Elizabeth Fricker (fricker-e)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Fricker, Elizabeth. 1982. “Semantic Structure and Speakers’ Understanding.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83: 49–66.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 1987. “The Epistemology of Testimony.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 61: 57–83.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 1991. “Analyticity, Linguistic Practice and Philosophical Method.” in Meaning Scepticism, edited by Klaus Puhl, pp. 218–250. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 1993. “Against Gullibility.” in Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti, pp. 125–162. Synthese Library n. 230. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 1995. “Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony [critical notice of Coady (1992)].” Mind 104(414): 393–411.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 1998. “Self-Knowledge: Special Access versus Artefact of Grammar – A Dichotomy Rejected.” in Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald, pp. 155–206. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241406.001.0001.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2002a. “From Concepts to Knowledge [critical notice to Peacocke (1999)].” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10(1): 75–92.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2002b. “Trusting Others in the Sciences: a priori or Empirical Warrant?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33(2): 373–383.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2003. “Understanding and Knowledge of What is Said.” in Epistemology of Language, edited by Alex Barber, pp. 325–366. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2006a. “Varieties of Anti-Reductionism about Testimony: A Reply to Goldberg and Henderson (2006).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3): 618–628.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2006b. “Second-Hand Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(3): 592–618.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2006c. “Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy.” in The Epistemology of Testimony, edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, pp. 225–251. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.001.0001.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2007. “Audi on Testimony.” in Rationality and the Good. Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi, edited by Mark Timmons, John Greco, and Alfred R. Mele, pp. 100–105. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.001.0001.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2009. “Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against.” in Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 31–59. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2012. “Stating and Insinuating.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 86: 61–94.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2014. “Epistemic Trust in Oneself and Others – An Argument from Analogy?” in Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, edited by Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor, pp. 174–203. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672158.001.0001.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2015a. “Know First, Tell Later: The Truth about Craig on Knowledge.” in Epistemic Evaluation. Purposeful Epistemology, edited by David Henderson and John Greco, pp. 46–86. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.001.0001.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2015b. “How to Make Invidious Distinctions Amongst Reliable Testifiers.” Episteme 12(2): 173–202.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2016a. “Unreliable Testimony.” in Goldman and His Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith, pp. 88–124. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2016b. “Doing (Better) What Comes Naturally: Zagzebski on Rationality and Epistemic Self-Trust.” Episteme 13(2): 151–166.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2017. “Inference to the Best Explanation and the Receipt of Testimony: Testimonial Reductionism Vindicated.” in Best Explanations. New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation, edited by Kevin McCain and Ted Poston, pp. 262–294. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746904.001.0001.
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2019. “Knowing Full Well from Testimony?” Episteme 16(4): 369–384.

Further References

Coady, C. A. J. [Tony]. 1992. Testimony. A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198235518.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. and Henderson, David. 2006. “Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3): 600–617.
Peacocke, Christopher. 1999. Being Known. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198238606.001.0001.