Branden Fitelson (fitelson)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bradley, Darren J. and Fitelson, Branden. 2003. “Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation.” Analysis 63(1): 23–31.
Briggs, Rachael A., Cariani, Fabrizio, Easwaran, Kenny and Fitelson, Branden. 2014. “Individual Coherence and Group Coherence.” in Essays in Collective Epistemology, edited by Jennifer Lackey, pp. 215–239. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.001.0001.
Dorst, Kevin, Levinstein, Benjamin A., Salow, Bernhard, Husic, Brooke E. and Fitelson, Branden. 2021. “Deference Done Better.” in Philosophical Perspectives 35: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 99–150. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12156.
Easwaran, Kenny and Fitelson, Branden. 2012. “An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry About Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism.” Dialectica 66(3): 425–433.
Easwaran, Kenny and Fitelson, Branden. 2015. “Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume V, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 61–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0003.
Eells, Ellery and Fitelson, Branden. 2000. “Measuring Confirmation and Evidence.” The Journal of Philosophy 97(5): 663–672.
Eells, Ellery and Fitelson, Branden. 2002. “Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support.” Philosophical Studies 107(2): 129–142.
Eva, Benjamin, Shear, Ted and Fitelson, Branden. 2022. “Four Approaches to Supposition.” Ergo 8(26): 58–98, doi:10.3998/ergo.2227.
Fitelson, Branden. 2002. “Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction.” Philosophy of Science 69: 611–622.
Fitelson, Branden. 2006. “The Paradox of Confirmation.” Philosophy Compass 1(1): 95–113.
Fitelson, Branden. 2008a. “Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Paradox of Confirmation.” Philosophy Compass 3(5): 1103–1105.
Fitelson, Branden. 2008b. “Goodman’s ‘New Riddle’ .” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 37(6): 613–643.
Fitelson, Branden. 2010a. “Strengthening the Case for Knowledge from Falsehood.” Analysis 70(4): 666–669.
Fitelson, Branden. 2010b. “Pollock on Probability in Epistemology [on Pollock (2006)].” Philosophical Studies 148(3): 455–465.
Fitelson, Branden. 2012. “Evidence of Evidence is Not (Necessarily) Evidence.” Analysis 72(1): 85–88.
Fitelson, Branden. 2013. “Contrastive Bayesianism.” in Contrastivism in Philosophy, edited by Martijn Blaauw, pp. 64–87. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 39. London: Routledge.
Fitelson, Branden. 2015. “The Strongest Possible Lewisian Triviality Result.” Thought 4(2): 69–74.
Fitelson, Branden. 2016. “Coherence.” Unpublished manuscript, http://fitelson.org/coherence/coherence_duke.pdf.
Fitelson, Branden. 2017a. “Confirmation, Causation, and Simpson’s Paradox.” Episteme 14(3): 297–309.
Fitelson, Branden. 2017b. “Closure, Counter-Closure, and Inferential Knowledge.” in Explaining Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 312–324. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
Fitelson, Branden, Borges, Rodrigo Martins and Braden, Cherie, eds. 2019. Themes from Klein. Knowledge, Scepticism, and Justification. Synthese Library n. 404. Dordrecht: Springer.
Fitelson, Branden and Braden, Cherie. 2019. “Introduction.” in Themes from Klein. Knowledge, Scepticism, and Justification, edited by Branden Fitelson, Rodrigo Martins Borges, and Cherie Braden, pp. 1–13. Synthese Library n. 404. Dordrecht: Springer.
Fitelson, Branden and Hájek, Alan. 2017. “Declarations of Independence.” Synthese 194(10): 3979–3995.
Fitelson, Branden and Hawthorne, James. 2010a. “The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 207–241. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Fitelson, Branden and Hawthorne, James. 2010b. “How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens.” in The Place of Probability in Science. In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953–2006), edited by James H. Fetzer, pp. 247–276. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 284. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5.
Fitelson, Branden and Hitchcock, Christopher R. 2011. “Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength.” in Causality in the Sciences, edited by Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson, pp. 600–627. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fitelson, Branden and Zalta, Edward N. 2007. “Steps toward a Computational Metaphysics.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 36(2): 227–247.
Harris, Kenneth and Fitelson, Branden. 2001. “Comments on Some Completeness Theorems of Urquhart and Mendez & Salto.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 30(1): 51–55.
Jehle, David and Fitelson, Branden. 2009. “What is the ‘Equal Weight View’?” Episteme 6(3): 280–293.

Further References

Pollock, John L. 2006. Thinking about Acting: Logical Foundations for Rational Decision Making. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195304817.001.0001.