Carl Ginet (ginet)
Contributions to Philosophie.ch
No contributions yet
Bibliography
Ginet, Carl. 1962. “Can the Will Be Caused?” The Philosophical Review 71: 49–92.
Ginet, Carl. 1964. “Comments on Ginet (1964).” in Knowledge and Experience: Proceedings of the 1962 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, edited by C. D. Rollins, pp. 72–76. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Ginet, Carl. 1966. “Might We Have No Choice?” in Freedom and Determinism, edited by Keith Lehrer, pp. 87–106. New York: Random House.
Ginet, Carl. 1970. “What Must Be Added to Knowing to Obtain Knowing That One Knows?” Synthese 21(2): 163–186.
Ginet, Carl. 1975. Knowledge, Perception, and Memory. Philosophical Studies Series n. 5. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Ginet, Carl. 1979. “Performativity.” Linguistics and Philosophy 3(2): 245–265.
Ginet, Carl. 1980a. “Knowing Less by Knowing More.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: Studies in Epistemology, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 151–162. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Ginet, Carl. 1980b. “The Conditional Analysis of Freedom.” in Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, edited by Peter van Inwagen, pp. 171–186. Philosophical Studies Series n. 19. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-017-3528-5_10.
Ginet, Carl. 1983a. “In Defense of Incompatibilism.” Philosophical Studies 44: 391–400.
Ginet, Carl. 1983b. “Justification of Belief: A Primer.” in Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays, edited by Carl Ginet and Sydney S. Shoemaker, pp. 26–49. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ginet, Carl. 1983c. “Castañeda on Private Language.” in Agent, Language, and The Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castañeda, with His Replies, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 271–286. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.
Ginet, Carl. 1985a. “Contra Reliabilism.” The Monist 68: 175–187.
Ginet, Carl. 1985b. “Plantinga and the Philosophy of Mind.” in Alvin Plantinga, edited by James E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen, pp. 199–223. Profiles n. 5. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-009-5223-2.
Ginet, Carl. 1986. “Voluntary Exertion of the Body: A Volitional Account.” Theory and Decision 20(3): 223–246. Reprinted, with the same page numbering, in Audi (1986).
Ginet, Carl. 1988. “The Fourth Condition.” in Philosophical Analysis: A Defense By Example, edited by David F. Austin, pp. 105–118. Philosophical Studies Series n. 39. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Ginet, Carl. 1989. “Reasons Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account.” in Philosophical Perspectives 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 17–46. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Ginet, Carl. 1990. On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ginet, Carl. 1992. “The Dispositionalist Solution to Wittgenstein’s Problem of Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke’s Objections.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17: The Wittgenstein Legacy, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 53–73. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Ginet, Carl. 1996. “In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing.” in Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 403–417. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Ginet, Carl. 1998. “Review of Kane (1996).” The Philosophical Review 107(2): 312–315.
Ginet, Carl. 1999. “Qualia and Private Language.” Philosophical Topics 26(1–2): 121–137.
Ginet, Carl. 2000. “The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility.” in Philosophical Perspectives 14: Action and Freedom, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 279–300. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Ginet, Carl. 2001a. “Norman Malcolm (1911–1990).” in A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Aloysius P. [Al] Martinich and David Sosa, pp. 231–238. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998656.
Ginet, Carl. 2001b. “Deciding to Believe.” in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, edited by Matthias Steup, pp. 63–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195128923.001.0001.
Ginet, Carl. 2002. “Reason Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, pp. 386–405. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Kane (2011), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
Ginet, Carl. 2003. “Libertarianism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, edited by Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 587–612. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199284221.001.0001.
Ginet, Carl. 2004a. “Trying to Act.” in Freedom and Determinism, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 89–102. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Ginet, Carl. 2004b. “Intentionally Doing and Intentionally Not Doing.” Philosophical Topics 32(1–2): 95–110.
Ginet, Carl. 2005a. “Infinitism is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 277–291. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 283–290).
Ginet, Carl. 2005b. “Reply to Klein (2005).” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 299–302. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 295–297).
Ginet, Carl. 2005c. “Volition.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ginet, Carl. 2005d. “Comments on Mele (2003).” Philosophical Studies 123(3): 261–272.
Ginet, Carl. 2008. “Critical Notice of Sehon (2005).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(3): 736–740.
Ginet, Carl. 2010. “Self-Evidence.” Logos & Episteme 1(2): 325–352.
Further References
Audi, Robert, ed. 1986. Action, Decision, and Intention: Studies in the Foundation of Action Theory as an Approach to Understanding Rationality and Decision. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted from Theory and Decision, 20(3), 1986.
Kane, Robert H. 1996. The Significance of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001.
Klein, Peter D. 2005. “Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 257–276. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 274–282).
Mele, Alfred R. 2003. Motivation and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019515617X.001.0001.
Sosa, Ernest and Steup, Matthias, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 1st ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014).
Steup, Matthias, Turri, John and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2014. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.