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Robert H. Kane (kane-r)

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Bibliography

    Kane, Robert H. 1978. Divine Foreknowledge and Causal Determinism.” The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9(1): 69–76.
    Kane, Robert H. 1984. The Modal Ontological Argument.” Mind 93(371): 336–350.
    Kane, Robert H. 1985. Free Will and Values. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
    Kane, Robert H. 1989. Two Kinds of Incompatibilism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49: 219–254.
    Kane, Robert H. 1994. Free Will: The Illusive Ideal.” Philosophical Studies 75: 25–60.
    Kane, Robert H. 1996a. The Significance of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001.
    Kane, Robert H. 1996b. Freedom, Responsibility, and Will-Setting.” Philosophical Topics 24(2): 67–90.
    Kane, Robert H. 1999a. Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism.” The Journal of Philosophy 96(5): 217–240, doi:10.2307/2564666.
    Kane, Robert H. 1999b. On Free Will, Responsibility and Indeterminism: Responses to Clarke (1999), Haji (1999) and Mele (1999).” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 2(2): 105–121.
    Kane, Robert H. 2000a. Précis of Kane (1996a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 129–134.
    Kane, Robert H. 2000b. Responses to Berofsky (2000), Fischer (2000) and Strawson (2000).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 157–167.
    Kane, Robert H. 2000c. The Dual Regress of Free Will and the Role of Alternative Possibilities.” in Philosophical Perspectives 14: Action and Freedom, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 57–79. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Kane, Robert H., ed. 2002a. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Kane (2011a), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
    Kane, Robert H. 2002b. Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, pp. 3–43. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Kane (2011a), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
    Kane, Robert H. 2002c. Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will: Reflections on Wallace’s Theory [on Wallace (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(3): 693–698.
    Kane, Robert H. 2002d. Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, pp. 406–439. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Kane (2011a), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
    Kane, Robert H. 2004. Agency, Responsibility, and Indeterminism: Reflections on Libertarian Theories of Free Will.” in Freedom and Determinism, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 70–88. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    Kane, Robert H. 2005. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Kane, Robert H. 2007. Incompatibilism.” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 285–302. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 10. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Kane, Robert H. 2009. Libertarianism.” Philosophical Studies 144(1): 35–44.
    Kane, Robert H. 2010. Ethics and the Quest for Wisdom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Kane, Robert H., ed. 2011a. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. 2nd ed. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Kane (2002a), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
    Kane, Robert H. 2011b. Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates (Part 2).” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, 2nd ed., pp. 3–37. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Kane (2002a), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
    Kane, Robert H. 2011c. Rethinking Free Will: New Perspectives on an Ancient Problem.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, 2nd ed., pp. 381–405. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Kane (2002a), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0019.
    Kane, Robert H. 2014a. Torn Decisions, Luck, and Libertarian Free Will: Comments on Balaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.” Philosophical Studies 169(1): 51–58.
    Kane, Robert H. 2014b. Acting ‘Of One’s Own Free Will’: Modern Reflections on an Ancient Philosophical Problem.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114(1): 35–55.
    Kane, Robert H. 2014c. Quantum Physics, Action and Free Will: How Might Free Will be Possible in a Quantum Universe? in Quantum Physics Meets the Philosophy of Mind. New Essays on the Mind-Body Relation in Quantum-Theoretical Perspective, edited by Antonella Corradini and Uwe Meixner, pp. 163–182. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 56. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Further References

    Berofsky, Bernard. 2000. Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic World [on Kane (1996a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 135–140.
    Clarke, Randolph. 1999. Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 2(1): 20–41.
    Fischer, John Martin. 2000. Review of Kane (1996a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 141–148.
    Haji, Isthiyaque. 1999. Moral Anchors and Control.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29(2): 175–203, doi:10.1080/00455091.1999.10717510.
    Mele, Alfred R. 1999. Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 2(2): 96–104.
    Strawson, Galen. 2000. The Unhelpfulness of Indeterminism [Review of Kane (1996a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 149–156.
    Wallace, Richard Jay. 1998. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.