Kenny Easwaran (easwaran)
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Bibliography
Briggs, Rachael A., Cariani, Fabrizio, Easwaran, Kenny and Fitelson, Branden. 2014. “Individual Coherence and Group Coherence.”
in Essays in Collective
Epistemology, edited by Jennifer Lackey, pp. 215–239. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.001.0001.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2008a. “Strong and Weak Expectations.”
Mind 117(467): 633–641.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2008b. “Review of Azzouni (2006).”
The Philosophical Review 117(2): 296–299.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2009. “Probabilistic Proofs and Transferability.”
Philosophia Mathematica 17(3): 341–362.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2011a. “Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in
Favor.” Philosophy Compass 6(5): 312–320.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2011b. “Bayesianism II: Applications and
Criticisms.” Philosophy Compass 6(5): 321–332.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2011c. “The Varieties of Conditional Probability.”
in Philosophy of Statistics, edited
by Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm
R. Forster, pp. 137–115. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science n. 7.
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2013. “Why
Countable Additivity?” Thought 2(1): 53–61.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2014a. “Decision Theory without Representation
Theorems.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14(27).
Easwaran, Kenny. 2014b. “Principal Values and Weak Expectations.”
Mind 123(490): 517–531.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2014c. “Probability and Logic.” Philosophy
Compass 9(12): 876–883.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2014d. “Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.”
The Philosophical Review 123(1): 1–41.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2015a. “Rebutting and Undercutting in Mathematics.”
in Philosophical Perspectives 29: Epistemology,
edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 146–162.
Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2015b.
“Formal Epistemology.” The Journal of
Philosophical Logic 44(6): 651–662.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2016a.
“Conditional Probability.” in The Oxford Handbook of Probability and
Philosophy, edited by Alan Hájek and Christopher R. Hitchcock, pp. 167–182. Oxford
Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.001.0001.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2016b. “Review of Titelbaum (2013).”
The Philosophical Review 125(1): 143–148.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2016c. “Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
Bayesian Probabilities.” Noûs 50(4):
816–853, doi:10.1111/nous.12099.
Easwaran, Kenny. 2017. “The Tripartite Role of Belief: Evidence, Truth, and
Action.” Res Philosophica 94(2): 189–206.
Easwaran, Kenny, Fenton-Glynn, Luke, Hitchcock, Christopher R. and Velasco, Joel D. 2016. “Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement,
Agreement, and Synergy.” Philosophers’ Imprint
16(11).
Easwaran, Kenny and Fitelson, Branden. 2012. “An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry About Joyce’s
Argument for Probabilism.” Dialectica 66(3):
425–433.
Easwaran, Kenny and Fitelson, Branden. 2015. “Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence.” in
Oxford Studies in Epistemology,
volume V, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler
and John Hawthorne, pp. 61–96. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0003.
Easwaran, Kenny, Hájek, Alan, Mancosu, Paolo and Oppy, Graham. 2023.
“Infinity.” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language;
Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/infinity/.
Easwaran, Kenny and Monton, Bradley. 2012. “Mixed Strategies, Uncountable Times, and Pascal’s Wager:
A Reply to Robertson.” Analysis 72(4): 681–685.
Easwaran, Kenny and Stern, Reuben. 2018. “The Many Ways to Achieve Diachronic Unity.”
in Self-Control, Decision Theory, and
Rationality, edited by José-Luis Bermúdez, pp. 240–263. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, doi:10.1017/9781108329170.
Oppy, Graham, Hájek, Alan, Easwaran, Kenny and Mancosu, Paolo. 2021.
“Infinity.” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language;
Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/infinity/.
Further References
Azzouni, Jody. 2006. Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and
Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195187137.001.0001.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2013. Quitting Certainties. A Bayesian Framework Modeling
Degrees of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.001.0001.