (2014a, 227–240).
Schroeder, Mark. 2013b. “Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce?” Noûs 47(3): 409–430. Reprinted in Schroeder (2015a, 75–96).
Schroeder, Mark. 2013c. “Tempered Expressivism.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VIII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 283–314. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Schroeder (2015a, 181–207), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2014a. Explaining the Reasons We Share; Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713807.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2014b. “Introduction.” in Explaining the Reasons We Share; Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 1, pp. 1–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713807.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2014c. “What Matters about Metaethics?” in Explaining the Reasons We Share; Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 1, pp. 83–95. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713807.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2014d. “The Price of Supervenience.” in Explaining the Reasons We Share; Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 1, pp. 124–145. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713807.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2014e. “Hypothetical Imperatives, Scope, and Jurisdiction.” in Explaining the Reasons We Share; Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 1, pp. 216–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Also said to be forthcoming in Robert Johnson, Mark TImmons ed., with OUP, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713807.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2014f. “Does Expressivism have Subjectivist Consequences?” in Philosophical Perspectives 28: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 278–290. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Schroeder, Mark. 2014g. “The Truth in Hybrid Semantics.” in Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, pp. 273–294. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2015a. Expressing Our Attitudes: Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714149.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2015b. “Knowledge Is Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume V, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 226–252. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2015c. “Is Knowledge Normative?” in Philosophical Issues 25: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 379–395. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Schroeder, Mark. 2015d. “Hypothetical Imperatives: Scope and Jurisdiction.” in Reason, Value, and Respect. Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., edited by Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson, pp. 89–100. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699575.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2015e. “Higher-Order Attitudes, Frege’s Abyss, and the Truth in Propositions.” in Passions and Projections. Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, edited by Robert N. Johnson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 228–245. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Schroeder (2015a, 44–73), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198723172.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2015f. “Introduction.” in Expressing Our Attitudes: Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 2, pp. 1–29. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714149.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2015g. “Is Semantics Formal?” in Expressing Our Attitudes: Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 2, pp. 209–224. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714149.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2015h. “Attitudes and Epistemics.” in Expressing Our Attitudes: Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 2, pp. 225–256. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714149.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2015i. “Hard Cases for Combining Expressivism and Deflationist Truth: Conditionals and Epistemic Modals.” in Meaning without Representation. Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism, edited by Steven A. Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams, pp. 160–179. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Schroeder (2015a, 115–134), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722199.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2015j. “What Makes Reasons Sufficient?” American Philosophical Quarterly 52(2): 159–170.
Schroeder, Mark. 2016. “Value Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/value-theory/.
Schroeder, Mark. 2017a. “What Matters about Meta-Ethics?” in Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity, edited by Peter Singer, pp. 213–230. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2017b. “Being For.” in Ethics at 3:AM. Questions and Answers on How to Live Well, edited by Richard Marshall, pp. 80–88. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schroeder, Mark. 2018a. “The Moral Truth.” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by Michael Glanzberg, pp. 579–601. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2018b. “Normative Ethics and Metaethics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, pp. 674–686. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315213217.
Schroeder, Mark. 2018c. “Rational Stability Under Pragmatic Encroachment.” Episteme 15(3): 297–312.
Schroeder, Mark. 2018d. “Believing Well.” in Metaepistemology, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 196–212. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2018e. “The Unity of Reasons.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 46–66. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2019a. “Persons as Things.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume IX, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 95–115. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846253.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2019b. “Why You’ll Regret Not Reading This Paper.” in Passions and the Emotions, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 135–156. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 85. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schroeder, Mark. 2021a. Reasons First. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198868224.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2021b. “Value Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/value-theory/.

Further References

Alwood, Andrew. 2010. “Imperative Clauses and the Frege-Geach Problem.” Analysis 70(1): 105–117.
Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. Ethics without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199270023.001.0001.
Dancy, Jonathan. 2012. “Response to Schroeder (2012a).” Philosophical Studies 157(3): 455–462.
Huemer, Michael. 2005. Ethical Intuitionism. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1007/978-0-230-50317-5.
McKeever, Sean and Ridge, Michael. 2006. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199290652.001.0001.
McPherson, Tristram. 2012. “Mark Schroeder’s Hypotheticalism: Agent-Neutrality, Moral Epistemology, and Methodology [on Schroeder (2007a)].” Philosophical Studies 157(3): 445–453.
Shafer-Landau, Russ, ed. 2012. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. vol. VII. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.001.0001.
Spencer, Jack. 2016. “Relativity and Degrees of Relationality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92(2): 432–459, doi:10.1111/phpr.12153.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2010.“Schroeder (2008a) on Expressivism: For – or Against?” Analysis 70(1): 117–129.