Mikkel Gerken (gerken)

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Brown, Jessica A. and Gerken, Mikkel, eds. 2012a. Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. and Gerken, Mikkel. 2012b. “Introduction. Knowledge Ascriptions: Their Semantics, Cognitive Bases, and Social Functions.” in Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 1–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
Gao, Jie, Gerken, Mikkel and Ryan, Stephen B. 2017. “Does Contextualism Hinge on a Methodological Dispute?” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, pp. 81–93. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2007. “A False Dilemma for Anti-Individualism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 44(4): 329–342.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2008. “Is Internalism About Knowledge Consistent with Content Externalism?” Philosophia 36(1): 87–96.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2009. “Conceptual Equivocation and Epistemic Relevance.” Dialectica 63(2): 117–132.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2011a. “Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(3): 381–400.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2011b. “Warrant and Aaction.” Synthese 178(3): 529–547.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2012a. “Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions.” Erkenntnis 76(3): 373–394.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2012b. “Discursive Justification and Skepticism.” Synthese 189(2): 373–394.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2012c. “On the Cognitive Bases of Knowledge Attributions.” in Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 140–170. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2012d. “Critical Study of Goldberg (2012).” Episteme 9(1): 81–88.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2013a. Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental. Innovations in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2013b. “Epistemic Focal Bias.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(1): 41–61.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2014a. “Same, Same but Different: The Epistemic Norms of Assertion, Action and Practical Reasoning.” Philosophical Studies 168(3): 725–744.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2014b. “Outsourced Cognition.” in Philosophical Issues 24: Extended Knowledge, edited by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 127–158. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2015a. “The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment.” European Journal of Philosophy 23(1): 141–161.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2015b. “Philosophical Insights and Modal Cognition.” in Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism. Rethinking Philosophical Method, edited by Eugen Fischer and John Collins, pp. 110–131. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315714196.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2017a. On Folk Epistemology. How We Think and Talk about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198803454.001.0001.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2017b. “Against Knowledge-First Epistemology.” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 46–71. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2018. “The New Evil Demon and the Devil in the Details.” in The Factive Turn in Epistemology, edited by Veli Mitova, pp. 102–122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316818992.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2019a. “Philosophical Insights and Modal Cognition.” in Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography. Causal and Teleological Approaches, edited by Gunnar Schumann, pp. 110–131. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780429506048.
Gerken, Mikkel. 2019b. “Pragmatic Encroachment and the Challenge from Epistemic Injustice.” Philosophers' imprint 19(15).
Gerken, Mikkel. 2022. Scientific Testimony: Its Roles in Science and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198857273.001.0001.
Gerken, Mikkel and Petersen, Esben Nedenskov. 2020. “Epistemic Norms of Assertion and Action.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 683–706. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.49.

Further References

Goldberg, Sanford C. 2012. Relying on Others. An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593248.001.0001.