Matjaž Potrč (potrc)
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Henderson, David, Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2007. “Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism.” Acta Analytica 22(4): 281–300.
Henderson, David, Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2017. “Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 94(1–2): 194–225.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2000. “Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence.” Facta Philosophica 2: 249–270.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2006a. “Particularist Semantic Normativity.” Acta Analytica 21(1): 45–61.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2006b. “Abundant Truth in an Austere World.” in Truth and Realism, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 137–161. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Proceedings of the 2004 St.Andrews Conference on Realism and Truth, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2008. Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262083768.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2010. “The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content.” Acta Analytica 25(2): 155–173.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2011. “Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism.” in Spinoza on Monism, edited by Philip Goff, pp. –76. Philosophers in Depth. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2013. “Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance Errors.” Acta Analytica 28(2): 161–177.
Horgan, Terence E., Potrč, Matjaž and Strahovnik, Vojko. 2018. “Core and Ancillary Epistemic Virtues.” Acta Analytica 33(3): 295–309.
Lance, Mark Norris, Potrč, Matjaž and Strahovnik, Vojko, eds. 2008. Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory n. 11. London: Routledge.
Potrč, Matjaž. 1988. “Why Won’t Syntactic Naturalization of Belief Do?” in Contemporary Yugoslav Philosophy: The Analytic Approach, edited by Aleksandar Pavković, pp. 241–250. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series n. 36. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Potrč, Matjaž. 1989. “Externalizing Content.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 36: 179–192. “The Mind of Donald Davidson,” ed. by Johannes Brandl and Wolfgang L. Gombocz.
Potrč, Matjaž. 1991. “A Naturalistic and Evolutionary Account of Content.” in The Turning Points of the New Phenomenological Era: Husserl Research Drawing Upon the Full Extent of his Development, edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, pp. 357–366. Analecta Husserliana n. 34. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Potrč, Matjaž. 1995. “Sensation according to Meinong and Veber.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 573–590. “Meinong und die Gegenstandstheorie – Meinong and the Theory of Objects,” ed. by Rudolf Haller.
Potrč, Matjaž. 1996. “Meinong on Psychophysical Measurement.” Axiomathes 7(1–2): 187–202. Special issue on “The Philosophy of Alexius Meinong” .
Potrč, Matjaž. 1997. “Haller and Brentano’s Empiricism.” in Austrian Philosophy, Past and Present. Essays in Honor of Rudolf Haller, edited by Keith Lehrer and Johann Christian Marek, pp. 55–70. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 190. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Potrč, Matjaž. 1999. “Morphological Content [on Horgan and Tienson (1996)].” Acta Analytica 13(22).
Potrč, Matjaž. 2000. “Justification Having and Morphological Content.” Acta Analytica 15(24): 151–174.
Potrč, Matjaž. 2001a. “Nonreductive Realism and Preservative Irrealism [on Jacob (1997)].” Acta Analytica 16(26): 61–74.
Potrč, Matjaž. 2001b. “France Veber (1890-1975).” in The School of Alexius Meinong, edited by Liliana Albertazzi, Dale Jacquette, and Roberto Poli, pp. 209–224. Western philosophy series n. 57. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
Potrč, Matjaž. 2002a. “Non-Arbitrariness of Composition and Particularism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 63: 197–216. “Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan,” ed. by Johannes L. Brandl and Olga Markic.
Potrč, Matjaž. 2002b. “Transvaluationism, Common Sense and Indirect Correspondence.” Acta Analytica 17(29): 101–119.
Potrč, Matjaž. 2003. “Blobjectivist Monism. Repulsive Monism: One dynamic BLOB and no principles.” in Monism, edited by Andreas Bächli and Klaus Petrus, pp. 125–156. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 9. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Potrč, Matjaž. 2004. “Particularism and Resultance.” Acta Analytica 19(33): 163–187.
Potrč, Matjaž. 2008. “The World of Qualia.” in The Case for Qualia, edited by Edmond Leo Wright, pp. 109–124. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001.
Potrč, Matjaž. 2013. “Phenomenology of Intentionality.” in Themes from Brentano, edited by Denis Fisette and Guillaume Fréchette, pp. 165–187. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Potrč, Matjaž and Strahovnik, Vojko. 2005a. “Justification in Context.” Acta Analytica 20(2): 91–104.
Potrč, Matjaž and Strahovnik, Vojko. 2005b. “Meinongian Scorekeeping.” in Meinongian Issues in Contemporary Italian Philosophy, edited by Alfred Schramm, pp. 309–330. Meinong Studien n. 1. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Potrč, Matjaž and Strahovnik, Vojko. 2013. “Moral Dilemmas and Vagueness.” Acta Analytica 28(2): 207–222.